THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Vol. VIII, No. 1 Fall 1997

INSIDE

Feature Essay: Ethics, Migration and Global Stewardship 5

An Interview with Garrett Hardin 25

Review of Hardin's *Stalking the Wild Taboo* 37

Faulty Education Statistics — Again ...47

Tunnel Vision Dooms America's Future ...50

Bicentennial Soon for Malthus Essay 51

Richard Lamm on Population Growth and Public Policy 53

Another Case Study of Immigration Fraud ..56

Myths of Family Reunification 57

Popular Fiction and the Immigrant Wave 70

Book Reviews 64

Carrying Capacity & Caring Capacity: Are They At Odds?

Featuring an interview with celebrated biologist Garrett Hardin



A do-it-yourself program to sort out the clashes of humanitarian goals. See p. 12.

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About The Social Contract

The English philosopher John Locke, whose thinking helped inspire the American revolution, said that society should be governed by an understood set of values he termed "the social contract." Under the social contract, governments have obligations to their citizens, and citizens have responsibilities to society.

Most great public issues are basically moral and ethical ones. What is the right thing to do? How do we decide what we think is right? When "rights" collide, which ones take precedence? The concept of the social contract helps us sort out the difficult issues confronting American society today and helps us find balance.

Each quarter, **The Social Contract** journal examines trends, events and ideas that could unravel America's delicate social fabric. Key topics addressed by this journal:

- *Human population issues, including absolute size, rate of growth and distribution.* Do cherished American ideals prosper or suffer through further population growth?
- *Immigration issues.* In order to best facilitate meeting the highest goals of the American people, (1) how many immigrants should we admit? (2) who should be admitted, and (3) how can we humanely enforce the rules?
- *Language, assimilation, culture and national unity considerations.* What are the shared values necessary to the maintenance of our social contract?
- *The balance of individual rights and civic responsibilities.* Since the previous issues are so often framed in terms of rights, what are the balancing obligations?
- *Other nations' efforts at guarding or creating their own social contracts.* What practical insight can be gained from observing the failures and successes in nation-building by other societies?

The Social Contract explores these complex and interrelated issues with articles varying greatly in outlook and philosophy in the attempt to further vigorous public debate.

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Contents

Spotlighting

Guest Editorial: When Ethical Considerations Are Murky, Let Democracy Work 3

Population, Immigration and Ethics

Ethics, Migration and Global Stewardship 5
Lawrence Harrison

Sorting Through Humanitarian Clashes In Immigration Policy 12
Roy Beck

The Moral High Ground 20
David G. Payne

Weasel Word on Immigration 23
Thomas Sowell

'Living in a World of Limits' An Interview With Noted Biologist Garrett Hardin 25
Craig Straub

***Not On My Lifeboat: A Review of Garrett Hardin's Recently Reprinted book,* Stalking the Wild Taboo** 37
Michael W. Masters

The Anguish and The Angst: Immigration and the Western World 43
Derek Turner

Population Growth

The Baby Boom Echo? The Education Department Has It Wrong Again 47
Linda Thom

Immigrants Account for 60 Percent of U.S. Population Growth 49
Virginia Abernethy

Tunnel Vision Dooms America's Future 50
B. Meredith Burke

The Malthus Bicentennial 51
John F. Rohe

A New Question for Makers of Public Policy 53
Richard D. Lamm

Other News and Viewpoints

Those 'Marrying Sams' — A Case Study of Immigration Fraud 56
James Walsh

Myths of Family Reunification 57
William Buchanan

The Irish: Great Emigrants, But Not So Keen on Receiving Outsiders 62
Kevin Rafter

About Books and Reports

***Jean-Claude Barreau's* Will France Disappear?**
Reviewed by Gerda Bikales 64

Endangered Mexico: An Environment on the Edge *by Joel Simon*
Reviewed by Wade Graham 68

Flood Tide *by Clive Cussler and* The Next War *by Casper Weinberger and Peter Schweitzer*
Reviewed by Wayne Lutton 70

***Lawrence Auster's* Huddled Clichés: Exposing the Fraudulent Arguments That Have Opened America's Borders to the World**
Reviewed by Samuel Francis 71

Letters to the Editor 4

Bulletin Board 55

Index to Volume VII .....*Center Pullout*

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

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Letter from the guest editor

When Ethical Considerations Are Murky, Let Democracy Work

The accompanying review of a special issue of the *International Migration Review* that addresses ethics, migration, and global stewardship should make one point crystal clear: when we try to apply ethical considerations to migration and immigration issues, the result is murky in the extreme. Ethical currents collide with one another. Those whose first allegiance is to humankind everywhere are likely to advocate less restrictive immigration policies. Those whose first allegiance is to human beings in their own society are likely to advocate a more restrictive approach, because open policies inevitably lead to costs for the receiving society, and, in the case of the United States at least, costs that are often paid by the less affluent.

Which position is more ethical? I can't answer that question to my own satisfaction. I clearly fall into the latter group. I might consider myself more practical, more pragmatic, than those whose primary concerns are more universal than my own. But my ethical system is different from their ethical system, and my priorities are different from their priorities. Does that make me right and more moral? Is their position more moral than mine? My answer to both questions is, "I can't be sure." There is moral validity, sanctified by the scriptures and by revered philosophers, to both positions.

In addition to my concerns about the problems of poor citizens, most of whom are Hispanic and black, I also have concerns about divisions in our society along racial and ethnic fault lines — concerns that are intensified by recent immigration volume and social and geographic patterns. And I have a further concern born of my many years of aid work in Latin America: I believe that most of Latin America's problems are the consequence of traditional cultural values and attitudes that are obstacles to progress. The possible perpetuation of those values and attitudes by what will soon become our largest minority is a source of real concern to me.

Other Americans may consider my concerns either unfounded, or wrong, or racist and xenophobic. We have a profound disagreement. Can we find our way out of the disagreement by a debate of moral considerations? As the special issue of the *International Migration Review* makes clear, we probably can't. Nor can we leave the solution to those — mostly clergy and scholars — who may claim higher ethical sensibilities than the rest of us. They, too, are often in disagreement on these same issues.

When people in a democracy are unable to develop a satisfactory consensus in the face of controversy, they resort to the instruments available to citizens in such societies: they associate with those who are like-minded; they disseminate their views through the media; they debate with those who see things differently; they communicate with their elected representatives; and they vote. I know of no other way for a society to deal with issues that defy moral consensus.

Let the people decide on the levels and composition of immigration. Let democracy work.

LAWRENCE HARRISON
Guest Editor

[***Lawrence Harrison*** *is the author of* Pan-American Dream *(1997),* Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success *(1992), and* Underdevelopment Is A State of Mind *(1985), all of which were written while he was a visiting scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He directed five missions in Latin America for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1965 and 1981. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Central American Business Administration Institute which is headquartered in Costa Rica. Mr. Harrison's books are all available from The Social Contract Press by calling toll free, 1-800-352-4843.*]

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Immigrants and Social Security

Editor:

In the June 22nd issue of the *New York Times Magazine,* pro-natalist and immigration enthusiast Ben Wattenberg declared that immigrants will "save" Social Security. Since Mr. Wattenberg is a fellow at the Heritage Foundation, he should have consulted with experts on the subject in his own institution.

Bruce D. Schobel, a former actuary of the Social Security Reform Commission wrote in the fall 1992 issue of the Heritage Foundation publication, *Policy Review,* that there will be no money to draw down from this fund in the future, *not because there isn't enough money coming in,* but because the government "spent it on other programs."

As recently as 1990, The Heritage Foundation endorsed a *cut* in the Social Security tax, as proposed in a bill sponsored by Senators Moynihan and Kasten. That cut would have exposed the problem that Mr. Wattenberg wants to hide by importing more impoverished Third World immigrants. The Moynihan-Kasten bill failed because the big spenders in Congress needed all of the yearly $50 billion in Social Security taxes as a vehicle to mask multi-billions of accumulated debt and money squandered by Washington to pay for current expenses and new programs.

Without immigration, the lower birth rate of U.S.-born women, which Mr. Wattenberg incorrectly claims is the problem, could lead to a "real" Social Security Trust Fund arrangement. That would expose what Social Security taxes have actually been used for and force both Democrats and Republicans to take action on overdue spending reforms. *It is a balanced budget we need, not a U.S. population of 400 million people.*

Under the present arrangement, in exchange for the short-term "cheap labor fix" for their business constituents, pro-immigration Republicans help Democrats hide irresponsible spending. Although most immigrants pay their social security taxes, only 15 percent of them are sufficiently skilled to earn more than subsistence level incomes.

A large group with low income and high fertility encourages a variety of government subsidies and politically unstoppable entitlement programs that increase the engorgement and power of the federal bureaucracies. Is that what Republicans want? And when they welcome high levels of poor, uneducated newcomers, they are also delivering millions of future voters to the Democrats, making immigration promotion an odd agenda for the Heritage Foundation, if not for Mr. Wattenberg.

DIANA HULL, PH.D.
Santa Barbara, California

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Ethics, Migration and Global Stewardship

Comments on a special issue of the journal, International Migration Review

by Lawrence Harrison

The Spring 1996 issue of *International Migration Review* bears the title, "Ethics, Migration, and Global Stewardship." It contains 13 articles by different writers (and 7 accompanying commentaries) that are grouped under five headings: Religious Traditions and Migration; Ethics, Environment, and Migration; Migration, Politics, and Ethics; Rights of Migrants, and Rights of Political Communities; and Ethical Dilemmas of Refugee Policy.

The immigration ethics debate is both highly complex and very much a reflection of personal judgment and ideology.

This review contains both a summary of each of the articles and some thoughts that occurred to me on reading them. My strongest overall reaction is that the immigration ethics debate is both highly complex and very much a reflection of personal judgment and ideology. There are few if any solid foundations on which people can take a moral stand. In the last analysis, universal humanist theory clashes with the reality of national interests. The tension between the two moralities becomes exquisite when, for example, the well-being of poor immigrants is pitted against the well-being of poor citizens.

I. Religious Traditions and Migration

(A.) Drew Christiansen, S.J., is the author of "Movement, Asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives." He traces the Old and New Testament roots of "God's identification with the outcast and the exile," which lies "behind the Christian option for the poor and the church's defense in the public square of human dignity of migrants and refugees..." He cites the Good Samaritan's succoring of an itinerant Jew who has been set upon by thieves as a particularly relevant example. He also stresses the universal vision of the Catholic Church, one that transcends national boundaries. He speaks of "the universal common good, that is, the well-being of the whole human family and the planet...we share."

Christiansen recognizes the current in Catholicism, flowing from St. Augustine, that "endorse[s] a priority for more immediate special relations of family kin and native place," although in the tension between national interest and universal humanity, he tilts toward the latter. He believes that a new international authority is necessary: "From the point of view of Catholic social teaching, the paramount ethical problem in the movement of peoples today is precisely the lack of a global authority with the competence and capacity to address the needs of victimized populations in timely fashion." He considers the work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees as "heroic and vast," but insufficiently funded and without the necessary power.

The Catholic position inclines toward open borders, and Catholic doctrine sees little distinction between those fleeing persecution and violence and those fleeing "severe poverty and deprivation." But the Church also recognizes the political realities and the needs of nations. Christiansen concludes, "To the degree that newcomers put stress on the national system, it is responsible to control their entrance into a country. Insofar as political authorities and the nations they represent

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Lawrence Harrison is our guest editor for this feature section of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

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contribute to the maintenance of effective alternatives to asylum, to that degree some restraint on refugee admissions may be justified. But, from a moral point of view, particular cases may still trump such limits unless and until such alternatives are made available to them as well."

Comment: *Christiansen's statement and, particularly, its emphasis on universalism and human rights makes the Catholic Church's identification with open borders and the sanctuary movement easier to understand. But the Church has a credibility problem, in my view. At least in this hemisphere, the vast majority of migrants are leaving highly inequitable and traditionally authoritarian societies in which the Church has played an influential role for five centuries. In Latin America, the Church's "option for the poor" appears to have been more rhetorical than real.*

(B.) W. Gunther Plaut of Toronto's York University is the author of "Jewish Ethics and International Migration." His view of migration is profoundly — and understandably — shaped by the Holocaust and the refusal of many countries, the United States included, to accept Jewish refugees. Plaut also cites biblical passages to stress Judaism's tradition of hospitality to strangers, including acts of kindness by Abraham and the lessons of Jewish servitude in Egypt. And what is the Diaspora if not the search for hospitality and refuge by a persecuted people?

Their very different history notwithstanding, Jews (in Plaut's view) substantially share the universalist, anti-xenophobic, anti-nationalist view of Catholic doctrine:

> *Where then are we with regard to moral and ethical considerations of migratory movements? Nations have rights and so have individuals in search of a livable habitat... But from the point of view of Jewish tradition, the ultimate imperative lies with the injunction to treat strangers like the home-born and to open not only our hearts but our borders to them so that they can find a new and sustainable existence. It is this kind of sentiment that underlay the Sanctuary Movement in the United States, and which underlies the current Sanctuary Movement in Canada.*

Comment: *For the same reasons Plaut cites, I believe that most American Jews are favorably disposed to high levels of immigration. Emma Lazarus was Jewish. Yet it is also true that many members of the advisory board of FAIR (the Federation for American Immigration Reform), including this writer, are Jewish. I believe that the problems of Third World countries are chiefly the consequence of traditional cultural values that impede progress; that heavy immigration, particularly from Latin America, tends to perpetuate these progress-resistent values in the United States and contributes to the growing divisiveness in our society; and that high levels of immigration, again particularly from Latin America, make it more difficult for poor citizens, most of whom are black and Hispanic, to get ahead. The latter concern is underscored by the recent displacement of blacks by Hispanics as the poorest large minority in the United States.*

(C.) In "The Islamic Conception of Migration," Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law describes a world divided in two: "'*Dar al-islam*' (the land of Islam) and '*Dar al-harb*' (the land of war) or '*Dar al-kufr*' (the land of infidelity). *Dar al-islam* includes all the territory under Muslim control, whether or not the inhabitants are Muslims. On the other side of the frontier is *Dar al-harb* which will sooner or later pass under the the authority of Islam." The Islamic view of migration is dominated by this ominous division, also by the view that "to convert others to Islam remains a permanent goal for Muslims." Even within *Dar al-islam*, there is debate about the roles of nationalism (the author cites the idea of "Egyptian-ness"), pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism.

Comment: *The Islamic conception of migration is clearly more rigid, narrow, and proselytizing than the Catholic or Jewish conceptions.*

(D.) In his article, "Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality: A Confucian Perspective on Ethics, Migration, and Global stewardship," Harvard's Weiming Tu focuses on the cultural conflict between the Confucianism of the Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans and the modern value system of the West, so powerfully influenced by the Enlightenment. As an example:

> *Industrial East Asia, under the influence of Confucian culture, has already developed a less adversarial, less individualistic, and less self-interested modern civilization. It is now widely acknowledged that the coexistence of market economy with government leadership provides an important*

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impetus for rapid economic development in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and, more recently, the People's Republic of China. Scholars in comparative politics have also noticed that the development of democratic polity in East Asia is not at all incompatible with meritocracy.... In short, the synergy engendered by individual initiatives with group orientation has made this region economically and politically the most dynamic area of the world since World War II.

Comment: *For those of us interested in the relationship between culture and human progress, this article makes interesting reading. But it scarcely touches on the question of immigration ethics.*

II. Ethics, Environment, and Immigration

(A.) "Ethics is about choices, specifically choosing the good or the morally correct course of action. An old canard about disciplinary differences identifies choice as also being the distinguishing characteristic among the social science disciplines: economics is about what choices people make, political science is about who makes those choices, and sociology is about how there are no choices to make. An ethics of immigration should examine choice as it confronts each of these disciplines: whether there are any choices to make, who makes the choices, and then how the choices can be evaluated in terms of moral goodness."

These are the first words of Teresa A. Sullivan's article, "Immigration and the Ethics of Choice." Sullivan, a demographer at the University of Texas, starts her analysis of choice by exploring the idea of cultural distance and its link to xenophobia, the fear and hatred of strangers. She argues that we are likely to feel more comfortable with people we know than with strangers, and we are likely to feel more comfortable with strangers with whom we share some bond of language and culture than with those with whom we don't. "Fearing those we do not know may be hard-wired into the human brain, because a developmental milestone during the first year of human life is acquiring the fear of strangers." From this perspective, the process of assimilation of immigrants is a process that reduces cultural distance and promotes trust.

One of the bonds of community is the idea of reciprocity — the expectation that others will reciprocate responsible, ethical treatment. But cultural distance dilutes this expectation, and Sullivan poses some questions that challenge the undiscriminating open borders ethics implied by the Old and New Testaments:

> *How does a community enjoin a symmetric ethic on strangers? Suppose large numbers of Samaritans and Gomorrans want to move into a neighborhood as permanent immigrants? Suppose that there is a modern state with all the apparatus for identifying its citizens, staffing border outposts, issuing visas, and controlling access to jobs. Suppose, in fact, that the modern international situation exists, with large numbers of actual and potential immigrants ready to cross borders? Do the standards of ethics change under those circumstances?*

Some migrants have no choice — they have been expelled by their societies. Others believe they have no choice because they are denied opportunity and freedom by their societies and believe themselves immutably destined to poverty and abuse. Other migrants have choice, and their ethical framework places more emphasis on the opportunity presented to them and their families by moving to more progressive societies than on their obligations to their own society.

"An ethics of immigration should examine choice — whether there are any choices to make, who makes the choices, and then how the choices can be evaluated in terms of moral goodness."
— Teresa A. Sullivan

But the Bible's injunctions notwithstanding, all nations do have choice and exercise it. And that choice is expressed in rationing devices that include ceilings on numbers, family preferences, and skill/education preferences. One possible outcome is "to take as immigrants those who find themselves at the greatest extremes of the continuum [of

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choice]: the most desperate among the refugees but also the most desirable of the economic immigrants — the former because of humanitarian concerns, the latter because of enlightened self-interest."

Comment: *Sullivan's emphasis on cultural distance humanizes the "evil" of xenophobia and further complicates the ethical labyrinth that surrounds immigration.*

(B.) Graeme Hugo of the University of Adelaide in Australia examines the environmental factors that provoke immigration and the impact of immigration on the environment. His catalogue of environment-induced migration includes natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes); technological disasters (e.g. Bhopal, Chernobyl); economic disasters (in addition to deforestation and crop failure, Hugo includes "structural adjustment" — the economic policies promoted by the World Bank); political disasters (e.g., ethnic cleansing, terrorism); and social disasters (e.g. class war, animal rights activism [!]). He stresses that immigration is not the only cause of environmental degradation: per capita consumption and environment use also impinge.

Comment: *Hugo stretches — and dilutes — the word "environment" to embrace all causes of migration, and his article loses credibility and utility in the process. It adds little to the ethics debate when the author concludes:*

> *It is the contention here that the world is facing [uncertainty, change, and opportunity] with respect to forced migration due to environmental disruption and there is a need for international involvement. This should be both in the short term in dealing with environmental migrants displaced by the sudden onset of disasters, but more importantly in the longer term in working to eradicate poverty, reduce population growth and encourage the adoption of sustainable ways of using the environment which, if successful, will obviate the need for such migration.*

(C.) Virginia Abernethy of Vanderbilt University's School of Medicine sees ethical arguments against migration both in the native and host countries. Her fundamental concern is rapid population growth, and she cites data that suggest that migration from a country tends to encourage those who stay to have larger families and that when migration possibilities are reduced, population growth declines, thereby enhancing the prospects for improved well-being. "Advocates for beneficence as a guide to foreign policy should be concerned that inappropriate international aid and generous immigration policies both signal that some regions have wealth which they are willing to share. Such misinformation fosters the belief that it is unnecessary for recipients to adjust to the limited resources of their own environment, and thus it undercuts incentives to restrict family size."

Abernethy sees comparably negative effects in the United States: "Immigration also harms Americans...first and worst America's own poor and unskilled workers. Working Americans and established immigrants compete with new waves of immigrants for jobs, education, housing and other essentials." In connection with the condition of established Hispanics, Abernethy cites the words of syndicated columnist Richard Estrada:

> *...the evidence shows that Hispanic Americans have emerged as the greatest victims of U.S. immigration policy since 1965, instead of its greatest beneficiaries. The notion that Hispanics in this country favor more immigration, while the rest of America favors less, is a false one that has poisoned the debate for too long.*

In Abernethy's ethical framework, immigration is bad because it hurts both the native and host countries. She concludes forthrightly: "...permitting immigration from countries which have higher than replacement level fertility imposes on the self-restraint of American citizens who limit reproduction and is, therefore, unfair. And it should stop."

Comment: *While I sympathize with many of Abernethy's points, particularly her concern about the impact of immigration on poor citizens, I think her focus on population stability as a solution to the problems of poor countries may oversimplify. I also think that there may be at least a partial coincidence in the decline of population growth and the decline in opportunities for emigration (e.g. in the English-speaking Caribbean). Increased education and income may also have contributed.*

Abernethy's comments on the adverse impact of emigration on native countries reminds us of another cost when the emigrants are educated, skilled, and possibly affluent: the native country loses precious human and financial capital.

I suspect that there are some who would label Abernethy's position "xenophobic." That smacks of McCarthyism. In the debate on the ethics of immigration, where there are no reliable moral signposts because the

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ethical currents so often clash, Abernethy's views are wholly legitimate and worthy of consideration.

III. Migration, Politics, and Ethics

(A.) In his article, "Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration," Joseph H. Carens of the University of Toronto succinctly describes two philosophies of immigration:

> *There are two approaches to morality. The realistic approach wants to avoid too large a gap between the ought and the is and focuses on what is possible given existing realities. This approach, however, inhibits us from challenging fundamentally unjust institutions and policies. The idealistic approach, in contrast, requires us to assess current reality in light of our highest ideals. Its weakness is that it may not help us answer the question of how to act in this non-ideal world. Discussion about the ethics of migration requires a full range of perspectives using both approaches.*

"There is a limit to the extent to which most people can be expected to act against their interest.... A morality that requires people to sacrifice what they regard as their basic interests is bound to fail as a guide to action."
— Jospeh H. Carens

Carens echoes the arguments of Teresa Sullivan in examining the realistic approach. He notes a structure of concentric circles of identification, starting with the family, and extending outward with decreasing intensity, the extent of the decrease being an important cultural phenomenon. [I would contrast Latin America, where the decline beyond the family circle is abrupt, with Canada and the United States, where identification extends more powerfully to strangers within the society and even beyond. Interestingly, Carens applauds the immigration policies of both North American countries.]

He also stresses the foundation of reciprocity that so importantly informs morality: "There is a limit to the extent to which most people can be expected to act against their interest. No morality should expect most people to be saints or heroes. A morality that requires people to sacrifice what they regard as their basic interests (at least under normal circumstances) is bound to fail as a guide to action."

In discussing the virtues of the idealistic approach, Carens points to what would have been the consequence of a wholly realistic approach to slavery. It might still be with us today, albeit in a more humane form. This leads him to the $64 question: "In a just world, what rights would political communities have to limit migration and what rights would individuals have to travel freely across state borders and settle wherever they choose?" But, as he notes, we do not live in a just world, and the idealistic approach "may be irrelevant to the moral issues we face. Idealistic inquiries may be academic in the pejorative sense...privileged speculations that do little to help us reflect on the moral choices we must make or to guide us to act responsibly in the world."

Carens concludes with a call to blend the realistic and idealistic approaches. His last sentence: "There is no uniquely satisfying perspective on the ethics of immigration."

Comment: *This is a very useful article that confronts the dilemmas of moral definition in the immigration debate. And what if the idealistic approach focuses, as Abernethy does, on the problems of needy citizens (consistent with the concentric circles of identification) and concludes that immigration makes it more difficult to solve those problems?*

(B.) M.I.T.'s Myron Weiner views the immigration ethics debate as reflecting "the fundamental moral contradiction between the notion that emigration is widely regarded as a matter of human rights while immigration is regarded as a matter of national sovereignty."

Weiner traces some possible outcomes of a completely open border:

> *A safe and prosperous country that declares its borders open risks being overwhelmed by a massive influx of immigrants from poor and/or violent countries...its social services and welfare services may be stretched to the limit. The country's own poor may find themselves pushed aside by migrants prepared to work at lower wages...the local population may find*

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itself outnumbered by people who speak another language, belong to another culture, and perhaps seek to change the political system...the local population may become xenophobic...

Weiner looks at the view that "liberal democratic countries ought to admit all individuals whose human rights are violated by their government" and finds it wanting, since "a broader definition of refugee would, in effect, offer refugee status to entire populations in civil conflicts, authoritarian regimes, or weak governments that fail to protect human rights."

But Weiner fears that xenophobia may impel unprincipled politicians to ignore moral considerations when it comes to immigration policy, although he recognizes that, "When there is public opposition...it may be for good reason." He says, "...if the proposed policies are morally unjust then they should not be adopted, no matter how strong public sentiment may be, even in a democracy. Consequently, a complex balance must be struck between catering to the wishes of a citizenry and protecting the rights of migrants and refugees." He concludes, however, that "...the incorporation of moral reasoning into public policies requires that we recognize that we cannot resolve immigration debates over migration with reference to principles of absolute justice."

Comment: *Weiner's treatment of the moral dilemmas of immigration is comprehensive, balanced, and excellent. My only quarrel is with his discussion of "xenophobia" and his view that morally superior officials must override the citizenry if they judge that the citizenry is motivated by "xenophobia." As I point out in the accompanying editorial, the moral issues are too murky and conflicting to warrant the suspension of democratic processes in favor of the judgments of the morally superior.*

IV. Rights of Migrants, and Rights of Political Communities

(A.) In "Cultural Minority Rights for Immigrants," Rainer Bauböck of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna attempts to trace the obligations, principally of the receiving culture but also of the immigrating culture, in a multicultural society. His foundation is the liberal view of multiculturalism that flows from cultural relativism — the view that all cultures are essentially equal, one that "assigns positive value to a plurality of cultures within a society, demands respect for cultural difference, refutes the possibility or desirability of a strict separation between private and public cultural practices, supports a policy of public recognition beyond mere tolerance, and rejects claims of (moral) superiority for specific cultural traditions as well as relations of domination, exploitation, and forced assimilation between cultural groups." He chooses not to address "the many charges against divisive ideological and political movements that have been associated with multiculturalism."

Bauböck's views parallel those of the Catholic and Jewish writers discussed above:

Universalistic moral norms which specify what we owe to others qua human beings can only be consistently defended when we see individuals as being equally human by virtue of, and not in spite of, their cultural differences...At its most basic level, cultural recognition is thus a cornerstone for moral universalism.

But Bauböck's universalism does not embrace what he describes as "irregular" immigration (somewhere between "illegal" and "undocumented"). "Regular" immigrants are entitled, in his view, to the right of equality; freedom of speech, religion, and association; and protection from discrimination. But he would not extend this to affirmative action for immigrants or redistricting to enhance their representation. He is, however, an advocate of bilingual education. He concludes:

...immigrants and their descendants have no other choice than to accept the institutions of the receiving society as the proper framework for their integration. With good reason they may try to change these institutions so that they adequately reflect the transnational context which shapes the immigration experience, and they ought to be granted cultural minority rights which publicly acknowledge the transformation of the receiving society into a multicultural one. But they generally do not transform the political community into a federation of polities, and they can only at their own peril ask for such collective rights which undermine their membership as equal citizens in the common polity.

Comment: *Bauböck's article is an articulate and thoughtful statement of the multicultural view. Those of us who reject cultural relativism and believe that some cultures do better for human beings than others will view his multiculturalism as utopian and potentially destructive.*

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For example, should the progress-resistant culture of Latin America that importantly explains its underdevelopment displace the progress-prone cultural traditions of the United States? I also find disconcerting his lack of concern about multiculturalism's undermining of a sense of national community that transcends ethnic sub-communities.

(B.) Bhikhu Parekh of Britain's University of Hull addresses "Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration," a fascinating topic but one that is on the fringe of the question of the ethics of immigration. After exploring several possible moral bases for addressing the issue (universal values, core values, the absence of values, and the irrelevance of values), Parekh concludes that "the best way to decide what minority practices to allow or disallow is to appeal to what I shall call the society's operative public values" as reflected in the constitution, the laws, and accepted civic behavior.

He then examines several minority practices: Hindu scattering the ashes of the dead (and sometimes submerging corpses) in rivers; Jewish and Muslim religious slaughter of animals, the Asian practice of arranged marriages, female circumcision, and polygamy. In each case the debate within the structure of "the society's operative values" leads to a reasonable conclusion.

Comment: *A very interesting and convincing treatment of a difficult issue, albeit one on the fringe of the immigration ethics debate.*

V. Ethical Dilemmas of Refugee Policy

(A.) Howard Adelman of Canada's York University examines the reaction of several Canadian institutions to the Rwanda crisis in "The Right of Repatriation — Canadian Refugee Policy: The Case of Rwanda." His focus is the extent to which those institutions took into account the right of Tutsi refugees to repatriation in Rwanda in formulating their policies.

Adelman reviews the history of Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and then examines the relevant policies of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board, the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defense, and the Canadian Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Each institution pursued its own view of the Rwanda crisis, and only the Department of Foreign Affairs integrated repatriation into its policy. Adelman concludes, "...the right of repatriation, though sometimes referred to for rhetorical effect, does not seem to have been a significant norm guiding Canadian policy."

Comment: *We are reminded of the complexity of immigration's ethical issues by this interesting examination of a rather esoteric but clearly relevant problem and how it was treated by different agencies in a country motivated "primarily by lofty norms."*

(B.) Michael J. Churgin of the University of Texas reviews U.S. immigration history with respect to large movements of people in "Mass Exoduses: The Response of the United States." Prior to World War I, mass exoduses (e.g. from Ireland, Germany, and Eastern Europe, but not from Asia) were viewed positively — and were indeed encouraged — by U.S. officials. As an example, immigrants were eligible for Homestead Act benefits.

This changed after World War I, and U.S. policy has since discouraged such movements — with a few exceptions, particularly those involving Cold War considerations such as Hungary in 1956, Cuba after 1960, and Indochina after the fall of South Vietnam. In both Democratic and Republican administrations, the U.S. has attempted to keep refugees and asylum seekers other than those from "Cold War" countries outside the United States where their cases can be adjudicated without the recourse to the U.S. legal system. Churgin concludes: "While there have been periods of hospitality, there have also been periods of closed doors. The strong preference continues to be overseas screening — in someone else's backyard."

Comment: *I get the impression that Prof. Churgin has both moral and legal reservations about the efforts we go to—for example in the case of the Haitian boat people—to keep "refugees" at arms length. Perhaps I misread him, but his reluctance to confront the fact that the overwhelming majority of Haitians—and Latin Americans in general—are fleeing poverty and seeking opportunity leaves me wondering if he wouldn't be more comfortable with an open door "refugee" policy. The problem is, of course, that in Latin America and the Caribbean alone, there are more than one hundred million potential "refugees" from poverty. Those who argued that the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti would end the outflow because political persecution would end now have to contemplate a new outflow. (A boatload of 160 Haitians was stopped by U.S. ships in August 1997.)* TSC

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Sorting Through Humanitarian Clashes In Immigration Policy

by Roy Beck

The issues of immigration often are couched in considerable discussion about humanitarianism. An appeal to set policy based on humane grounds carries with it intrinsic ethical clashes. An action that is humane to one category of persons deemed deserving of compassion can harm another category also deserving of compassion. Thus, there are ethical dilemmas that must be confronted in establishing a humane immigration policy.

A humane policy would consider four primary classes of people:

(1) those seeking to immigrate,
(2) needful people left behind in the sending country,
(3) disadvantaged citizens of the receiving country, and
(4) the general citizenry of the receiving country.

Interests of those four classes inevitably will clash, and so will interests of sub-groups within each class. The effort to create an ethically humane policy requires decisionmakers to assign different moral weight to the needs of each of those classes and sub-groups so that priorities can be set.

Writing immigration policy is an act of favoring one group over another. Which group wins? Which loses? How does a country maximize benefits and minimize harm? Those are the questions that any immigration policy must answer.

I usually ask my audiences to go through several exercises that point up the ethical dilemmas in devising immigration policy. First, however, I have them look at three philosophies of immigration. Many of the values that guide one through the later exercises are exposed in this discussion.

I. Open-immigration Philosophy

The first ethical issue of immigration is whether any community — especially a nation or country —has a right to place the needs of its own residents ahead of the needs of people outside the community. Open-immigration advocates answer in the negative. They essentially are globalists who see people more as citizens of the world than as members of more localized communities in which they enjoy special rights from and bear special responsibilities for the other members of their own community.

In the United States, most advocates of the open-immigration philosophy can be found in two groups:

Free-market Libertarians

Their emphasis on the individual suggests that everybody in the world should have the opportunity to rise as high as their talents and energy allow, without the restriction of borders.

It is not right to deny consumers the opportunity for lower-cost goods that might arise from the free flow of lower-cost goods and labor from other countries. Neither is it right to restrict the owners of capital from the additional profits that might be gained from cross-border movements of goods and labor. And, thus, it is not right to protect the workers of one country from wage and job losses due to competition of foreign workers through either trade or immigration barriers. Restricting the access of the lower-wage foreign worker from jobs in this country not only would deny that worker the right to upward economic mobility, it would deny American owners the right to further upward mobility for themselves.

Religious and Secular Globalists on the Left

In general, these believe that the needs of people in the Third World have priority over the needs of people in more advanced nations when it comes to

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questions of whether migrants should cross borders. Underlying this is the assessment that most would-be immigrants come from conditions that are worse than those for the Americans who may be hurt by their entry.

Unlike the libertarians, these people often favor open borders only for immigrants, not for goods. Hence, the name, "open-border philosophy," is not an accurate one for everybody who adheres to the open-immigration philosophy. The globalists on the left tend to believe in protecting American workers from unfair competition from goods produced by low-wage labor in foreign countries, but they do not favor protecting American workers from low-wage foreign workers entering the country and competing with them directly at their workplace.

"The ethics of closed-immigration are based primarily on the belief that a country's ethical priority is to its own citizens. To the extent it has ethical obligations to other people, a country should help those people where they reside..."

The open-immigration philosophy challenges — but doesn't necessarily call for the elimination of — the nation-state and its borders. Except among purely utopian thinkers, most open-immigration advocates concede the appropriateness of some controls at the border for factors such as disease, crime and certainly military intervention. Most will also concede that there probably are some upper limits to how many immigrants could enter a country each year without creating debilitating anarchy. But that limit is thought to be so far above present limits as to make it a rather abstract issue.

Powerful appeals for a version of open borders have come in recent years from some high-profile religious leaders who say that although a country has a right to control its borders, workers without jobs have a higher right to cross the borders in search of work. That would qualify hundreds of millions of people around the world to immigrate. A similar view espoused by many secular and religious philosophers contends that countries with low birth rates and lower population pressures on their natural resources have an obligation to take the excess population of the most congested and impoverished countries with high birth rates.

Many open-immigration globalists contend that borders and communities are barriers to a just world; any person anywhere in the world should be allowed to go anywhere else in the world if that will advance that person's well-being — even if it creates a decline of the well-being of residents of the receiving community. The justice of this is based primarily on the assumption that migrants would not move into a community unless the conditions there were better. Therefore, residents of that community can lose some of their standard of living and still not be worse off than the arriving migrant. Global egalitarianism appears to be the goal.

Open-immigration advocates point to the universalist appeals of various religions in their discussions of the brotherhood and sisterhood of all humankind.

No government in the world today practices an open-immigration philosophy. Support for open borders among the American public in general is almost non-existent, according to polls. Yet, the United States and several other of the world's newest countries had virtually open borders into the beginning of the 20th century. The primary rationale then was to use immigration to help settle the relatively open lands that at the time were marginally controlled by the indigenous peoples, to establish a nation across the continent, and — in a purpose still reflected by today's free-market libertarians — to assist the owners of industry.

II. Closed-immigration Philosophy

Most nations today essentially bar all immigration except for emergency refugee movements and persons considered to be "returning home." The philosophy is gaining adherents in the United States. Polls show that up to 20 percent of Americans favor stopping all immigration, at least for a few years.

Although critics often call these people "closed-border types," many advocate vigorous international trade. And most would not close borders to the

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millions of foreigners who come each year for business, education and tourism. They would close the borders only to permanent re-location.

The ethics of closed-immigration are based primarily on the belief that a country's ethical priority is to its own citizens. To the extent it has ethical obligations to other people, a country should help those people where they reside, not by bringing them into the country and posing harm to its own citizens.

Closed-immigration advocates note that the same religions with teachings about the brotherhood and sisterhood of all humankind also include teachings about the creation of just societies based on mutually held responsibilities within the family, tribe or nation. Supporters of closed borders point to what they see as substantial agreement among history's philosophers that a person's moral obligations are greatest for those persons who are closest to them, and to their own descendants. Vanderbilt University philosopher John Lachs has noted that, "Throughout history, acting in self-interest for one's own people generally has not been considered morally selfish."

A sampling of history's philosophers finds:

(Roman: Cicero) *The union and fellowship of men will be best preserved if each receives from us the more kindness in proportion as he is more closely connected with us. ... Nature produces a special love of offspring...To live according to Nature is the supreme good.*

(Greek: Homer) *...every good man, who is right-minded, loves and cherishes his own.*

(Christian: Paul) *If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith.*

(Jewish: Teachings from the Middle Ages) *The general rule is that the poor of your town come before the poor of any other town.... As between relatives and poor strangers, relatives come first.*

(Hindu: Janet) *For him who fails to honour them (father and mother), every work of piety is in vain. This is the first duty.*

(Socialism: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) *If all the world is my brother, then I have no brother.*

That last quote may be as important as any in the minds of the ethical advocates of closed borders. Certainly, there may be incredible need in the rest of the world, but any attempt to meet all that need would mean worthless tiny gestures to each individual. So a person or a country must limit beneficence to a small enough number of people so they can actually benefit. Since that is the case, why not direct all of one's resources first toward the needy who are closest? In the U.S., for example, why bring more needy people into the country when there already are millions of Americans who are ill-fed and unable to secure decent housing, tens of millions of children growing up in poverty and overcrowded schools, and even larger numbers of adults who are illiterate?

"...why bring more needy people into the country when there already are millions of Americans who are ill-fed and unable to secure decent housing, tens of millions of children growing up in poverty..."

Environmentalists who hold this closed-immigration philosophy place heavy emphasis on the protection of environmental resources for the future inhabitants of a land. Because immigration can cause enormous population growth — as is the case in the United States today — they see immigration as an environmental threat. Their opponents suggest that this is a clash between the needs of the non-human environment and the needs of today's would-be — and very human — immigrants. But the clash could just as easily be seen as one between the needs of today's humans and tomorrow's humans. Many environmentalists do not believe that the occupants of a land have the ethical right to destroy the environmental resources for the future generations who will occupy the land.

As with proponents of the open-immigration philosophy, the closed-immigration advocates usually do not take absolutist positions. Most would allow the entrance of some refugees and close members of the nuclear families of people already residing inside the country. A 1996 Roper poll found that about 30

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percent of Americans supported such a policy that would restrict immigration to under 100,000 a year, but more than zero. Added to the advocates of a zero level, that suggests that the closed-immigration philosophy may be approaching majority status among the public.

III. Restricted-immigration Philosophy

Restricted-immigration has been the standard for the United States since 1924 and guides the policies of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the few other countries that still allow a significant flow of new immigrants. Polls suggest that the majority of Americans hold to this philosophy. A great deal of the most heated debate in this country occurs between people who share this same viewpoint but disagree on whether one million or something more like 200,000 to 500,000 best fulfills their criteria.

The restricted-immigration philosophy usually is characterized by four beliefs:

- A country has an ethical obligation to open its borders to at least some of the world's most needy migrants, especially those who may face death if not given refuge. Although there is no recognized international obligation of a country to accept migrants who want to better their lives economically, immigration restrictionists believe many countries' traditions and religious foundations suggest an ethical obligation to use immigration to help some. And the international community has agreements that in essence condemn closed-immigration governments as unethical if they refuse the entry of migrants who have a well-founded fear of individualized persecution in their home country.

- The needs of a country's own citizens usually have moral priority over the needs of others.

- At low enough flows, it is possible to help migrants by letting them in without harming a country's own citizens.

- The majority of migrants who might want to come into a country must be barred because their entrance would lead to great injustices to a country's own citizens. In terms of the numbers allowed to enter, policies of restrictive immigration are far closer to closed-border than to open-border policies.

Listening to American debates can be confusing because many of the people in it are not clear about their underlying immigration philosophy. Many of the people who argue for the current level of immigration — which is more than triple the country's average level historically — criticize those who argue for reductions as being selfish for putting their own fellow citizens ahead of foreign citizens who wish to enter. But most people who make those criticisms do not hold the open-immigration philosophy. That is, they advocate not the free entry of all who would like to come but the maintenance of the present level; or an increase to, at most, twice the present level. Even at those high levels, immigration policy rejects most of the people in the world who would like to immigrate. What is the reason for taking a million a year instead of five million, 25 million or 50 million? Supporters of the status quo justify not going to those levels because they would bring too much harm to the country. Thus, they clearly operate out of a restricted-immigration philosophy that recognizes the moral rationale for restraining immigration for the benefit of the people already inside a country's borders.

"Listening to American debates can be confusing because many of the people in it are not clear about their underlying immigration philosophy."

Nonetheless, adherents of the restricted-immigration philosophy tend to view the closed-immigration adherents as tipping the scales too far in favor of a country's own inhabitants. In varying degrees, they believe a country should take enough immigration to hurt — at least a little bit.

Like adherents of the closed-immigration philosophy, though, those who hold to the restricted-immigration philosophy believe in the nation-state as a superior way of organizing people and of creating incentives for behavior that will benefit the most people. For example, the people of Nation A may have small families and accept numerous sacrifices in order to protect their natural resources. Nation B might have a high fertility rate that contributes to the overuse of its natural resources. If Nation B is allowed to export its

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overpopulation to Nation A, the citizens of Nation A will be denied the benefits of their environmentally ethical decisions. With little incentive to make those ethical environmental decisions, the citizens of Nation A are likely to behave in a much different manner in the future. And the citizens of Nation B will be relieved of some of the pressure that might have caused its citizens to adopt a more responsible fertility and a system of environmental laws.

"I have found that most people have never systematically looked through the competing claims for immigration slots to think about the fact that some have more moral weight than others..."

Restrictive-immigration advocates see the open-immigration philosophy as a rejection of the idea that a community, people or nation has a right to self-determination. Mass migrations of people into a democratic society shift the power of deciding the future to the people coming from outside the borders. And once the migrants are settled, they too lose their ability to determine the culture, politics, laws, economics and quality of life of their adopted home upon the arrival of the next wave of migrants. The sense of nationhood that causes individuals to provide complex social systems to their own "people" cannot continue when the population of a country no longer seems to be "us," as Australian sociologist Katharine Betts has pointed out. In the view of the restricted-immigration philosophy, mass immigration has the power to do what open-border supporters say it will do: reduce disparities among nations. But the growing equality does not come by greatly improving the conditions of the poor countries. Henry Simons, a pioneer advocate of free-market economics at the University of Chicago, argued that free trade among nations would raise living standards in all participating nations. But he said that major cross-border movements of workers would level standards everywhere, perhaps without raising them anywhere.

Another noted pioneer free-market economist, Melvin Reder, in 1963 advised President Kennedy that free immigration would cause per capita incomes between nations to equalize (the goal of open-border globalists), mainly by leveling the incomes of workers in industrialized countries down toward the low wages in the Third World. (Kennedy backed immigration numbers that were approximately one-third of today's.)

The dilemma for those who endorse restricted immigration is (1) to find what level of immigration is low enough not to hurt the citizens of a country, (2) to determine under what circumstances there is an ethical obligation to cause some domestic harm by bringing in a higher level of migrants, and (3) to decide to whom the immigration slots should be allotted.

IV. Using Exercises to Put Specifics Where One's General Philosophy Is

I have found that most people have never systematically looked through the competing claims for immigration slots to think about the fact that some have more moral weight than others — nor have most considered that meeting the needs of one group of people can have the effect of denying the needs of another group. That is why when I present this material to any audience I go on to present three worksheets for an exercise in ethical decision-making.

In the first exercise, I ask people to design an immigration policy that would only answer international needs — to think only of the sending countries and the conditions of their citizens. Canada uses a point system to prioritize applicants for admission to that nation. Suppose we were to do the same and were to rank applicants on the basis of humanitarian factors?

The exercise lists over 30 types of applicant including those who have an income below an international poverty line; those who have advanced degrees and are seeking a way to use them to a full potential; those who are seeking to escape from a dictatorship, from evironmental devastation, from persecution as a homosexual or as a member of a minority religion or an opposition party; those who have a medical condition that can be helped best in the U.S.; those who have a family member who migrated here earlier.

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The ranking should also include negative marks for the professional skill or political opposition that would be lost in the sending country by that person's leaving.

Exercise 2 asks participants to consider the various Americans who would be positively or negatively impacted by immigrants: people leaving welfare and seeking jobs, businesses seeking cheaper labor, citizens trying to preserve small city and rural ways of life, the chronically unemployed, descendants of U.S. slaves, industries seeking skilled labor, children in crowded schools, and many more.

"What are the trade-offs? What happens when helping a group on one list hurts a group on the other?"

Exercise 3 tries to foster thinking about a design for U.S. immigration policy. What are the trade-offs? What happens when helping a group on one list hurts a group on the other? *International* humanitarianism might value bringing in poor people with few skills. But those immigrants would compete most directly in the job market with lower-skilled and poor Americans who may be ranked high in terms of *domestic* humanitarian concerns.

If we bring in people with high skills, we may work against the interests of the poor of the Third World by depriving them of their brightest citizens who might have made life better there.

Individuals who face discrimination or persecution because of their political activities may rank high on our international lists. But allowing them to immigrate from a badly run country removes agents-for-change who might have eventually worked with others to pressure for improvement for the masses left behind.

V. Squaring Results with Current Policy

Once the priorities and rankings are worked out, it is an eye-opening experience to compare them with actualities. It turns out that U.S. policy does not primarily bring in the poorest, most persecuted, most helpless, sickest and most desperate people of the world for whom a truly humanitarian policy would be designed. Rather, our policy dips liberally from the most energetic, educated, skilled and healthiest and from the richest countries of the underdeveloped world such as Mexico and Russia. Some 25 percent of adult immigrants have college degrees.

Indeed, U.S. immigration policy primarily showers its humanitarianism on the following types of people:

- Foreign citizens who manage to marry a U.S. citizen. Many of these are illegal aliens at the time they meet their future citizen spouse; marriage legalizes their status. Many others meet their future spouse while in America legally on stu-dent, business or tourist visa. Still others are in their home coun-tries and are courted by pre-vious immigrants after they achieve U.S. citizenship and return home looking for a spouse. And there are those who, in their home country, meet native-born Americans who are visiting there while in the military, or as students or international business workers.

- Spouses and minor children of immigrants who are not U.S. citizens. Many of those immigrants previously were illegal aliens but were granted amnesty by Congress. Now that they are legal, they can send for nuclear family members they left behind. In many cases, though, the spouses and minor children are themselves illegal aliens already living in the United States.

- Foreign citizens whose brother, sister, parent or adult child left them behind years ago and now has become a U.S. citizen.

- Foreign workers who get the attention of U.S. businesses. Businesses having any trouble finding American workers in their locale at a low enough price are able to add tens of thousands of foreign workers each year to be nurses, farm workers, teachers, doctors, engineers, scientists, nannies, gardeners, housekeepers, etc. Businesses work to get many of these people admitted as permanent immigrants because they already are in the locale as illegal aliens or foreign students.

- People (primarily white) who live in countries from which there have been few immigrants in recent years. There is very little chance for making ethical choices in this category as people are chosen totally without regard to their circumstances through a lottery. This category was begun in the 1990s and

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is of special benefit to a small class of Americans: immigration lawyers who helped process the 59,000 lottery winners last year.

- People facing discrimination but not persecution in foreign countries. These people come in through refugee categories, but the State Department says the majority of "refugees" entering this country are not internationally recognized as refugees. They are people living in their home countries without the threat of persecution from the government. Congress has ordered that they be admitted as refugees anyway because they live in cultures that are inhospitable to their religion (primarily Jews and Pentecostals in the former Soviet Union) or in countries with communist governments (especially Cuba).

- Internationally recognized "special needs refugees." The international refugee-care community recommends that most refugees be served near the borders of the home country they fled so that they can be repatriated as soon as conditions improve. Experts recommend resettlement of refugees into wealthy nations primarily as a last resort and for "special needs refugees" who have little chance of ever being allowed to go back to their home country. The U.S. often takes up to half of special needs refugees who are resettled each year.

On the domestic front, according to a number of studies, including a much-publicized report by the National Academy of Sciences this year, the ethical basis of the current U.S. immigration policy would appear to be to help:

- consumers to benefit from lower prices,
- business owners to restrain the growth in wages and to more easily fill job openings,
- families — primarily upper income — to obtain the services of nannies, gardeners and housekeepers,
- the owners of capital to make larger profits (immigration is a key ingredient in the rising income disparity in the nation).

And immigration, according to those studies, currently harms:

- lower-skilled workers, especially the foreign-born,
- poor Americans trying to leave welfare and join the labor force,
- students in crowded schools, especially racial minorities in core cities,
- middle-class taxpayers in high-immigration states who subsidize the average immigrant by $1,500 to $4,000 each,
- hunters, anglers, boaters and outdoor recreation enthusiasts of all types who suffer extra congestion from population growth caused primarily by immigration,


UNDER DEVELOPMENT
THE FAR FAR FAR FAR EASTERN-MOST SUBURB OF LOS ANGELES
UNDER DEVELOPMENT
THE FAR FAR FAR FAR WESTERN-MOST SUBURB OF NEW YORK
Then one day, the twain met.
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- breathers of air in cities that do not meet clean air standards because of population growth,
- users of the 40 percent of the nation's lakes and streams that still do not meet clean water standards,
- all who value the wildlife, natural habitat, eco-systems and bio-diversity that are reduced each year by the pressures from population growth,
- traffic-weary motorists and residents of small cities, towns and rural areas trying to preserve their culture of living.

Because the effect of current immigration numbers is so drastic on the rate of population growth, people who place a high ethical value on clean air and water, protecting eco-systems, resisting congestion and sprawl, and preserving community cultures will have to consider great reductions in the overall numbers as they create an ethically ideal immigration policy.

VI. Wrestling with the Numbers

Before deciding what our ethical position dictates in terms of "how many?" we should consider that the U.S. Census Bureau projects that under the current rate of immigration the 1970 population of 203 million will nearly double to 394 million by the year 2050.

A country can eventually stabilize a population by moving to replacement-level fertility and replacement-level immigration. American women have met the fertility goal every year since 1973. But Congress each year moves America farther from the immigration goal.

For comparison purposes: the average annual legal immigration for the first two U.S. centuries (1776-1976) was 236,000. After Congress declared the end of an open-border philosophy in 1924, the annual average was 178,000 from 1925 until major changes in the law in 1965. The post-World War II average from 1945 to the first Earth Day in 1970 was 255,000.

The Census Bureau states that replacement-level immigration currently is 225,000. So illegal immigration would have to be stopped entirely, and legal immigration reduced from 915,000 in 1996 to 225,000 to allow the U.S. population (267 million in 1997) to stabilize soon after 2050 at around 320 million. If we don't want to add another 50 million people to the country, we will have to choose an immigration level below 200,000.

The box on this page shows the figures for current U.S. immigration policy. Except for spouses and minor children of citizens, there are quotas that restrict all the categories, thus creating long waiting lists. What changes would you make to design a more ethical or humanitarian immigration policy? It becomes your choice whether to eliminate a waiting list by eliminating a category or to create a new waiting list by creating a new category. Fill in the blanks with numbers that you think would create a more ethical policy in weighing the humanitarian considerations of all.

My hope is that average Americans will let go of abstractions and deal with hard choices: if there are to be limits, where will the cuts occur; if Congressional policy stays where it is, what are the tradeoffs? TSC

[*Editor's note: The worksheets and exercises used in Roy Beck's "ethics of immigration" presentations would be useful for reform activists as they speak to groups of interested citizens. Contact Beck at his Washington office for copies.*]

CATEGORY	1996 ACTUAL	YOU CHOOSE
TOTAL LEGAL IMMIGRATION	915,900	
Spouses and minor children of citizens (unlimited)	235,391	
Spouses and minor children of non-citizen immigrants	182,834	
Refugees and asylees (around 25,000 typically are "special needs refugees")	128,565	
Workers specifically requested by businesses or private households	117,499	
Parents of citizen immigrants	66,699	
Lottery	58,790	
Adult children of citizen immigrants	46,699	
Other	14,782	
Your new category #1	—	
Your new category #2	—	
Your new category #3	—	

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The Moral High Ground

Immigration reformers need to recapture it

by David G. Payne

The occupation of high ground can thus mean genuine domination. Its reality is undeniable.
— CLAUSWITZ, *On War*, V, 18

An interesting article by Mark Sagoff[1] recently appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly*, in which he argues that those who are interested in curbing the destruction of our natural resources should change their approach. Traditional argumentation invokes dire predictions that the earth will run out of such and such a resource by such and such a date, and then concludes that we should therefore all start conserving or face the consequences. One problem with this argument, says Sagoff (and it is a problem that is traceable all the way back to Malthus), is that the dire predictions hardly ever pan out. The specified dates come and go without the arrival of Armageddon. Furthermore, says he, the pessimistic preachers are wrong — technology has and will continue to solve our ills before judgment day ever arrives.

I have before, in these very pages, praised the pessimist for making us conscious of problems that need to be solved, and thus for being partially responsible for solutions when they are found. But I am not interested in arguing with the content of Sagoff's article. Rather, I am interested in examining the strategy *behind* his argumentation, because I think it might well be applied to other areas (and is beginning to be so applied) with some success.

Sagoff claims we should argue not from economics based on impending losses of (or potential gains from) our endangered resources, but from moral and aesthetic grounds. In other words, instead of appealing to the pocketbook, we should appeal to the heart. You will always lose using the economic argument, says he, because you will be fighting on your enemy's turf. In doing so you inevitably overvalue the resources you are trying to protect, and thus set yourself up for failure.

> *By claiming that a threatened species may harbor lifesaving drugs, for example, we impute to that species an economic value or a price much greater than it fetches in a market. When we make the prices come out right, we rescue economic theory but not necessarily the environment.*[2]

The "dire consequences" approach, then, is doomed to failure in the resource arena. Because of this, says Sagoff, we should change tack and argue, not from what our resources can do for us either now or in the future (their external value), but from their internal value to us as humans. The change here is from external fact to internal feeling. This latter has, by necessity, a moral aspect since it appeals to what we value most in our lives.

That, in a nutshell, is the strategy of Sagoff's article; and those within the immigration debate can learn much from this strategy, for the same distinction — factual arguments versus moral arguments — is to be found in this debate as well.

The problem is: the anti-immigration camp has implicitly conceded the moral high ground by focusing almost entirely on the factual side, and so has little of substance to fall back upon. Browse through any catalog containing anti-immigration literature — you will find book after book by demographers, economists, social scientists and population experts arguing that dire consequences will inevitably result from continued immigration.

I happen to think that there is some merit to these arguments, but then, I'm part of the choir. If the writers' goal is to persuade others to join in their cause, it is not people like me they should want to reach. And those they *do* want to reach they probably aren't even approaching. I think there are two reasons for this.

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First, there is the reason lurking behind Sagoff's claim that past predictions have always failed to come true. The heart of this objection has to do with knowledge acquisition. All such arguments are based on what is going to happen in the future based on what we know about the past and the present, and no one knows what is going to happen in the future based on such information. No matter how exhaustive your information, knowledge of the future is undetermined. Therefore, no advantage is gained over your opponent by arguing in this way, and no one is persuaded to change sides.

"I assume that taking the moral high ground is a good thing to do; or at least a good thing to say you have done."

Second, I am convinced that more people are persuaded by moral arguments than by factual arguments. People tend to form gut-level opinions on important issues, and only then look about for factual justification for these opinions.[3] I'm not claiming this is the proper way to approach an issue, only that it is in fact the road usually taken, and that we ignore this fact at our own peril. Those who have formed gut-level (moral) opinions are not interested in seeking out the truth — they are interested only in justifying their already firmly entrenched opinions. For this reason, such people would never even consider reading a book or an article that is full of facts contrary to their position. Their bias prohibits their being persuaded by such arguments.

Do Anti-immigrationists Have a Moral Case?

Here we see the importance of the moral argument, which has the potential to strike at the very root of a person's bias. The problem is: most anti-immigrationists have already abandoned this field of battle, with the result that the pro-immigration camp has had huge success in convincing people to join their side on the basis of their claim to overwhelming moral superiority.

If we are to reverse the popular trend in anti-immigration argumentation and thereby become a persuasive force in the immigration debate we must return to arguments based on the morality of the issues. But, as mentioned, the enemy has already staked claim to that area, as anyone who has ever been accused of "racism" because of her position on immigration is aware. The pro-immigration forces have traditionally been firmly in control of the moral high ground — or so they say. Which leads to an interesting question: when one side in a debate makes the claim to have "taken the moral high ground," what exactly do they think they have done?

I assume that taking the moral high ground is a good thing to do; or at least a good thing to *say* you have done. The analogy has military roots — taking and holding the high ground being a generally sound strategy, as the French learned to their regret at Dien Bien Phu, as did the ANZAC forces at Gallipoli. When one is said to take the moral high ground the implied mental picture is of a heroic charge up, say, San Juan Hill where the forces arrive, bloodied but victorious, unfurling the flag to cheers and sounds of music. That is one version, based on a particular use of the term "take" *i.e.* "to seize by force."

There is another use of the word "take," however, which is subtly more appropriate to debate, *viz.*, "to obtain," (which includes "to steal"). This usage also has military application, if somewhat less heroic. If an army is first to arrive on the scene of a potential battle, it can take the high ground in this sense without a struggle, as the Union Army did at Gettysburg before Lee arrived. Armies are thus said to have "assumed" the high ground, and have gained an advantage by doing so.

The wisest move for an opposing army, having found the enemy firmly ensconced on high ground, is to decline battle if possible. But there is another move in debate that is not usually open to armies, since the fog in debate is often thicker than on a battlefield. In debating, it is possible to assume the high ground and turn out to be wrong — a most embarrassing circumstance. In a debate you can dispose of your opponents' assumed advantage by unceremoniously dumping then on the ground beside you (called "leveling the field"). Even better if, having dumped them, you then assume the high ground yourself (called "turning the tables"). Both of these are instances of the more general strategy known technically as "knocking them off their high horse."

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The pro-immigration movement has traditionally *assumed* the moral high ground in two ways. **First**, by claiming that Americans have a moral obligation to help those in less fortunate countries by allowing them into the land of opportunity — thus casting as immoral or less moral, those who deny this obligation, or "right" as it may be labeled. **Second**, the pro-immigration movement assumes the high ground by labeling immigration reformers as "racist" because they do not want to allow other nationalities into the country. Since the pro-immigrationists are against this "racist" position they must therefore be standing for all that is right and good — increasing the height of the ground on which they (think they) stand.

The first of these moves is fairly easy to counter with arguments that point out that we are not helping those who need help the most with our immigration policies — that there are better ways of helping those who are less fortunate than ourselves, etc. In this way you agree with the opposing side's moral statement ("Yes, those in less fortunate countries should be helped") but deny their solution. These are powerful and, I think, definitive objections which go a long way toward showing that if the pro-immigrationist is really serious about moral obligations to those in other countries, he needs to revisit his methods. (If *really* serious, we would hope he would trade places with someone in dire need.)

"...if the pro-immigrationist is really serious about moral obligations to those in other countries, he needs to revisit his methods."

The second move has been both less and more troublesome. Less troublesome because it is often a strategy-of-last-resort — when you can't think of any substantive criticism, go for the "R" word. This was evident in the debates over Peter Brimelow's book, *Alien Nation*, several years ago. In such instances the epithet "racist" is little more than a red-herring designed to alleviate one's discomfort at having nothing substantive to say.

The move has been more troublesome due to the fact that it is often difficult to know how to respond to the charge — sometimes because it comes as so off-the-wall, and sometimes because hardly anyone knows what the term "racist" means. Ironically, overuse of the term has eroded the reprobation it once conveyed.

One recent book that has addressed this second move with particular force is Roy Beck's *The Case Against Immigration*.[4] For example, Beck makes at least three important points on the subject of racism. **First**, he shows that there is no necessary connection between being a racist and attempting to limit immigration — as his subtitle implies: there are "moral, economic, social, and environmental" reasons for limiting immigration. **Second**, and more important from the perspective of this essay, the immigration reform position, far from being racist, is shown to be a position that instead tries to *do away with* racism. These first two points thereby serve to level the field. **Third**, Beck shows by implication that the pro-immigrationist position fits better into the racist mold than does the alternative, Thus, he turns the tables.

I don't want to delve into the details of Beck's arguments here, but a brief statement of how this is done may be of interest. The vehicle used to make the three points is the same: labor. The argument running throughout Beck's book is that high levels of immigration are being sustained primarily to satisfy big business's insatiable hunger for low cost labor. Keeping the levels of immigration high insures a glut in the labor market, which in turn creates a buyer's market — with the commodity being human labor. This excess of bodies has allowed business to successfully undermine a century of labor reforms by slashing wages and benefits, and reducing standards of working condition to the bare minimum. Were American workers overpaid? In many cases the answer is "yes" — no one denies that both executives and labor unions took advantage of a good thing, just as no one denies that business has the right to make a dollar. But the line must be drawn somewhere. History has shown that business, if left unrestrained, will consistently disregard that right of human beings to earn a decent wage. Since business cannot regulate itself in this matter, the task of doing so has been left to Congress — which has also consistently failed to perform.

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Doesn't this moral argument essentially boil down to a factual argument? Yes, to a degree. Isn't it just as difficult to determine who is right with this sort of argument? Yes, it is. But it doesn't follow from these points that the moral methodology *reduces* to the factual. For one thing, by invoking the moral argument you still have the high ground, *even if your reader thinks your facts, or your analyses of the facts, are mistaken.* This is why holding the high ground *can* mean genuine domination (as Clauswitz says) — its reality cannot be denied. Your intentions become almost as important as your arguments. No one can impugn your motivations. You are not a racist — you are battling *against* racism. The very fact will, in itself, cause many (who would otherwise be diametrically opposed) to look more favorably upon factual arguments put forth by yourself and others.

What We Should Do

So here is my suggestion for strategy. The demographers, economists, social scientists and population experts should keep pumping out books filled with factual arguments — we can't afford to let the opposition make inroads in that theater. This is an important function. But we are sorely lacking books and articles along the line of Beck's. We need books that argue from the moral point of view — books that assume the moral high ground or take back the ground assumed by others. These moral arguments are *logically prior* to the factual arguments in that they "prepare the way." By showing first that the anti-immigrationist position is a moral position in its own right, they open the door for acceptance of the factual material. My suggested strategy thus diverges from Sagoff's. He seems to think factual arguments should be dispensed with altogether. My view, however, is that both are essential to a complete strategy. To paraphrase Immanuel Kant: the moral without the factual is empty, the factual without the moral is blind.

Antoine-Henri Jomini, the great propounder of Napoleonic strategies, claimed that victory in war is achieved by the occupation of enemy territory. This alone, claims Jomini, is what brings a war to successful conclusion. If also true of debates, then we must win the war of immigration reform by concentrating on turning the tables on the opponents and re-occupying the moral high ground which is rightfully ours. TSC

NOTES

[1] Mark Sagoff, "Do We Consume Too Much?", *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1997.

[2] Sagoff, ibid., p.96.

[3] This is no elitist claim. We all do this, from scientists to philosophers. Objectivity is often preached but seldom practiced.

[4] Roy Beck, *The Case Against Immigration: The moral, economic, social and environmental reasons for reducing U.S. immigration back to traditional levels* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), p.176ff.

Weasel Word on Immigration

Showing how far the moral intimidation has gone

by Thomas Sowell

New York's mayor, Rudolph Guiliani, helped launch yet another special-interest organization. This one is called the Immigration Coalition. Like so many such organizations today, its purpose is described not as trying to persuade others of the merits of its position, but as "educating the public." Apparently only the ignorant can possibly disagree with them.

There are many arguments that can be made for and against immigration in general and our current immigration laws and policies in particular. However, many of the pro-immigration spokesmen do not depend on arguments at all but on lofty talk about "educating" others, evasive talk about "undocumented" immigrants, nostalgic talk about immigration in a past era

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radically different from today and politically correct talk about "diversity" — a word more designed to silence others than to convince them.

For any one who respects logic and honesty, it is virtually impossible to talk about immigration in general because there is no such thing as an immigrant in general. Some immigrants — past and present — have brought priceless gifts to this country, while others have brought crime, disease and degeneracy. Not only do individual immigrants differ, so do whole groups from various parts of the world. Given the enormously different geographic, cultural and historical backgrounds from which they come, it could hardly be otherwise.

Yet any thought that the United States should more readily accept immigrants from nations whose track record is good than from nations whose track record is bad sets off howls of protest and charges of racism. More important, this moral intimidation shuts off discussion.

Mayor Giuliani laments that proposed federal legislation would not allow local governments to "provide zones of protection for undocumented immigrants." What specifically does this collection of weasel words mean?

Protection from what?

Under proposed new federal legislation, local governments could no longer pass laws forcing local officials to conceal the presence of illegal immigrants from the federal government. The very fact that we can no longer use the plain words "illegal immigrants" shows how far the moral intimidation has gone.

"...local laws deliberately set up to conceal people who are breaking federal laws."

It is bad enough for individual citizens to obstruct the application of immigration law to people who are here illegally. It is staggering that there should be local laws deliberately set up to conceal people who are breaking federal laws.

Giuliani, like many other pro-immigration spokesmen, sidesteps this outrageous legal situation to argue that, on net balance, it is better not to pursue illegal immigrants too zealously, or to restrict their benefits too severely, for fear of social repercussions. Whatever the merits of that policy position, it is a position that should be argued before the federal law-makers.

We cannot have local governments passing laws exempting people from those federal laws they don't happen to like or making it a crime for local officials to obey federal law. This is so blatantly obvious that nothing like this is even attempted on other issues.

Underlying such practices and rhetoric is the notion that it is somehow wrong to stop people from coming to the United States. Those who adopt a "citizen of the world" air and lament the existence of national borders may enjoy a glow of self-righteousness but immigration is a virtually irreversible decision — and it is receiving nothing like the careful scrutiny that our irreversible decisions deserve.

A nation and a people is more than simply the sum total of the individuals who happen to live within its borders. For a multi-ethnic society like the United States, especially. It is a population which shares certain cultural traditions and moral values. Protecting those traditions and values means limiting how many people can enter, under what conditions and with what commitment to becoming American rather than remaining foreign.

The much-denounced restrictions on immigration to the United States in the 1920s at least served the purpose of encouraging the Americanization of the existing immigrants. All over the world, immigrants who are part of a continuing stream of immigrants from their homeland tend to remain foreign longer. Today, there are organized movements and government-subsidized programs to keep people not only foreign but even hostile to the very country to which they have immigrated.

Ironically, those who thus raise the cost of immigration to the American people are loudest in demanding freer immigration. ■

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'Living in a World of Limits'

An interview with noted biologist Garrett Hardin

by Craig Straub

Garrett Hardin is Emeritus Professor of Human Ecology at the University of California at Santa Barbara. As an educator, ecologist, and environmentalist, he has devoted much of his work to a reconsideration of the ethical implications of population-related problems. Dr. Hardin is perhaps best-known for his 1968 essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons." The Social Contract Press is reprinting some of his most important books.

Dr. Hardin was interviewed at his home in Santa Barbara on June 21, 1997, for The Social Contract by Craig Straub. Mr. Straub is an environmental scientist who is currently completing a Ph.D. in Human Ecology at The Union Institute, Cincinnati, Ohio. His dissertation involves an application of Professor Hardin's methodology outlined in his 1985 book *Filters Against Folly.*

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Did you have any childhood experiences which had a major influence on your life?*

PROFESSOR GARRETT HARDIN: All the years that I was growing up, in the summer time and during vacations as well, we would go to the Hardin family farm, five miles from Butler, Missouri. So this was the one, fixed place. My own home, the home of my parents, kept moving all the time because my father kept moving from one place to another. The one stable place in my life was the farm in Missouri. After about my tenth birthday I spent all my summers there until I was about eighteen or nineteen. My work load was stepped up as I grew older. It had to be kept back somewhat because of my physical disabilities. But still, by the time I was eleven or twelve I was in charge of about 500 chickens, which I had to take care of — feed and water. And I had to kill a chicken every day for lunch.

This, I think, was a very important part of my education — learning to kill an animal. I regard this as an important part of everybody's education. I think the fashionable attitude is one of the many foolish things in this world. If you want to eat meat, somebody has to kill it. I think everybody ought to have to do it, and not just once but many times. Because one of the things that I was imbued with, by this farm family, was a horror of cruelty — not of killing, but of cruelty. If you are going to kill an animal, you have to kill it instantly and as painlessly as you can. It's a disgrace to do otherwise.

Killing is part of life, you see — one of the things that has to be done. I have always had very strong emotions about this matter, very negative emotions about so many people who claim to love animals. There were people in Kansas who had cats they didn't want. They would drive out from Kansas City and when they got out to the farms, they would let the cats out and drive on, because that way they weren't killing the cat. They weren't being cruel. They thought, "It will find a good home." I'm sure that was their attitude. Well, we were on the farm. Those cats wandered onto our farm, so what do you do? Well, the dogs would kill them. They distinguished between the visitor cats and the home cats. When they saw a visitor cat... particularly when our little fox terrier saw a strange cat, boy, he'd kill it if he possibly could. And he usually could.

I realized from the very beginning that death is a necessary part of life. I learned my first basic lessons about population and carrying capacity on the farm. All my life, I have been haunted by the realization that there simply isn't room for all the life that can be generated, and the people who refuse to cut down on the excess population of anything are not being kind; they are being cruel. They are increasing the suffering in the world. So, I have a very low opinion of most so-called animal lovers who want to save every last animal.

In fact, I've asked in one of my essays, "Does God give a prize for the maximum number of human beings?" And I think this needs to be taken seriously. If we think he does, then, of course, I shouldn't keep that canary you hear singing in the other room,

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because that canary is eating seed that could be feeding people. Now it's true, it might require the seed from (I'm just guessing) five hundred canaries to keep a human being alive, in which case you could say that every five hundred canaries are depriving one person of life. The question is: "What sort of world do we want — a world with the maximum number of human beings, but no canaries?" I'd rather have a world with fewer people, but in which canaries are a part of the world.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *How do you define ethics?*

HARDIN: To a biologist, so many things nowadays revolve around the insights of Darwin. He is absolutely essential in view of the world and human nature as far as biologists are concerned. A very old question which men have been aware of for centuries is to what extent is a person driven by selfish motives, (egotism), to what extent is he driven by unselfish motives (altruism), wanting to help other people.

The really original thing with Darwin was the idea of natural selection. He was excited after he realized that this explained almost everything about biology. He didn't make this as clear as he should have and for that reason it took 100 years for people to realize what he had done. The real change came about when, in recent times, in 1973, Richard Dawkins published *The Selfish Gene.* That was not entirely original, but Dawkins is an extremely insightful writer. He took the idea that had been circulating among biologists and other experts for the last ten years, and said: "Look everybody, here it is, this is what Darwin was talking about 100 years ago."

So what does this do for the problem of ethics? Well, if you look at an animal who fights for his life, kills another animal for food and so on, this is clearly an egotistical sort of thing to do, and you can see how this may account for a lot of an animal's behavior; it's egotistical. But if you try to have, as you say, a system to work solely on egotism — it can't be. A simple example: parenthood, particularly motherhood, in species where mothers tend their offspring. If mothers were egotistical, that would be the end of the species. A mother would eat the children one by one as they came out; she'd prosper, but there would be no species. On the other hand, at the other extreme, there are numerous examples of self-sacrifice among parents. In one species of crickets, the mother bears quite a few offspring, several dozen, I think, and then offers herself up as a meal to her offspring. They eat her up. Well, that helps the offspring get a good start in life, which is the whole point of it, but it doesn't do anything for the mother. It's a one-time sacrifice and that's it. Extreme altruism and extreme egotism: neither one can work by itself.

This is where Dawkins came in and said, "Look, here is one thing that will work if you focus, not on the individual, but on the genes of the individual, then you've got a single system that works all by itself. It's egotistical and that's fine. In the case of an individual eating another individual, it's obvious how it works: the genes that tell one animal to eat another will survive. On the other hand, the mother who sacrifices herself for her own children, her genes survive, and so again the system works. It's gene egotism that works and there are many different ways it can work. I think this is at the base of all ethical questions. The question is how can the gene ensure its own survival — by what set of actions, and do we call them egotistical, or altruistic? It's always essential for the mixture to work, because neither will work by itself. So that's the subject matter of ethics: what's the balance?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What would you say are the major influences on the development of a person's ethics?*

HARDIN: Well, certainly his parents. There's certainly no question about that because an animal so young is busy learning what it should do and it learns what it shouldn't. What the parent does, it does. If a parent whops it, then it knows that it shouldn't do that. Parents, first of all; its litter mates secondly; its playmates; and then decreasing influences as you get farther and farther away from home base.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What have been the major influences on the development of your own personal ethics?*

HARDIN: Well, it hasn't been any different from anybody else's. I've done some thinking about this lately, looking back on my own life, and I realized that every period in my life there's at least one person who was keenly interested in my welfare. I'm very lucky; this isn't true for everybody. I've always had someone very close, a teacher, my wife, friends and so on. I've never been alone.

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *You've addressed the consequences of assisting poor countries with food aid. For example, in some of these countries, they've increased the population in response to food. There are some who would argue that without the supply of food, you'll have malnutrition which results in the formation of new microbial strains in poor countries, which are then transmitted by the infected immigrants to a healthy U.S. population. How do you respond to this?*

"When we do intervene in what's called a crisis, insist that a genuine crisis last only a short time. Otherwise it becomes chronic..."

HARDIN: I think that's mostly malarkey. I think there are many barriers, including the barrier of distance between poor countries and rich countries, and between poor people and rich people. There are dreadfully poor people in India and Africa, but for the most part, our connection with them is a delusion. They can have all sorts of diseases, and we'll never get them. Now that we know the intermediate steps in the transmission of diseases from, say, Calcutta to Cincinnati, we can interrupt that along the way with fairly simple measures, and we do have various things that make it difficult for a person who's carrying the disease to get into the country. And if we don't, we can make very severe barriers. This means, in effect, poor people may get terrible diseases and suffer great loss, and maybe that touches your heart, but just don't let it touch your mind. Don't do something foolish because you think the trouble is going to get here in spite of yourself. It won't if you use your head.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What does one need to consider when contemplating the idea of foreign aid?*

HARDIN: Well, I think the basic point to make here is that every unit that claims sovereignty has to accept responsibility. In other words, if the unit says we want to run our own affairs, then say, that's fine, then you have to be responsible if they go wrong. And if your people are starving to death, it's because the unit that's claimed sovereignty is at fault, and you've got to find some way — because no matter how poor the country, at the right level of population the people there can live high on the hog. You know, for instance, India has nine hundred million people now. For centuries, they had one hundred million people. If they had one hundred million people now they would be very prosperous indeed. So that's really the problem and our position should be that national sovereignty implies national responsibility.

Now, if you want to go beyond that, then you have to say, well, in the real world we sometimes have to trim our sails and there might be times when we want to intervene. Notice, I didn't say, "help," but "intervene," from the outside in the hope that we could help. But the first thing to do is to keep our language clean and always say "intervene" and never "help." Because the value of "help" remains to be proven. Intervention is provable. So we intervene. We hope we can help. History shows that most interventions don't help. I mean, most well-meant interventions don't help, and that should make us very chary of doing very much. Only in exceptional circumstances should we intervene.

Now, possibly one of those times — and this is debatable, but for the sake of argument — was in India in 1965 and 1966 when they had serious crop failures both years. And we did send ten million metric tons of grain to India each of those years. In effect we kept fifty million Indians alive who otherwise would have died. I think that's a fair historical summary. But, when President Johnson, at the end of 1966, privately gave notice to the rulers of India there would be no similar gift in 1967, I think he was behaving quite properly. In other words, this can't go on year after year. You've got to pull yourselves up by your bootstraps. And I think that was the right thing to do. In other words, when we *do* intervene in what's called a crisis, insist that a genuine crisis lasts only a short time. Otherwise it becomes chronic, and we're not in the business of chronic help, because that creates perpetual beggary. So, a certain amount of trimming of the sails, perhaps, should be done, but not much and always very reluctantly and in the full knowledge that you may be doing more harm than good.

Each sovereign nation should live within the limit of its resources, whatever they are — they can modify

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this somewhat if they have some special skills. Maybe they can make statues out of ivory that other people can't. Then they can sell those things and use that money as foreign exchange for buying things they don't have. I mean Cuba can, for example, buy snow machines and create some ski runs on its little mountains, if it wants to spend the money that way. But it shouldn't expect the rest of the world to furnish the money. Iceland or Greenland, say, could put up some hot houses and use artificial illumination, grow a few palm trees and have some of their people lie under palm trees, if they really want to. But that's their decision. They shouldn't expect to be given a section of tropical beach elsewhere, just because they don't have it. In the same way, I don't think the land-locked nations should expect to be given seafood. If they can buy it with some foreign exchange, fine. But I don't see that they should have any right to it.

"It's very hard to make intelligent sacrifices: we often make the situation worse by trying to help others."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *You've also written an essay entitled "Lifeboat Ethics" which describes the choices one must make in a world which is becoming overcrowded. What are the ethical implications of lifeboat ethics for those who already consider the U.S. to be overcrowded?*

HARDIN: Well, the simple thing to say to anybody who wants to make a sacrifice for distant people is this: "Go ahead and do it if that makes you happy, it's all right with me." But it may or may not help the distant person, because we have so many chances for sacrifices to be made, and in the end, they often do more harm than good. It's very hard to make intelligent sacrifices: we often make the situation worse by trying to help others. So if you're really concerned with distant people, your first question should be an intellectual one, "What's the argument; what's the evidence that this particular sacrifice will help them?" Most of the time it doesn't. Liberals tend to think that if my heart is pure, and I make a sacrifice, it'll do some good. Conservatives seem to think there's so many ways of doing things wrong, and I have enough trouble managing my own life, what makes me think I can manage other people's lives?

The unfortunate thing about the lifeboat image is that there are really two lifeboat problems. I'm speaking now of real lifeboat situations. In the case of a lifeboat that is already loaded up to capacity, if the people on the lifeboat refuse to take on any more, they are never charged, or successfully charged, in a court of law with having done anything wrong. It's accepted that that is the nature of the situation and they don't have to take on extra passengers. However, in the case of a lifeboat which is already loaded, perhaps over capacity, and somebody starts throwing people off, that's another problem, legally. And there is a famous case of the ship *John Brown* off the coast in about the time of Lincoln's administration, as I recall. One of the sailors took it upon himself to throw people overboard saying they were simply overloaded and that was it. He just threw people over until he got down to a number he felt there should be. They got into port and this sailor was charged with murder and convicted. The judge said that in such a case, if people volunteer to go overboard, that would be all right, but no one should take it upon himself to be the judge. Therefore this man was a murderer. There were mixed feelings about this as you can imagine. And, as I recall, after about six months, either the governor or the president — I can't remember which — pardoned him.

I think there is a general feeling that this was probably a good solution. He should have been convicted of murder, but he also should be pardoned. People have mixed feelings about this. But you see, it's a different problem when you throw overboard people who are already on board. And about that, I don't think we can say the law is really clear. There have been very few cases.

Whereas with the other lifeboat problem I think the law is quite clear. You are not compelled to commit suicide by taking more people on board. And basically what I am talking about when I use the lifeboat as an image for the national situation, I'm thinking of the case in which the lifeboat is not yet overcrowded, and I'm urging that we not overcrowd it — that we do not take on board more people.

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What is the difference between lifeboat ethics and triage?*

HARDIN: Well, they're just two ways of looking at the same thing. They're both taking account of the fact that you have limited resources. And then the second question is, if you have limited resources, how should you dispose of them? All agriculturalists have known since long before writing was invented that the only rational way to dispose of them is to invest in the winners and throw the losers out the door. And this is what you do. Your good livestock you save; your poor livestock you have for supper. And the same way with the seed, and so on. With only a limited number of acres to grow things on and a limited time to gather grain, you're silly if you grow poor grain. You're silly if you grow poor livestock. This idea is thousands of years old and wasn't even put into words or into a philosophy. One just knows it naturally.

"If you're going to eliminate unequal distribution, you should work at the other end by reducing the number of people who are living a miserable life, which means reducing the number of people who are alive in the next generation."

Then, in the late eighteenth century, as I recall, this term "triage" was introduced. I believe it was introduced into the sorting of coffee beans. I believe that was the first place this occurred. This is a commercial enterprise with people dividing the beans into three groups: the oversize, the right size and the undersize. I think that's where the word "triage" comes in. From there it went into medicine. Under battle conditions, one of the surgeons under Napoleon introduced this system. I think he also introduced the word "triage" also. If he didn't, it was done soon after. He gave an explicit definition making the point that we have limited resources: we cannot save all these wounded men. Which ones shall we save? He said they should be divided into three groups. From Napoleon's time it went into military medicine, and nobody questioned it. However, I read an interesting survey of military medical literature and it seems that an English military man said, "Oh, we never practice triage — that's terrible." Then he proceeded to describe what they did do and it turns out they were using triage. But he was not going to use the word.

So the word "triage" from an early day has had unfortunate connotations. People don't like it, even if they practice it. Many people are so dishonest. Now, coming down to the present, I was appalled when I discovered in reading for the lectures I was giving at the University of Washington, Seattle, (which eventually ended up in the book *Promethean Ethics*) — I discovered a little paper in a philosophical journal in which the individual was explicitly coming out against triage on philosophical grounds because it isn't fair. People should be chosen fairly regardless of the consequences. So, I really should have written a short paper to send to that journal so it wouldn't be lost, but I didn't. I just wrote it up in the book and pointed out I had worked on the mathematics of this and showed how, under all plausible situations, this led to fewer people living than if you used triage. I said, "That's a curious defense that you consciously use the system that sacrifices the most life." I wouldn't have believed that anybody would have explicitly come out for that but this philosopher did (he was up in Stanford at the time). I found it incredible that a person could have such a high regard for what he called fairness that he's willing to sacrifice lives so that everybody has the same chance.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *How do you respond to Paul Ehrlich's perspective that we cannot survive on an island of affluence in an ocean of misery.*

HARDIN: I think his statement is simply false. I think you have to look at one issue after another to see the extent to which we're bound together into one world. But as for his basic statement, "You can't live on an island of affluence in an ocean of misery," I think human beings have been living this way since Hector was a pup. Now, there is a certain amount of instability in it. Every now and then there's a revolution; and somebody invents a guillotine and a

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lot of heads roll, and so on. And then a new island of affluence develops, living in an ocean of misery, and life goes on. This is the way human life is. It may be that you don't like this or don't think it should be true, but in fact, it is true. And as far as the survival of civilization is concerned, I think that now we have essentially licked the diseases that took care of excess numbers of people, we should want to make it possible for this to happen because it's the only possibility for keeping civilization going. These various things we label as civilization — the art, the music, and so on — these are the offspring of affluence and can be maintained only by affluence. The people in the slums of Calcutta are not maintaining any of it, and won't and shouldn't and can't — any verb you want to use. Just can't be done. So, you can feel as bad as you want to about the fact that you're comfortable and somebody else is uncomfortable, but I think it's very foolish to try to eliminate that aspect of life — that is, the unequal distribution of things. If you're going to eliminate unequal distribution, you should work at the other end by reducing the number of people who are living a miserable life, which means reducing the number of people who are alive in the next generation. That's the thing to work on. And don't have a bad conscience about your prosperity now.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *You have stated your position on abortion as pro-choice. When do you consider life as being human?*

HARDIN: Whenever we all say it's human. This is a matter of definition, and we should define it so as to cause the minimum of disruption to society. One of the things we have to consider, and this has been known now for forty years, is that fifty percent of all the zygotes that are produced, human zygotes, perish without coming to birth. Fifty percent of them. But it's done at such an early stage that the woman doesn't know it. She thinks she's missed a period, and then it comes 5 or 8 or 10 days later, and she says, "I just had a late period, that's all." She's had an abortion — a spontaneous abortion — and she doesn't even know it. Once the woman knows it, when she stops to think about it, she says, "It doesn't matter, it really does not. I can't possibly have all those children that I could have if every egg survived, so this is normal." Of course, it's very easy to see with a species like rats where you have a litter started within a week after intercourse. If you count the number of little embryos that are started, you'll get a number that's twice as great as the average number in litters born. Half of the embryos degenerate during pregnancy, and only half are born. So, the general principle is this: we cannot make an ethical advance until we realize that numeracy is a part of ethics. If the number of spontaneous abortions is fifty percent, it doesn't matter. Now, if it was ninety-nine percent, then we should start being concerned. Put another way, however you assign values, the value of an early stage is only a fraction of value at a later stage, and I'll use as an example to bring that home, too. If you saw a man busy with a whole bunch of acorns in the driveway, pounding those acorns to death with a hammer, how would you feel about a public official coming along and trying to prosecute him for deforestation? People who say that all the stages are equally valuable are saying that there's no difference between an acorn and a hundred-year old oak tree. How wrong can you be? — there's a huge difference; and the same principle applies to all species of animals and plants, including humans. The value of a tiny zygote is just about zero; forget it.

"...we cannot make an ethical advance until we realize that numeracy is a part of ethics."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *How do you respond to the church and the Right to Lifers on the accusation of murder? Can you be righteous in the eyes of God and be pro-choice?*

HARDIN: The first thing is to be righteous in the eyes of human beings and do your library work. If you do your library work, you will discover that the Hebrew language for the Sixth Commandment is not "Thou shalt not kill." No, no, it is "Thou shalt not murder," and that's utterly different. Because the minute you say thou shalt not murder, you're acknowledging that killing is not necessarily murder. Then you have to settle on when do we want to call it murder. Killing is an objective fact, murder is an

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interpretation. When do we want to call killing murder? So, the idea that this is the way the Sixth Commandment goes is based on *bad* scholarship. We ignore the fact that Bibles that have been produced in the Twentieth Century, almost without exception, say "Thou shalt not commit murder." The King James version mistranslated the Hebrew.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *As a biologist, how do you view the issue of birth control?*

HARDIN: The essential part of this is that a biologist will never speak of the immense preciousness of life, or the sanctity of life, because the biologist sees no problem in "producing life" as we say (although, you don't produce it, you just pass it on). The problem is getting rid of excess life. This is a problem for every species. The problem is solved for most species by predators. Predators save a species from the problem of evolving intrinsic methods of population control. The reason we have a human population problem is because we got rid of our macro-predators about eight thousand years ago. As for the micro-predators, the disease germs, we've done a pretty good job of getting rid of those in the last two hundred years. This leaves nothing to curtail our numbers except ourselves. That's the problem.

There's no way that an animal can get rid of all its predators and avoid committing suicide as a species. All that has kept all species going has been the existence of predators, enemies. We see this in many partial ways whenever we have a pyramid — a food pyramid, as we call it — where the carnivores feed on the herbivores, and then the carnivores feed on the secondary carnivores, and so on. Finally we get to the top and find, say, a lion. Well, if you look at the populations of animals in such a pyramid — the mice down at the bottom, and maybe something a little bigger above that, and then the lions at the top — you hardly ever see a starving mouse. The mice are sleek and fat at all times. But you often see starving lions. The lions have no enemies; the mice do. And the rule in all predation is that the predators are great economizers. They want to get their food with the least effort. They look around and see which animal is lagging behind; either because it's sick or it isn't getting enough food, or something. That's the one the predator chooses. He goes after the easy meat. Predators constantly cull the prey-animals that are boderline cases. Predators are a blessing to the species they prey on. They keep the prey from becoming overpopulated

So you see, a biologist knows that there's just more life than we can manage, so he never speaks of the sanctity of life or anything of that sort. From the beginning, biologists have been with me.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Lynn White, Jr. has suggested that the historical roots of our ecological crisis stem from Christianity. White asserts that western culture has been shaped by reading the Bible to form the hierarchical view of human beings as dominant and separate from all other creatures. To what extent, if any, can Christianity be blamed for the current immigration problems of the U.S.?*

HARDIN: Well, there's a large literature, you might say, on Dr. White. He made a lot of people write essays. I'm not really familiar with these, so I'll get at it a different way, and maybe not the way that most people do. If you think of the development of an adapted organ, and you think of a situation that caused that development: which one comes first? The answer is, stress has to come first, then the development. If you want somebody to do something, you have to say, "I won't give you a reward first." No. They make the appropriate action, then you give them the reward. As for "reward first, then action," one gets away with this in a family because the relationship that has developed within the family is such that it turns out you can give a child ten cents now because you expect him to go over to the neighbor's house and offer to walk the lady's dog for her, and the child will take the ten cents and go walk the dog. Reward first, then action works in a small population, but it doesn't work with large populations, and yet we constantly try to make it work. People say, well if we only make these poor people rich enough they'll stop having so many children. This is absolutely wrong. You have to, in effect, say to them, "stop having so many children, and we will then give you a reward." In this sense, I think Christianity is responsible for a great deal of suffering in the world. Now, of course, it isn't just Christianity, most religions act this way, because most religions are simply an extension of the family. Religion developed before there was much development of science, and before there was much appreciation of the importance of numeracy — that numbers matter, that size matters. With a small group you could make a system work, when that

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same system will not work with a large group. Religions don't recognize that. They say, "we're going to be all one great big happy family living the way families do." It can't be done.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *You've indicated your favorite portion of the Bible is the third chapter of "Ecclesiastes." Could you elaborate on how this chapter provides biological implications toward human population?*

HARDIN: Well, that chapter, as I recall, says there is a time to be born, there's a time to die, there is a time to kill, and all these things are seen as both good and bad. They are all part of life; this is the realism as I see it of this passage. Now "Ecclesiastes" is, in the minds of most so-called Christians, not one of their favorite books. You seldom hear it recited or referred to in churches. Instead they refer to the softhearted part of the New Testament, where it builds up the idea of reward first, then behavior. "Ecclesiastes," if it does anything at all, says "No. Behavior first, then the reward."

"If you ask what is the carrying capacity for any piece of real estate, you have to specify at what level of living. ...The higher the quality of life, in the physical sense, the lower the carrying capacity, and vice versa."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Could you expand on the idea of carrying capacity?*

HARDIN: Carrying capacity falls under the heading of the conservative principles. For the animals other than human beings, which most people just call animals, the carrying capacity causes no essential trouble, no arguments. The carrying capacity for deer of a piece of land can be determined with considerable exactitude by the experts, who can look over the situation, make measurements, and so on. They'll come up with a figure. They'll say the carrying capacity of this square mile of land is seventy-five deer, say. And maybe it's seventy, maybe it's eighty. But it's about seventy-five. Now they acknowledge that there will be differences from year to year, but by the official carrying capacity they mean the safe carrying capacity. In other words you have to allow for bad years as well as good years, and keep the number down to the bad-year level so that you have a safety factor. Just as you have the carrying capacity of a bridge, you have a safety factor there. In the same way. But with that qualification, carrying capacity is a very sharp idea with non-human animals.

When we come to human animals, aside from the safety factor consideration, we run into some other factors that cause considerable trouble. Do you have in mind that people have meat in their diet, or are they going to be on a vegetarian diet? If they're going to eat a vegetarian diet, somewhere between five and ten times as many people can live on the same piece of land, and that's quite a difference. Are people going to live a luxurious life or a very simple life? Are they going to ride around in expensive automobiles, or are they going to ride buses and trains, or walk and ride bicycles, and so on? All of those figure into the carrying capacity. In other words, the quality of life — the physical quality of life.

And the simplest way to put this is in terms of energy. This isn't the whole story but it is a very quick way to grab hold of the problem. We require 3,000 kilocalories a day per person simply to live, and nothing more. Actually, Americans, at the latest reckoning, use 211,000 kilocalories a day per person. That's the quality of our life. When you come to countries like India or Bangladesh, they use, say, something like 30,000 to 40,000 kilocalories a day. Let's say 30,000. In other words, they use ten times as much energy as they need for food alone. But what do they use it for? Well, they use it for their clothing. They don't need as much in a tropical climates as one would in a colder one, of course. And they have some automobiles. They have some buses, and machines of various sorts, and these use up some of the energy. But they live on a much smaller energy diet than we do. So, if you ask what is the carrying capacity for any piece of real estate, you have to specify at what level of living. There is no unique answer for carrying capacity. Asking that question immediately raises the problems of value.

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What quality of life do you have in mind? The higher the quality of life, in the physical sense, the lower the carrying capacity, and vice versa.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Thomas Malthus has been criticized for being wrong about the issue of human population and carrying capacity. What can be gleaned from the work of Malthus?*

HARDIN: It is standard in certain quarters, particularly literature and sociology quarters, to decry Malthus as if this is something that has been completely disproved and all a bunch of nonsense. This is like saying that the idea that two plus two equals four is an old-fashioned idea that we've outgrown. It just isn't true.

The population situation is actually very complicated. The point is: Malthus did make mistakes. And if you look on his work as a prediction of what was going to happen in the immediate future, then, of course, he was very wrong, because he was saying that if there is any further population growth in England there would be massive poverty as a result of it. And that was not true. Before he died the population of England had increased a great deal, and there was no question but that people were wealthier than they had been before. So, what happened was exactly the opposite of what Malthus had predicted.

But that isn't really the heart of Malthus. The heart of Malthus is that there are limits to the world. Now even this assertion is under attack by certain people, such as Julian Simon, who says there are no meaningful limits. Well, there I part company with Simonians. I think there *are* meaningful limits and we've got to live with them.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *How is the United States addressing population control?*

HARDIN: Oh, there's no population control in the United States at all because we don't agree we're overpopulated. Overpopulation is always someplace else. Planned Parenthood, a couple of years ago, tried very neatly to get people to see this. I think it was very good. They got out a bumper sticker that said, "Trouble parking? Support Planned Parenthood." This is good because the way in which we see the effects of overpopulation are not the classic instances of starvation. They are these other things such as no parking space. From an educational point of view, those of us who think population growth is important, we have to get people in America to see that the signs of overpopulation here are quite different from what they are in, say, Africa. And you have to interpret those signs rightly. Don't interpret the lack of parking spaces to be matter of malfeasance on the part of political leaders.

Here in Santa Barbara there has been a series of letters objecting to the fact that it's being proposed that they charge for parking down near the beach. Some people have written in to say, "I like to park there. I'm retired. I like to park there and stay all day." What the writer doesn't see is there are only so many parking spaces. What are we going to do? You've got to allocate them one way or another. If you allocate them on a first-come/first-served basis then the early risers get the spaces and the late risers don't. Maybe that's the best system. But it's got to be allocated on some system, and that's a consequence of population growth. If we had only half as many people in Santa Barbara, we wouldn't have to raise this issue of parking meters at the beach. But people don't see the connection.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What are the main differences between your approach to population stabilization and the Ehrlichs' approach?*

HARDIN: Well, the Ehrlichs' approach is infected too much with this Christian, liberal fallacy — the idea that you can get what you want by being infinitely gentle with people and rewarding them in advance for appropriate behavior. I just don't think they're sufficiently hard-nosed about this. I favor Bertrand Russell's approach (in 1949) in which he said: even if we could create this one world that people dream of, it would soon shatter because the moment you have one world, it starts dividing into groups who fight with each other. But if, in fact, you think Russell is right, then stop trying always to push things in an impossible direction. Say, "well, we're going to have to continue to live with our enemies." How do we do it?

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *The Ehrlichs promote the concept of living within limits, but they're soft on the restriction of immigration. Does this confuse the issue of carrying capacity and population control for the U.S.?*

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HARDIN: It sure does. The Ehrlichs are such a good influence in many respects. It's too bad that they are apparently irretrievably hopeless on this issue. If you're going to have to have separate countries, the only way to have separate countries is by having barriers between them. Whatever you call them, there have to be barriers and the Ehrlichs don't want that, they don't want barriers, they want one big happy world. This is a common fallacy among scientists and scholars of all sorts, and I think it comes about when they're not thinking clearly enough about their own exceptional situation. The fact is, if you are a scientist, you can go to any place in the world and walk into a good laboratory and be at ease. The people there are doing the same thing you're doing back home. The same is true of musicians. This gives you a false impression of the unity of humanity. But this is true only for the scholarly community. It's not true for a politician. Think of the sort of thing we've seen in Central Europe in recent years. My gosh, just try as you will to get these people to sit down at the same table and they'd rather cut each other's throats. This is the way most people are, and scientists and scholars have to get used to it. In Central Africa, there isn't a chance of having a unified country in the lifetime of anyone now living or even ten lifetimes.

"There are other reasons [aside from reducing the size of the U.S. population] for restricting immigration that are more powerful. My position is that this idea of a multiethnic society is a disaster ... is insanity."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Environmental organizations promote conservation and the preservation of natural resources. However, most of these organizations will not express their position on population. Do these organizations actually do a disservice to their cause?*

HARDIN: The environmental people consist of two groups, one of which thinks that is a very fundamental principle to follow and another group which refuses to do it. And I would just give as an example, The Sierra Club. They have had person after person write them letters, lecture them, and say, "for God's sake, do something about population, do something about immigration." The Sierra Club will not raise a finger. You see, it's afraid of losing members, and so what they're doing is useless because they can't possibly save the world they want, this world of natural beauty, if there's no control of population. If they won't face that, they might as well give up, go home, get drunk, because they have no purpose in life. The bigger organizations are usually the worst because they are established and they don't want to give up their established clientele. The same thing can be said for the Audubon Society. ZPG, Inc. (Zero Population Growth) is actually a small organization, but it got started on the wrong foot, and they came out early for open immigration, open borders. Absolute insanity.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Is that a matter of financial support do you think?*

HARDIN: Yes, but in an indirect sense. They realize the moment they change they're going to lose immense financial support. If ZPG, Inc. changed now, and said, "we're absolutely for closed borders and controlling people from coming in," they would lose ninety percent of their membership. But so what? Their membership is on the road to ruin. The Sierra Club is in the same position; likewise, the Audubon Society. They will not face facts because they don't want to lose any members.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Some restrictionists believe that immigration has bound them to the replacement level fertility in the U.S. of either 2.1 or 2.3 children per family. They justify having more than 2 children because immigration has infringed upon their rights to have 3 or 4 children. Their position is that by restricting immigration to the U.S., the replacement- level fertility would increase and allow them the freedom of having more than 2 children if they desire. Is this justified?*

HARDIN: Sure, in terms of the argument. If they will settle for zero-growth population, and if they will restrict immigration, by arithmetic reasoning the average family size could be greater. But I think there are other reasons for restricting immigration that are more powerful. My position is that this idea

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of a multiethnic society is a disaster. That's what we've got in Central Europe, and in Central Africa. A multiethnic society is insanity. I think we should restrict immigration for that reason. Having done that, then we can ask, are we having enough children or not? If our population is decreasing ten percent every year, we might decide we're better off by ten percent every year. Or on the other side, we say, "we've got to stop it at some level." When that level is reached, we can offer community rewards for those who will have more than the usual number of children. This can be subject to a reward system.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Has your essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," been misconstrued?*

HARDIN: Yes, yes. On some of these ideas I try to correct people over and over again, because like every subtle idea, it acts as a sort of Rorschach test and people see in it what they want to. If I had written more carefully, maybe I could have avoided that, but maybe not. If I were doing it over again I would summarize the idea more carefully somewhat along the following lines: that "in a crowded world, an unmanaged commons cannot possibly work." In the original, I did not refer to a "crowded world," but that's an essential part of it. Also the term "unmanaged" — I didn't put that in intially. That was the implication, but I didn't put it in. The omissions have caused people to misunderstand the meaning. We have people on the right sometimes thinking I'm giving a defense of the left position; people on the left think I'm defending the right position. I try to tell them I'm not defending either position.

In 1979 I finally prepared a one-page summary, together with a sort of a box in the middle where I summarized things, and then some words to go along with it in which I tried to set down exactly what I thought it meant. I pointed out that if the world is not crowded, a commons may in fact be the best method of distribution. For example, when the pioneers spread out across the United States, the most efficient way was to treat all the game in the wild as a commons, an unmanaged commons ("Just fire away") because for a long time they couldn't do any real damage. Whereas, if they tried to set up some sort of management scheme, they would have had the cost of managing. So, in an uncrowded world a commons is fine. But as soon as it starts getting crowded, then it doesn't work because each person, seeking his own self-interest — even though he sees that the result is bad for all of them — is trapped into mistreating the commons if it is unmanaged, if the rule is "help yourself." At that point you have to have some other rule.

There are two possibilities. Either you set up a commons manager (which is what you do under socialism) or you divide up the territory and assign it to individuals for each to manage as his own (private property). That can work, too. Either system may work: privatism or socialism. They may not, but they may. There's a chance. Whereas the unmanaged commons hasn't a chance of working once the world is crowded. Everything I've said now is really implicit in the original article, but I didn't make it as clear as I should have.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *On the concept of "the tragedy of the commons," do you believe there is a danger with constantly presenting the threat of doom to people such that they become insensitive and unmotivated as to the consequences?*

HARDIN: Oh, yes. Sure. This is a persistent danger, and I don't know what the answer to it is. It's a matter of temperamental differences no doubt built on education, that some people, defensively, simply don't want to hear unpleasant news, even if it's true news. Of course, I'm one of the people sometimes called a doomsayer, so you might ask: what's my defense? Well, I find my conclusions not gratifying, but somehow pleasing — somehow acceptable and profound, with the attraction of an idea of tragedy. This appreciation is largely missing from our society, partly because of the immense progress of science and technology and the dominance of the idea of progress. If anything goes wrong, there must be a solution to it. So we think.

We're a rather exceptional civilization in this way. The Greeks had a very keen idea of tragedy. There are many things that just can't go right. In all the stories of tragedy, the hero is told in advance what is going to happen, and then he tries to avoid his fate, switching to left and switching to right. But no matter what he does tragedy eventually hits him anyway.

This occurs among the Greeks; it occurs in the folktales of Europe, and so on. It's only in the last 200 years that the taste for that sort of story seems to

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have disappeared. I think we may be passing through a transition now when a new appreciation for tragedy may come back again. I'm afraid this appreciation will come back to us only after considerable pain and suffering. I would prefer to see it come back without so much suffering, in other words through just sheer intellectual understanding.

I agree with Whitehead that the idea of tragedy played an essential part in the development of science. Tragedy brings a feeling of the inevitable, a feeling that something is inescapable; and that is the idea of a scientific law. You may not like the thought of people dying because they happen to fall off the third story of a building, and they don't always die when they fall off the third story, but most of the time they do. And if not the third, the fifth. And there are some exceptional occasions — there's one occasion of a guy falling out of an airplane at 2,000 feet and living. But still, behind the confusing facts there is the inescapable law of gravity. So that's it. And Whitehead said this idea of inescapability, which is almost a religious idea, is essential to science.

That's the only way to put it.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *What will be the condition of the U.S. going into the 21st century if current population trends and immigration policies continue?*

H: In reading the trends remember what DuBois said: "Trends are not destiny." If you really read the trend correctly, you may decide to change it. You don't have to do what the trend says. But reading the trend right now we see that we're moving toward a larger society, faster growing, more diverse, more multicultural, and less peaceful. We're moving toward a state of steady civil war between the various groups that we're encouraging to come here. I see nothing but disaster ahead for us if we continue chasing after multiculturalism.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *You're in your eighties and you've just written another book. Do you have other goals you're pursuing? How do you plan to devote your time?*

HARDIN: Doing what I'm doing now. I have a lovely life. Right now you're here when I'm in one of my rare inactive moods. I decided I'm not going to work this summer. I've been working hard for five years and enough's enough! So I'm straightening up the study. I've got to get things in better order; but I'm just enjoying myself. My day is this: I get up at 6:30, dress, shave, make my bed, eat breakfast at 7:00, and read *The Wall Street Journal*, because I like the major stories. I'm not making money off it, but they have some good stories that most of the newspapers don't have. It's good journalism, in my opinion. At about a quarter of eight, I come out to the study, and I work through the morning, 8:00 to 12:00. Have lunch, then a nap, then a swim. It takes me an hour for my swim, but I don't think I'd be alive today without that swim; it's just wonderful. The rest of the day I read the paper, play cards with my wife, various things, It's really quite an easy life. I used to work an eight-hour day or more. Now I work just four hours, which is appropriate for a person my age, and I wouldn't want anything better. I'm fortunate that I have enough retirement pay to be able to do this ... no debts.

"...we're moving toward a larger society, faster growing, more diverse, more multicultural, and less peaceful. ...Moving toward a state of steady civil war between the various groups that we're encouraging to come here."

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *A last question: how would you like to be remembered?*

HARDIN: I find that I'm known most widely for two things. One is my paper, "The Tragedy of the Commons." This is in the literature permanently. It's part of economics. That suits me fine. I'm proud of that. The other paper — which had as a theme the phrase which I didn't coin, but it caught people's attention — is "Lifeboat Ethics." Ours is a limited world, and we have to find out how to dispense the goodies. We have to find the method of triage when there aren't enough goodies to go around. Many people damn me as "heartless." But the world *is* limited.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: *Well, thank you. It's been a pleasure.* TSC

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Index for Volume VII - Fall 1996 to Summer 1997

Numbers Given Refer to Pages:
Pages 1-72: Vol. VII, No. 1, Fall 1996; Pages 73-148: Vol. VII, No. 2, Winter 1996-97
Pages 149-228: Vol. VII, No. 3, Spring 1997; Pages 229-308: Vol. VII, No. 4, Summer 1997

Editorials

"Asylum Should be Temporary" p.231
"Jumping the Queue" p.3
"Reverse Brain Drain" p.151
"Song of the Sirens" p.75

Articles

"Alan Nelson Remembered" by Roger Conner, p.267
"Aliens in LA County Jails" by Linda Thom, p.290
"American Campus: Paying the Price of Induced Diversity" by David Simcox, p.164
"America's Trojan Horse" by Donald Collins, p.58
"An Anti-immigration Reckoning?" by Paul Gigot, p.86
"An Appeal to Conscience: Courting Liberals at the 1996 Democratic Convention" by Roy Beck, p.26
"Anchor Babies: Case for Correction by Constitutional Amendment" by Anthony Bielenson, p.7
"Anchor Babies: Case for Correction Through Legislation" by Brian Bilbray, p.9
"Anchor Babies: The Citizen-Child Loophole" by Wayne Lutton, p.5
"Anti-Immigration Immigrants" by Yeh Ling-Ling, p.130
"Asian-American: A New Identity" by Scott McConnell, p.61
"Asylum *Ad Absurdum*" by James Robb, p.235
"Asylum and Refugee Programs: Some Recommended Reforms" by William Chip, p.265
"Asylum Reform Needed" by Jack Martin, p.258
"Australian Nation-State: Decline and Reaction" by Robert Birrell, p.104
"Australia's Cultural Identity" by Robert Birrell, p.215
"'Being There': The [Australian] Prime Minister and Pauline [Hanson]" by Denis McCormack, p.101
"Britain Fails to Debate Immigration Issues" by Ray Honeyford, p.283
"CEOs and Immigration" by Perry Lorenz, p.176
"Citizenship and the Babies of Non-Citizens" by John Bauer and Dan Stein, p.11
"Citizenship Without Consent" by Peter Schuck, Rogers Smith, p.19
"Colonists and Immigrants: Who Were the First Americans?" by Henry Pratt Fairchild, p.134
"Culture Clash in South Central L.A." by Terry Anderson, p.50
"Debate Continues: Is Canadian Immigration Policy Really Better?" by Mark Wegierski, p.107
"Dissenting Voices on Immigration" by Scott Winokur, p.52
"'Dominican Vespers'" by Kevin Jenks, p.268
"Effective Enforcement of Immigra-tion Law" by Robert McGraw, p.186
"Endless Demand for Cheap Labor" by Edward Lewis, p.180
"Engineers and Scientists: Their Temporary and Permanent Entry Into the U.S.A." charts by David North, p.163
"Ethics Trumping Economics? The Economics of Immigration Control" by Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., p.117
"Ethnic Case Against Immigration" by Perry Lorenz, p.123
"Ethno-nationalism, Aztlan and 'Official Spanish'" by Diana Hull, p.37
"Family Values: A Valid Criterion for Immigrants?" by Joseph Daleiden, p.132
"Fax on Both Your Houses: Lobbying for the Chinese Student Protection Act" by Norman Matloff
"Fleeing Their Culture: Extending Asylum to Women" by Wayne Lutton, p.242
"Funny Thing Happened On the Way to the U.S." by James Walsh, p.247
"GOP Strategy 2000" by Lawrence Auster, p.92
"GOP Strategy Suggestion" by Samuel Francis, p.200
"GOP Wizards Miss the Point on Immigration" by Samuel Francis, p.83
"Grassroots Reform Group Discusses Goals" by Joseph Daleiden, p.213
"High Tech Careers: Big Draw for Foreign Students" by Jim Specht, p.172
"Hispanic Muscle in the 1996 Elections" by David Simcox, p.79
"Hispanic Political Tide?" by Linda Chavez, p.83
"How Should the GOP Handle Immigration?" by Paul Gigot, p.194
"How the '96 Immigration Bill Became Law" by John Judis, p.95
"Illegal Immigrants in U.S. Now at 5 Million" by William Branigin, p.189
"Illegal Immigrants: Let's Not Make Them Into 'Celebrated Martyrs'" by Linda Bowles, p.59
"Immigration Reform in France As Street Theater" by Gerda Bikales, p.276
"Immigration: The View From McArthur Park" by Don Feder, p.192
"Immigration's Role in the U.S. Computer Industry" by Norman Matloff, p.159
"'Indulgence in Ethnicity' (In Canada)" by Charles Krauthammer, p.282
"Is the Door Open Too Wide?" by Scot Lehigh, p.54
"It's a Wonderful Life: Gigot Says We Must Be Optimists At All Costs" by David Payne, p.197
"Job Market Does Number on Ph.D.s in Math and Science" by John Yemma, p.170
"Language Matters" by Leo Sorensen, p.214
"Latter Day Plantations: The National Institutes of Health and the Immigration Economy" by Mark Godec, p.155
"Light Bulbs, Flying Horses, and Cleopatra's Nose" by David Payne, p.115
"Mexa National Conference" by David Payne, p.210
"More Bad Statistics" by Linda Thom, p.28
"More Infamous Immigrants" by Joseph Fallon, p.42
"Myths of Family Reunification" by William Buchanan, p.31
"Needed: Better Training Not More Immigrants" by William F. Buckley, Jr., p.196
"No Need for Illegal Workers" by Mark Krikorian, p.56
"Not a Birthright: No Citizenship for the Children of Non-Citizens" by William Chip, p.17
"'Official Spanish' Push" by Georgie Anne Geyer, p.36
"Our Illegal Population Continues to Rise" by Ken Hamblin, p.191
"Picturing Dystopia: Social Change By Way of the Popular Novel" by John

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zmirak, p.111
"Right-wing Immigrationists" by Scott McConnell, p.86
"Rudolfo Acuña: A Chicano Warhorse Goes to Court" by Diana Hull, p.203
"Russian Jews Ponder U.S. Welfare Reforms" by Lev Krichevsky, p.63
"Seeking Unity in Diversity" by Rolando Flores Acosta, p.48
"'Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof'" by William Buchanan, p.287
"Time Bomb Ticking Away" by Dan Walters, p.295
"Too Close to Call" by Karen Saranita, p.94
"Toward Language Sanity" by Don Feder, p.47
"Undermining Tibet's Moral Claims" by Joseph Fallon, p.255
"Welcome to America: Still the Immigrant's Retirement Haven" by Don Barnett, p.293
"What Kind of [New York] City Do You Want, Mr. Mayor?" by Roy Beck, p.129
"Where It All Began" by Robert Kyser, p.174
"Which Countries Grant Birthright Citizenship" chart by Sarah Adams, p.16
"Winners and Losers: The Troubling Analogy of our Current Immigration Economy to that of the Antebellum South" by Mark Godec, p.121

Authors of Articles

Acosta, Rolando Flores, "Seeking Unity in Diversity" p.48
Adams, Sarah, "Which Countries Grant Birthright Citizenship" (chart) p.16
Anderson, Terry, "Culture Clash in South Central L.A." p.50
Auster, Lawrence, "GOP Strategy 2000" p.92
Bauer, John (with Dan Stein), "Citizenship and the Babies of Non-Citizens" p.11
Barnett, Don, "Welcome to America: Still the Immigrant's Retirement Haven" p.293
Beck, Roy, "An Appeal to Conscience: Courting Liberals at the 1996 Democratic Convention" p.26; "What Kind of [New York] City Do You Want, Mr. Mayor?" p.129
Beilenson, Anthony, "'Anchor Babies': Case for Correction by Constitutional Amendment" p.7
Bikales, Gerda, "Immigration Reform in France As Street Theater" p.276
Bilbray, Brian, "'Anchor Babies': Case for Correction Through Legislation" p.9
Birrell, Robert, "Australian Nation-State: Decline and Reaction" p.104; "Australia's Cultural Identity" p.215
Bowles, Linda, "Illegal Immigrants: Let's Not Make Them Into 'Celebrated Martyrs'" p.59
Branigin, William, "Illegal Immigrants in U.S. Now at 5 Million" p.189
Briggs, Vernon M. Jr., "Ethics Trumping Economics? The Economics of Immigration Control" p.117
Buchanan, William, "Myths of Family Reunification" p.31; "'Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof'" p.287
Buckley, William F., "Needed: Better Training Not More Immigrants" p.196
Chavez, Linda, "Hispanic Political Tide?" p.83
Chip, William F., "Not a Birthright: No Citizenship for the Children of Non-Citizens" p.17; "Asylum and Refugee Programs: Some Recommended Reforms" p.265
Collins, Donald, "America's Trojan Horse" p.58
Conner, Roger, "Alan Nelson Remembered" p.267
Daleiden, Joseph, "Grassroots Reform Groups Discuss Goals" p.213; "Family Values: A Valid Criterion for Immigrants? P.132
Fairchild, Henry Pratt, "Colonists and Immigrants: Who Were the First Americans?" p.134
Fallon, Joseph, "More Infamous Immigrants" p.42; "Undermining Tibet's Moral Claims" p.255
Feder, Don, "Immigration: The View From McArthur Park" p.192; "Toward Language Sanity" p.47
Francis, Samuel, "GOP Wizards Miss the Point on Immigration" p.83; "GOP Strategy Suggestion" p.200
Geyer, Georgie Anne, "'Official Spanish' Push" p.36
Gigot, Paul, "An Anti-Immigration Reckoning?" p.86; "How Shall the GOP Handle Immigration?" p.194
Godec, Mark, "Latter Day Plantations: The National Institutes of Health and the Immigration Economy" p.155; "Winners and Losers: The Troubling Analogy of our Current Immigration Economy to that of the Antebellum South" p.121
Hamblin, Ken, "Our Illegal Population Continues to Rise" p.191
Honeyford, Ray, "Britain Fails to Debate Immigration Issues" p.283
Hull, Diana, "Ethno-nationalism, Aztlan and 'Official Spanish'" p.203; "Rudolfo Acuña: A Chicano Warhorse Goes to Court" p.203
Jenks, Kevin, "'Dominican Vespers'" p.268
Judis, John, "How the '96 Immigration Bill Became Law" p.95
Krauthammer, Charles, "'Indulgence in Ethnicity'" (In Canada) p.282
Krichevsky, Lev, "Russian Jews Ponder U.S. Welfare Reforms" p.63
Krikorian, Mark, "No Need for Illegal Workers" p.56
Kyser, Robert, "How It All Began" p.174
Lehigh, Scot, "Is the Door Open Too Wide?" p.54
Lewis, Edward, "Endless Demand for Cheap Labor" p.180
Lorenz, Perry, "CEOs and Immigration" p.176; "Ethnic Case Against Immigration" p.123
Lutton, Wayne, "'Anchor Babies': The Citizen-Child Loophole" p.5; "Fleeing Their Culture: Extending Asylum to Women" p.242
Martin, Jack, "Asylum Reform Needed" p.258
Matloff, Norman, "Fax on Both Your Houses" p.250; "Immigration's Role in the U.S. Computer Industry" p.159
McConnell, Scott, "Asian-American: A New Identity" p.61; "Right-Wing Immigrationists" p.86
McGraw, Robert, "Effective Enforcement of Immigration Law" p.186
McCormack, Denis, "'Being There': The [Australian] Prime Minister and Pauline [Hanson]"p.101
North, David, "Engineers and Scientists: Their Temporary and Permanent Entry to the U.S.A." (charts) p.163
Payne, David, "It's A Wonderful Life: Gigot Says We Must Be Optimists At All Costs: p.197; "Light Bulbs, Flying Horses, and Cleopatra's Nose" p.115; "Mexa National Conference" p.210
Robb, James, "Asylum *Ad Absurdum*" p.235
Saranita, Karen, "Too Close to Call" p.94
Schuck, Peter (with Rogers Smith), "Citizenship Without Consent" p.19
Simcox, David, "American Campus: Paying the Price of Induced Diversity" p.164; "Hispanic Muscle in the 1996 Elections" p.79
Smith, Rogers (with Peter Schuck), "Citizenship Without Consent" p.19
Sorenson, Leo, "Language Matters" p.214
Specht, Jim, "High Tech Careers: Big Draw for Foreign Students" p.172

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Stein, Dan (with John Bauer), "Citizenship and the Babies of Non-Citizens" p.11
Thom, Linda, "Aliens in L.A. County Jails" p.290; "More Bad Statistics" p.28
Walsh, James, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the U.S." p.247
Walters, Dan, "Time Bomb Ticking Away" p.295
Wegierski, Mark, "Debate Continues: Is Canadian Immigration Policy Really Better?" p.107
Winokur, Scott, "Dissenting Voices on Immigration" p.52
Yeh Ling Ling, "Anti-Immigration Immigrants" p.130
Yemma, John, "Job Market Does Number on Ph.D.s in Math and Science" p.170
Zmirak, John, "Picturing Dystopia: Social Change by Way of the Popular Novel" p.111

Subjects

Abraham, Sen. Spencer (R-MI) as chair of Immigration Sub-committee, p.86, p.194, p.196, p.197, p.200
Acuña, Rudolfo, p.203
Affirmative action on campus, p.164
Agriculture, illegal immigrants in, p.56
AIDS sufferers and asylum, p.235
American, definition of, p.134; technical skills replaced by immigrants, p.155, p.159
Amnesty of 1986, effect of cancelled, p.189, p.191
"Anchor Babies" (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
Anti-reform coalition, p.95
Anti-white movement among students, p.61
Assimilation, p.196; means use of English, p.47
Asylees, p.213
Asylum and immigration policy, p.235, p.242, p.247, p.258, p.265
Australia, immigration policy in, p.101, p.104, p.215
Automatic citizenship (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
Aztlan, p.36, p.37, p.203, p.210
Backlog of asylum claims, p.258
Balkanization of American campuses, p.164
Bilingualism, p.214; separatism promoted by, p.48
Birthright citizenship, (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
Blacks, employment of hurt by immigration policy, p.26, p.50, p.54
British immigration policy, p.283
California, Civil Rights Initiative in, p.79, p.83, p.86, p.90; impacted by illegal immigration, p.59, p.192, p.290, p.295; "Proposition 187", p.79, p.191; voting patterns in, p.79, p.83, p.86, p.90
Canada, culture of, compared with Australia, p.215; ethnic politics in, p.282; immigration policy in, p.107; refugee policy of, p.107
CATO Institute, p.95
CEOs and immigration policy, p.176
Cheap labor, and immigration, p.58, p.115, p.121, p.176; highly skilled, p.155, p.159, p.250; in historical perspective, p.180
"Citizen-Child Loophole" (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
Chicanos, national conference of, p.210
China's policy toward Tibet, p.255
Chinese immigrants, recent, oppose immigration, p.130
Chinese Student Protection Act, p.250
Citizenship, automatic at birth, p.5, p.7, p.9, p.11, p.16, p.17, p.19, p.287
Clash of cultures (black/Hispanic), p.50
College faculties and immigration, p.172, p.174
Colonists, different from immigrants, p.134
Commission on Immigration Reform (Jordan Commission), p.26, p.31, p.54, p.95
Computer industry and immigration, p.159
Congress, and asylum/refugee claims, p.258, p.265; fails low-wage earner, p.54; fails to fund enforcement against illegals, p.186; and farm worker policies, p.56; and immigration reform, p.31, p.95; makes special provision for Chinese students, p.250; for Tibet refugees, p.255
Congressional election, of 1996, p.79, p.83, p.86, p.90, p.92, p.194, p.200
Congressional Immigration Commission of 1921, p.180
Constitution, U.S., and citizen-child amendment (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
Counterfeit IDs, p.192
Crime and immigration, p.132, p.290
Cubans, special status of, p.258
Culture clash (black/Hispanic), p.50
Diversity on campus, p.164
Dominican Republic, and immigration, p.268; 'Dominican Vespers' massacre, p.268
Dornan, Rep. Bob (R-CA), 1996 election loss of, p.79, p.83, p.86, p.90, p.94
Economic, concerns and national interest, p.117; consequences of mass immigration, p.117; inequality grows, p.54
Education, impacted by immigration in California, p.290
"Einstein Exemption", p.170, p.174
Election of 1996 (see Congressional election of 1996)
Employment, of blacks, p.26, p.50, p.54
Enforcement of immigration laws, p.186
Engineers and immigration, p.155, p.159, p.163, p.172
English as official language, p.214; English Empowerment Act of 1996, p.47, p.48
Entitlements on campus, p.164
Ethnic, bloodbath in Hispaniola, p.268; politics in Canada, p.282; tensions in Britain, p.283; studies programs, p.61; viability vs multiculturalism, p.123
Ethnocide in Tibet, p.255
Extended family and immigration, p.31
Fallacies in the debate over immigration policy, p.115
Family reunification, p.117; and immigration policy, p.31, p.95
Family values and immigration policy, p.132
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), p.235, p.242
Feminists, p.235
Ford Foundation, p.203
Foreign students, take jobs from Americans, p.170; on campus, p.164, p.172
Fourteenth Amendment and citizen-child loophole, (see citizenship, automatic at birth)
France, immigration policy and hunger strike in, p.276
Fraudulent claims for asylum, p.247
Gender and immigration policy, p.235, p.242
Globalization, p.104, p.111, p.176, p.200, p.215
GOP prospects and immigration (see Republican prospects...)
Grassroots immigration reform, p.213
Guest-workers in agriculture, p.56
Haiti, relations with the Dominican Republic, p.268
Hispanics, activist groups, p.36, p.37; voting patterns of, p.79, p.83, p.86, p.90, p.92
HIV/AIDS sufferers and asylum, p.235
Homosexuals and asylum, p.235
IDs, easy to counterfeit, p.192
Illegal immigrants, p.95, p.186, p. 189; in agriculture, p.56; apprehen-sion of, p.59; impact of in California, p.59, p.192; in France, p.276; in USA at 5 million, p.189, p.191
Immigrants, differ from colonists, p.134; and higher education, p.164; illegal, (see illegal immigrants); infamous, p.42; numbers threatens U.S., p.52
Immigration, affects employment of blacks, p.50, p.54; and California schools, p.290; and cheap labor, p.58, p.180; and crime, p.132, p.290; engineers and scientists affected by, p.163, p.170, p.172; and family values, p.132; from the Dominican Republic, p.268; impact

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of on computer programmers, p.159; impact of on medicine and research, p.155; lobbying for, p.95; mass, economic consequences of, p.117; not always beneficial, p.42; quota system of 1920s, p.134; reform and 1996 elections (see Congressional elections of 1996); and Republican party prospects (see Republican party...); and SSI/ Medicaid/ welfare reform, p.293
Immigration Act of 1965, p.117
Immigration Reform Act of 1986, p.191
Immigration Act of 1990, p.31
Immigration Bill of 1996, p.95
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and asylum/ refugee claims, p.235, p.242, p.247, p.258, p.265; and illegals, p.189; interior enforcement of laws needed, p.186; Investigations Division, p.186; reports increase in illegal population, p.191; under leadership of Alan Nelson, p.267
Immigration policy, p.194, p.196, p.197; and asylees, p.235, p.265; and ethnicity, p.123; fallacies in the debate over, p.115; hurts blacks, p.26; impact on California state finances, p.295; in Australia, p.101, p.104, p.215; in Britain, p.283; in Canada, p.107; in France, p.276; influenced by CEOs, p.176; and infrastructure, p.129; re: family reunification, p.31; reform of, p.213; re: scientists and mathematicians, p.174; and Republican prospects, p.200
Immigration reform at grassroots, p.213
Income disparity, p.121
INS (see Immigration and Naturalization Service)
Internationalist economic policies, in Australia, p.104
Investigations Division of INS, p.186
Irredentism, p.36, p.37, p.203, p.210
Jewish immigration from Russia, p.63
Jobs, for Americans, p.176; and immigrants in Australia, p.104; and immigration, p.117, p.121; highly skilled and immigrants, p.155, p.159, p.170; low skilled and immigrants, p.129; taken from blacks, p.50
Jordan Commission (see Commission on Immigration Reform)
Labor policy in France, p.276
Language, barrier in U.S. p.36, p.37; policy, p.48
La Raza (The Race) p.203
Lobbying and immigration, p.95, p.250
Logic in the imm. policy debate, p.115
MALDEF, p.36, p.37
Mass immigration, p.111; economic consequences of, p.117
Mathematicians and immigration policy, p.170, p.174
MEChA, p.36, p.37, p.203, p.210
Media, influencescultural identity, p.215
Mexico, male homicide rate in, p.132; source of most illegals, p.189
Microsoft (Bill Gates) and immigration, p.95
Moratorium proposed by some Chinese immigrants, p.130
Multiculturalism, p.61, p.111, p.176, p.196, p.214; in Australia, p.104, p.215; in Canada, p.282; in Britain, p.283; erodes ethnic cohesion, p.61, p.123
National Voter Registration Act, p.94
Nation-state, p.215
Nelson, Alan, as head of INS, p.267
Novel (fiction) and social change, p.111
Nuclear family and immigration, p.31
Official English, p.47, p.48, p.214
Proposition 187 in California, p.191
Racism, charge of, p.52, p.58, p.101, p.104; label stifles debate in Britain, p.283
Refugee Act of 1980, p.258, p.265
Refugee policy, p.247; re: HIV/AIDS sufferers, p.235; re: Tibet, p.255; re: women, p.235, p.242
Refugees, p.213, p.258; Russian Jews, p.63
Republican prospects and immigration, p.79, p. 83, p.86, p.90, p.92, p.197, p.200, p.290
Researchers and immigration, p.155
Restriction on immigration, history of in U.S., p.111
Scientists and immigration, p.155, p.163, p.170, p.172, p.174
Skilled professionals and immigration, p.170, p.172, p.250
SSI/Medicaid payments, to immigrants, p.293
Separatism, in Canada, p.282; in Hispanic Southwest, p.36, p.37; promoted by bilingualism, p.48
Southwest U.S., claimed by Chicanos, p.203, p.210; and Mexican Student Movement, p.36, p.37
Spanish as official language, p.36, p.37
Statistics, impact of immigration on California schools, p.290
Strike (hunger), by the "paperless", in France, p.276
Tanton, John, p.194
Terrorism Prevention Act, p.258
Tibetans flee to U.S., p.255
United States, decline of and immigration, p.58
Violence against women, p.235, p.242
Voting, patterns of Hispanics, (see Hispanics, voting patterns of); fraud possible, p.94
Wage decline and mass immigration, p.129
Welfare reform, and immigration, p.293; and Russian Jews, p.63
Workers (see employment, jobs)
Xenophobia, charge of, p.52

Books Reviewed

Bueler, William, *An Agenda for Sustainability: Fairness in a World of Limits* , p.299
Francis, Samuel, *Revolution From the Middle*, p.305
Glazer, Nathan, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, p.296
Grant, Lindsey, *Juggernaut: Growth on a Finite Planet*, p.142
Harrison, Lawrence, *The Pan-American Dream: Do Latin America's Cultural Values Discourage True Partnership with the U.S. and Canada?* p.222
Hollingsworth, William, *Ending the Explosion: Population Policies and Ethics for a Humane Future*, p.298
Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, p.137
Jacobson, David, *Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*, p.139
Lipset, Seymour Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, p.69
Maharidge, Dale, *The Coming White Minority: California's Eruptions and the Nation's Future*, p.301
Oppenheimer, Andres, *Bordering on Chaos*, p.67
Pan, Lynn, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: The Story of the Overseas Chinese*, p.144
Tezcatlipoca, Olin, *Mexica Handbook*, p.211
Weiner, Myron, *The Global Migration Crisis*, p.223
Williamson, Chilton, Jr., *The Immigration Mystique: America's False Conscience*, p.64

Reviewers of Books

Burke, B. Meredith, p.301
Collins, Donald, p.222
Gottfried, Paul, p.296
Lamb, Kevin, p.69, p.137
Lutton. Wayne, p.211
Masters, Michael, p.305
McCormack, Denis, p.144
Nelson, Brent, p.139
Pavlik, Gregory, p.64
Payne, David, p.223
Rohe, John, p.142, p.298, p.299
Simcox, David, p.67

Articles, Reports Reviewed

"Addressing the Criminal Alien Problem," p.148
"America's Victims at its Southern Border," p.148
"Flow of Peoples," p.227
"Immigration and the Welfare State: Immigrant Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs," p.71
"Measuring the Fallout: The Cost of IRCA Amnesty after Ten Years," p.307
"Net Costs of Immigration: The Facts, the Trends, and the Critics," p.147
"Saving Germans from Extinction," p.227
"What Is the Relationship Between Income Inequality and Immigration?" p.147

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Not On My Lifeboat

Avoiding universalism's fatal embrace

Book review by Michael W. Masters

> *"I feel guilty about my good luck," say some. The reply to this is simple: Get out and give your place to others.*
>
> — Garrett Hardin,"Living on a Lifeboat"

> *Stand by to repel boarders...*
>
> — Anonymous sailing ship captain

Perhaps the most gratifying sound in public discourse is the *pop* of punctured preconceived notions — particularly when the notions thus deposed are manifestly harmful ones. With the ascendancy of universalist liberalism as a compulsory ethical model, there are plenty of injurious preconceptions to choose from. No one harpoons them better than biologist Garrett Hardin, Professor Emeritus of Human Ecology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Hardin, now in his 80s, has wielded his pen with the impact of a wrecking ball ever since his seminal essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," appeared in 1968.

Stalking the Wild Taboo
by Garrett Hardin
Petoskey, MI: The Social Contract Press
376 pages, $15.95 paperback

Hardin is the author of numerous books and essays on ethics, ecology, population and immigration. Book credits include *The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist's View of Survival; Living Within Limits; The Immigration Dilemma: Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons*; and *Exploring New Ethics for Survival.* The most recent release, a reprint of *Stalking the Wild Taboo,* includes several essays and a new preface illuminating the destructive impact of the universalist ethos on our society. Besides "The Tragedy of the Commons," his most influential essays include "Living on a Lifeboat," "Carrying Capacity as an Ethical Concept," and "Discriminating Altruisms."

Much of Hardin's work advances the thesis that universalism is an *inherently* flawed, even suicidal, ethical system. It compels those deceived by its siren song to sacrifice self and group interests for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Yet it is practiced widely only by Western peoples — who are thereby impaired in competing with those whose loyalty remains closer to home. Universalism harms those we care about most — our own friends, relatives and kinsmen. It benefits those who are, at best, indifferent to our beliefs — and, at worst, utterly contemptuous of them.

Hardin has a warning for those whose actions are guided by such beliefs: "Noble intentions are a poor excuse for stupid action. Man is the only species that calls some suicidal actions 'noble.' The rest of creation knows better." To Hardin's words, we would add: The penalty for those who fail to grasp nature's realities is the same as it is in the animal kingdom—disappearance.

The Tragedy of the Commons

To understand Hardin's message, one may begin with "The Tragedy of the Commons." In concise, elegant prose, Hardin introduces many of the ethical themes that have illuminated his work since. Among them: anything that is free invites exploitation (an apt description of welfare); the carrying capacity of any resource is a vital ethical consideration (a realistic justification for limiting immigration in a finite world); and voluntary "ethical" behavior, without regard to the actions of others, can act as agent for its own elimination.

The tragedy of the commons, first advanced in 1833 by mathematician William Forster Lloyd, is

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Michael W. Masters *is the author of "The Morality of Survival," published in the July and August 1995 issues of* American Renaissance. *Based in part on Garrett Hardin's 1968 book,* The Limits of Altruism, *it explores the moral flaws of universalism and their implications for the future.*

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simple in concept. Imagine a pasture, held in common by a group of herdsmen. All are free to graze their animals in the commons. The depletion of resources caused by adding additional animals is borne by all, but the benefit accrues only to the individual. Thus each herdsman, acting purely out of self-interest, will tend to exploit the commons by adding more animals.

But the ability of the commons to support more animals is finite. This limit is called the carrying capacity. Exceeding the pasture's carrying capacity destroys its ability to produce grass and leads to soil erosion, takeover by weeds, etc. Thus, it is almost certain that the commons will be exploited to exhaustion. The inevitability of this outcome is the "tragedy" alluded to in the essay's title.

The tragedy of the commons is not confined to animal husbandry. Any system, natural or human, may constitute a commons. Our own land is a prime example. Immigration is turning Western civilization itself into a vast commons, a fragile human ecosystem ripe for exploitation not only by the teeming billions of people in the Third World — to whom the West looks like the proverbial land of milk and honey — but also by callous and rapacious elites who care nothing about the irreversible damage they cause.

Fortunately, restraint is possible even in the presence of human greed. If the pasture has an owner, he has a vested interest in preserving it for the future. If he fails to limit use to the pasture's natural carrying capacity it will be ruined, and he will suffer great loss. The tragedy of the commons is a persuasive argument for private property ownership. It is also a telling indictment of Marxism's denial of private property.

In a similar manner, the ethnic and cultural binding of the peoples of traditional nation-states with the geography they inhabit motivates preservation of historic homelands for future generations. Without this close, sometimes mystical association between blood and land ("the motherland," "the fatherland"), there inevitably ensues a rootlessness that renders impossible the conservation of nature's fragile endowment.

The Cult of Conscience

Taken by itself, the commons case is a profound one. It explains much of the tendency of societies to wreck their environment. But Hardin does not stop there. He adds another crucial point, one that deals with the flawed and potentially self-destructive nature of conscience.

Since conscience — adherence to a "moral" code of behavior without coercion by others — is one of the shibboleths of both secular liberalism and Christian dogma, this will strike many readers as heretical. However, reality is quite indifferent to our preconceived notions: *Conscience is self-eliminating from a population.*

Hardin first illustrates why by examining voluntary birth control. He then generalizes the conclusion to all acts of self-sacrificing conscience.

> *People vary. Confronted with appeals to limited breeding, some people will undoubtedly respond to the plea more than others. Those who have more children will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than those with more susceptible consciences. . . The argument here has been stated in the context of the population problem, but it applies equally well to any instance in which society appeals to an individual exploiting a commons to restrain himself for the general good - by means of his conscience. To make such an appeal is to set up a selective system that works toward the elimination of conscience from the race.*

Returning to the commons example, imagine that some herdsmen, imbued with concern for the land, forego overstocking the commons with their own animals. They will fare less well than their contemporaries who are under no such compulsion. Their families will live less well. Their children will inherit less and likely will also live less well. They may even be displaced by more aggressive herdsmen, whose assets have brought added power:

If even one person in the community follows a lower standard [of conscience] that person prospers at the expense of the others. A laissez faire market system ruled by conscience alone rewards for a lack of conscience. . .The second stage in the dissolution of a conscience-ruled system takes place because of envy. As the 'good guys' see the 'bad guys' prosper their envy is energized and one after another good guys become bad guys.

Some will object that Hardin's conclusion is false. After all, conscience still exists. Indeed, Western people may be its highest exemplar. The answer is that until recently, European-descended peoples

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were largely isolated from other peoples. Now, modern transportation and communication has changed all this. Our conscience-induced refusal to curtail immigration is importing vast numbers of people who do not share our moral code—and who thereby threaten to displace us permanently.
Whose lifeboat is it, anyway?

The commons model, where exploitation is restrained only by conscience, is an inherently flawed ethical system. This raises the question: Is there a more survivable way? Rather than treating our land as an endless vista of inexhaustible largess, to be bestowed on all comers as an act of kindness, Hardin asks us to consider a different approach.

His "Living on a Lifeboat," published in 1974, deals with the ethics of a finite world occupied by an ever-growing population. Consider the case of lifeboats floating on the ocean — each limited in its "carrying capacity" and each filled with an ample cargo of humans. Suppose occupants of some lifeboats are leaping into the water and swimming toward our lifeboat. It may be that they have reproduced to a level that they cannot sustain. Or they may be hungry, unable to feed themselves due to their lack of ability or motivation. Or they may simply wish to avail themselves of the amenities with which we have outfitted our lifeboat.

The ethical dilemma we face is what to do about these potential "immigrants" in the water. Hardin considers three possibilities. First, "We may be tempted to try to live by the Christian ideal of being 'our brother's keeper,' or by the Marxian ideal of 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.'" This ethical code will lead us to take in everyone. Since people in other boats are multiplying endlessly, our lifeboat will eventually capsize, leaving us to drown. As predicted in "The Tragedy of the Commons," our conscience will have been our undoing.

Second, we may take in none at all. To those who object to this alternative, Hardin offers the advice quoted earlier: "*Get out and yield your place to others.*" [Emphasis in the original.] Although letting in these sad-eyed strangers may seem to epitomize compassion and moral virtue, it is in reality a fatal embrace. If we do not reject them, we shall perish — overrun by people whose self-interest is not blinded by "noble intentions."

Finally, we may take in only a few. But who do we admit? "How do we *discriminate*?" We shall return to this theme in a moment, for there is a natural criteria by which we may guide our choice.

"Living on a Lifeboat" shows that immigration has turned the West into a precarious human commons. Our ecosystem is being plundered by those who have not duplicated for themselves our Western way of life. Although we already pay a high price for immigration in crime, welfare and destruction of our culture, our children and grandchildren may pay a higher price still.

> The law locks up both man and woman
> Who steals the goose from off the common
> But lets the greater felon loose
> Who steals the common from the goose.
>
> — Edward Potts Cheyney
> *Humane Society of U.S. News*
> (Spring 1997, Vol. 42, No. 2, p.31)

> *To be generous with one's own possessions is one thing; to be generous with posterity's is quite another...rejection of the commons is still valid and necessary if we are to save at least some parts of the world from environmental ruin. Is it not desirable that at least some of the grandchildren of people now living should have a decent place to in which to live?*

This last point provides us with a clue as to how to "discriminate" among potential immigrants. Our lifeboat is *not* filled with strangers. It is occupied by our own family and kin, an adjunct of the process that created ethnically-based nations. Immigration proponents ask us to *imperil the safety and future well-being of our children* to make room for these strangers. If we see our own kin in the water, we will no doubt gladly take them in, but we cannot admit every stranger who clamors for admission.

After all: *Whose lifeboat is it, anyway?* Does it belong to the people in the water — who are demonstrably unable to rise to our standards — or does it belong to those of us who made it what it is? The answer is clear if we value our children's future: It is ours — and we must take whatever steps necessary to make sure it remains ours. To those who clamor for admittance, we have no choice but to respond: *not on my lifeboat.*

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Nature's Moral Order

Is this "moral"? This is equivalent to asking, *is it moral to survive?* To even ask the question is to reveal the extent to which our instincts as well as our powers of rational thought have been corrupted. Leaving aside debilitating liberal platitudes and enervating Christian passivity ("...the meek shall inherit the earth."), one thing is certain; those who do not seek to survive will not do so.

Nature's moral order values loyalty to those to whom one has distinct ties, usually ties of kinship — what we would call ethnic groups or tribes.

"The politicizing of universalism by Western elites and their legal and social institutions ... has deluded many European-derived people into believing that it is immoral to survive as a distinct group. As a result, they can find no reason to resist the Third World flood inundating the West."

Hardin writes: "The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality — one kind of behavior for in-group relations, another for out-group." In-group relations are governed by cooperation while out-group relations are properly governed by, at best, a tit-for-tat code. Hardin argues that, because of the nature of altruism and competition, the dual code of morality is inescapable:

> *In the absence of competition between tribes the survival value of altruism in a crowded world approaches zero because what ego gives up necessarily ... goes into the commons. What is in the commons cannot favor the survival of the sharing impulses that put it there — unless there are limits placed on sharing. To place limits on sharing is to create a tribe — which means a rejection of One World.... A state of One World, if achieved, would soon redissolve into an assemblage of tribes.*

Those who demonize this as racist or xenophobic — and therefore immoral — are being disingenuous. That which is built inextricably into the laws of the universe cannot be immoral. The in-group, out-group distinction still operates today; only the battleground has shifted. Violence has diminished, only to be superseded by irredentism and dueling birthrates. Any idealistic group that unilaterally dismantles its own group identity will be the loser in this new form of competition.

Understanding the Script

Behind the pious rhetoric of those who condemn fealty to nature's plan is a dirty little secret: Universalism also provides an insidious means of securing power and wealth. It exposes us to exploitation by amoral men who use any weapon available to advance their own self-interest — including our innate sense of moral probity. Says Hardin: "[S]uch verbal devices as 'principles,' 'liberty,' and 'fairness' can be used as competitive weapons."

Despite the currently fashionable conceit that "democracy" and "free enterprise" have routed the worst excesses of socialism, what is happening in the West is recognizably Marxist in design. To understand how this is so, one must follow the *dramatis personae* in the West's unfolding passion play — of which there are three principals.

First, there is a group ripe for exploitation — a commons. This group is the historical body of European-derived people who created Western civilization. They are largely moral people who go quietly about their lives, often without concern for the grand design unfolding around them. Because they are productive, they have something others want. Because they are kind-hearted, they are vulnerable to appeals of conscience.

Second, there is a vast reservoir of disaffected people who, if cleverly manipulated, may be incited to envy of the first group's success. Call them the "poor" and the "oppressed"; they are largely Third World in composition. Their role is to function as a social battering ram in service of whoever is able to secure their allegiance.

Finally, there is a third group who stands to profit by pitting the second group against the first. It is this group that James Burnham, author of *The Suicide of the West,* called the "managerial elite."

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Immigration is a potent weapon in this struggle for dominance. The politicizing of universalism by Western elites and their legal and social institutions — among them government, education, media, entertainment, religion, etc. — has deluded many European-derived people into believing that it is immoral to survive as a distinct group. As a result, they can find no reason to resist the Third World flood inundating the West — a flood that is rapidly breaking down the culture, institutions and unique character of Western civilization.

The Ethics of Diversity

This disintegration benefits the elites who perpetuate it by creating hitherto unimagined opportunities for securing power and wealth at the expense of historic peoples and their cultures. This outcome can hardly be described as moral. Indeed, it may be the most immoral design ever inflicted on a long-suffering humanity. The elites' "return on investment" is the very antithesis of the moral code they espouse. It is not "liberty, fraternity and equality." It is something far more venal: power, wealth and dominance. Hardin writes:

> *Why poor people should want to make this transfer is no mystery: but why should rich host encourage it? This transfer, like the reverse one, is supported by both selfish interests and humanitarian ones.*
>
> *The principle selfish interest in unimpeded immigration is easy to identify; it is the interest of the employers of cheap labor, particularly that needed for degrading jobs. We have been deceived about the forces of history by the lines of Emma Lazarus inscribed on a plaque inside the Statue of Liberty...*

The Lazarus poem ("Bring me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free...") is a particularly pernicious example of exploiting the commons. Lazarus, a Sephardic Jewess from a wealthy New York family, exploited American sentimentality in order to prepare the way for more immigration by victims of the Russian pogroms. Likewise, the "melting pot" metaphor — created by playwright Israel Zangwell — also conditioned public opinion for the dismantling of turn-of-the-century barriers.

To Hardin's indictment of employers seeking cheap labor, we would add condemnation of politicians catering to minority voters. Just as Radical Republicans exploited the Southern black vote during Reconstruction, both parties pander shamelessly to minorities today. Whereas most whites vote their consciences, thereby diluting their effectiveness, minorities well understand their own self-interest — many bloc-vote to get it. Minority power is thus highly magnified while the majority's dispossession is largely conscience-inflicted.

"Democracy" is not an answer. When applied to "diverse" peoples, democracy simply "legalizes" the rape of the commons. The problem is not that democracy is inherently evil but rather that it has limitations. If the interests of those grouped as voters are sufficiently divergent, exploitation of the producers by envious have-nots is inevitable. The real enemy of democracy is "diversity" — as Hardin notes in *The Immigration Dilemma:*

> *Since diversity is so highly praised these days, it would be well for us to examine the environment needed to foster and conserve this virtue. Many people think that One World — a single political sovereignty governing the whole world — will be achieved some day ...Year after year the studies of Freedom House show that the great majority of the nations are not democratically run. In the formation of a single sovereignty, democracy would probably not survive the bargaining of the major non-democratic powers. ...Unity within nations, coupled with diversity among nations, is surely the best recipe for evolutionary progress in the species as a whole.*

"Unity within nations, coupled with diversity among nations, is surely the best recipe for evolutionary progress of the species as a whole." **— Garrett Hardin**

Western Survival at Stake

In an aptly titled 1971 essay, "The Survival of Nations and Civilizations," Hardin strips away feel-good humanitarian delusion and forces attention onto the ultimate issue that confronts us—our

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continued existence as a distinct people. We must maintain sufficient numbers to constitute a viable population group and to defend our "territory" or we will surely drown. Of Americans' diminishing percentage of the world's population, Hardin writes

> *If we renounce conquest and overbreeding, our survival in a competitive world depends on what kind of world it is: One World or a world of national territories. if the world is one great commons, in which all food is shared equally, then we are lost. Those who breed faster will replace the rest. Sharing the food from national territories is operationally equivalent to sharing territories: in both cases a commons is established, and tragedy is the ultimate result.*

Biologists have a name for this phenomenon — the Competitive Exclusion Principle. In the competition for living space and resources between two species (or two groups that occupy the same ecological niche), one will inevitably and inexorably eliminate the other. "[I]n a finite universe — and the organisms of our world know no other — where the total number of organisms of both kinds cannot exceed a certain number ... one species will necessarily replace the other species completely if the two species are 'complete competitors,' i.e., live the same kind of life."

But, why should we care if our living space is overrun by strangers? After all, if every one is "equal" why does it matter? The unpleasant truth is that all people are *not* equal — either by standards of objective reality or by their own perceptions. (Is there a mother anywhere who would concede that her own child is not in some way special, at least to her?) Indeed, if all peoples were equal, the West's prosperity would exist equally everywhere in the world. No one would want to come here. The very fact that others are attracted to the West is proof that our character — and the way of life it has created — is different, and therefore worthy of preservation.

One need not yield to liberal-condemned stereotypes of superiority and inferiority to justify the distinctiveness of the world's peoples. Distinctiveness is an inseparable part of human nature — a heritage we have an unalienable right to preserve. To attempt to destroy it — whether out of humanitarianism or out of something altogether more malevolent — is an act of aggression. Whether distinct groups be called tribes, nations, religions, ethnic groups or races, they are still worthy of respect and conservation for their distinctiveness. One of liberalism's most poisonous evils is that it condemns such loyalties as morally wrong.

If carried to its logical conclusion, our universalist, "melting pot" ethic — which ignores the realities of life in a competitive world — can only result in the inexorable eradication of *our* distinctiveness. Others not fettered by fastidious consciences will occupy the land and multiply to the utmost limit. There is a word to describe this outcome, and Hardin does not flinch from its utterance. "It may be that no one is ever killed; but the genes of one group replace the genes of the other. This is genocide."

It is difficult to understand how anyone could view this outcome as morally defensible. But, of course, that's the point isn't it? The most cunning promoters of this view do not believe it themselves, nor do they practice it. For them, universalism is simply a path to power. Over whom that power is exercised — whether it be the endangered heirs of European civilization's creators or an empire populated with Third World masses — seems to matter not at all. This is universalism's ultimate malediction; far from being the most righteous of moral systems it is the most corrupt. TSC

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The Anguish and the *Angst*

Immigration and the Western world

by Derek Turner

The debate about immigration in the Western world is heavily charged with emotion and full of complex moral significances. The very concept of immigration carries with it a heavy load of subjective emotional baggage, positive or negative or a mixture of both, depending on one's point of view.

For the immigrant himself, there is virtually no moral aspect to immigration. The concept of immigration has only positive emotional undertones for immigrants themselves. It evokes vaguely-realized but brightly colored notions of new beginnings, compensation for mistakes made, escape from old oppressions and — not least — the sheer, reckless joy of restlessness. The act of emigration from one's ancestral homeland and subsequent arrival in somebody else's is both an act of faith and an exhilarating adventure.

I speak from experience, as a former immigrant myself. After I came to London from Dublin to live nearly ten years ago, I would quite often get momentary bursts of enthusiasm, irrational seconds of excitement whenever I saw something particularly emblematic of my adoptive city. On my first night in London, I remember walking through Camden Town in the rain, with an enormous thunderstorm overhead, full of the double excitement of the storm and the new yet familiar streets, whose names I had heard in a hundred stories. And there were other occasions when something was somehow encapsulated for me — I remember walking along the road from my bedsit in Maida Vale on Remembrance Sunday 1988, a beautiful autumnal day, with yellow leaves falling in the crisp sunshine and a red Flanders poppy in the buttonhole of my coat — and the sweep of Hampstead Heath in the failing light of a drizzling evening after a long day's tramp, with the old-fashioned lamp posts gleaming through the wet, reminiscent dusk, like the lamp post in the forest in Narnia.

I think of all these experiences and many others, and can remember how an immigrant can feel about an adopted country, and what it is to try to embrace a new culture. This is a much more profound feeling than the pleasure of being abroad on holiday — I spent several holidays in England as a boy but never felt the inchoate excitement and sense of intimate involvement that I did (and do) as an immigrant. I can imagine that similar feelings of liberation must have been embedded in the hearts of the first European settlers in North America, where every man could (in theory) be a king, and the horizons were limitless. I feel I have some comprehension of the feelings of the well-meaning, hard-working, willing-to-assimilate newcomer, and understand the rationale of the immigrant, and why he does not think of the possible moral implications of the act of immigration, or how it might impinge on the indigenous inhabitants. He leaves it to others to worry about the ethics of immigration.

And there are very many moral implications to immigration from the point of view of the recipient nation, which must undergo the rapid and sometimes even violent changes that can be brought about by immigration. It should be remembered that this era of immigration is unlike any other, insofar as the numbers are extremely large, and nobody is being expected to assimilate into their host culture any longer

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(unless one is going to an Islamic country). A further point should also be made — that there are great differences between large and small-scale immigration. The consequences, real or imagined, are very different according to the magnitude of the immigration — and, of course, much morality is based on a fear of the possible consequences.

When immigration is small in scale, when it is made up of genuine refugees, when the newcomers are grateful and eager to "fit in" and when the host culture is sure of itself, the problem is relatively small, usually becoming a matter of simple charity rather than culture or politics. Where could be the harm, most people reason, and with considerable justice, in accepting a small number of refugees or workers — especially if they are educated or healthy people whose presence may actually quicken the cultural or economic life of the host nation? Few Britons could find it in their hearts to object to the trickle of pleasant and industrious West Indians who came to Britain from 1950 on, to work on building sites, drive buses and empty hospital bedpans. Who then could have foreseen modern-day Brixton, Peckham, Elephant and Castle, Ladbroke Grove or Hackney?

We can all imagine ourselves in the situation of refugees. We all know that life is short and precarious. We have all experienced home-sickness and loneliness. We all detest injustice, and can understand why anyone might fly from it. We even feel guilty about economic inequality, even when there is no actual repression. Among the powerful images conjured up when we think of immigrants are all the sad-eyed, brown children we have seen staring gravely into the television cameras, with their wasted limbs and the flies crawling in and out of their nostrils. Although our first reaction may be repulsion, we also feel duty-bound to offer succor. One look into those brown eyes and we are unmanned, like Samson under Delilah's scissors. What Jean Raspail called the "stampeding lambs" of the Third World bowl us over. We think the Third World is all like Upper Volta, and feel generic compassion for people we shall never meet, and who would feel nothing for us if we did meet them. A blend of charitable pity and racial guilt for our prosperity (and, increasingly, for what our forefathers allegedly did) means that we make allowances for all the immigrants who come to our countries — so long as there are not too many of them, and so long as they do not directly affect us — that is, move in next door. It is is no accident that the most vociferous "anti-racists" come from comfortable backgrounds, which means that they can patronize the immigrants from a safe distance.

"When there are not too many immigrants, members of the host nation can comprehend the immigrants as individuals, and chivalrous instincts can come into play."

When there are not too many immigrants, members of the host nation can comprehend the immigrants as individuals, and chivalrous instincts can come into play. But when the immigrant numbers become numerically significant, very different feelings are aroused. It then becomes a matter of two colliding moralities — the morality of the animal kingdom, which wills us to hold our ground, versus the "higher" morality, the will to be "good," the moral system we all ingested in Sunday school or college. The desire to live and multiply is in direct contradiction to the desire not to be "racist" or "bigoted." Although the race-guilt and pity are still present in conditions of large-scale immigration, they are much diluted by other motivations, which hark back to the prehistoric past, and belong more to the realms of group psychology than politics.

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When an immigration wave passes a certain, ill-defined numerical point, the immigrants start to lose their separate humanity in the nativist mind, and become part of a phenomenon. They are no longer individuals who may be assessed on their own merits. We enter the territory explored by Elias Cannetti, where mob rule replaces human understanding. Immigration becomes a question of species versus species, rather than humans meeting humans. The moral feelings that are felt by people reacting to individuals become the instinctual feelings held by a crowd. Let the few tolerated or even welcomed foreigners swell a thousand- or ten thousand-fold, and they become a rival gang, an army, a fifth column, a swarm, a tidal wave about to break over our heads. We may not mind having a bee in the same room as ourselves, but if there are a hundred bees it becomes a very different matter. The sheer number of "them" reminds us of the relative defenselessness of "ourselves," of our society's fragility, and of our own mortality.

In areas undergoing heavy immigration, our "family" is suddenly confronted with a lot of possible rivals, who are less "entitled" than we to our nation's riches because they do not have any "property rights." Our "family" has always lived here, and what we have, we hold. The sense of aggrievement felt by the indigenous about incomers in large numbers is augmented when incomers batten on the social welfare system, as they often do - but even then, criticism is muted, both because the facts are not widely enough known and because of the *ersatz* morality of "political correctness" — that burden of guilt that so many Europeans and Americans carry around like a little black cloud. True morality, which demands self-reliance and self-respect, would not permit of trying to bilk the taxpayer.

The quantity of immigrants is the single most important cause of inter-ethnic tension, and the single biggest destroyer of true morality. Who could blame the (extinct) Tasmanian aborigines for showing such hostility to the first Europeans? Who could blame the Estonians for getting so annoyed about the Russian settlers who are now something like a third of the population of Estonia? Who could blame the French for getting upset about the 5,000,000 Muslims now residing in France? It is never immoral to seek to retain one's own independence and identity. Those who say that it is simply do not realize the importance of culture — except, of course, when it comes to Third World peoples, when culture is suddenly of the greatest importance.

"The quantity of immigrants is the single most important cause of inter-ethnic tension..."

Furthermore, once immigrants become a "swarm," and their numbers become viable for self-sufficiency, they are more likely to become inward-looking and more confident — even to the point of arrogance. This can be easily seen in those countries of the Western world where radical Muslims have settled in appreciable numbers, or where aggressive multiculturalism holds sway. It is easier to retreat into one's ancestral culture than to take a step into the blue and attempt to join the mainstream. And once immigrants recede into their own group, and away from a common national culture, their differentiating characteristics are noticed and acted upon more often, by themselves and others. New layers of misunderstanding are built up; soon the ghettoes become permanent fixtures, and a new social schism is opened. Sometimes the alienation is so severe that the immigrants become *de facto* foes of the host society, sworn, like the radical Muslims, to rebuild society in their own image. Their drive for equality has become a drive for super-equality, and their feelings of moral duty have become feelings of moral superiority.

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Despite these obvious contradictions and flyings in the face of reason, political and religious enthusiasts of a certain type seem to be able to discern in the faces of Third World immigrants "noble savages," even little brown Christs. The Pecksniffs who pontificate in pulpits about "all the little children" and the Gracchites who massage "ethnic" voters' egos seem to obtain moral satisfaction by striking "anti-racist" attitudes. But the part-mawkish, part-splenetic posturing of the political Left is not genuine morality, merely a display of a lack of cultural self-confidence. It is in fact an ignominious surrender to the prevailing orthdoxy and an appeasement of the new masters. To them, the highest form of morality lies in spurning one's own people in favor of everybody — anybody — else. The warriors who stood up so doughtily for the rights of women and the preservation of the environment, and against cruelty to animals and the arms race are strangely quiet when it comes to female genital mutilation, *halal* slaughter and Third World dictators (particularly if the dictator is left wing).

Finally, it is instructive to note that our agonising about immigration is not universal. In the Third World, people take a rather more practical rather than a romantic view of immigration. Indeed, there are Third World politicians who believe that immigration into Western countries can be used as a weapon. In May this year, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, said: "We have the ultimate weapon...if we are not allowed a good life in our countries, if we are going to be global citizens, then we should migrate North in our millions, legally and illegally. Masses of Asians and Africans should inundate Europe and America...we will make all nations in the world rainbow nations."

The prospect of this *Camp of the Saints* scenario may well have the reverse effect — of showing the beleagured nations of the West that our conventional morality and wisdom about immigration are not enough. TSC



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The Baby Boom Echo?

Blame for school enrollment increase still being misplaced

by Linda Thom

Secretary of Education Richard Riley is at it again. For the second year in a row, he declared in August, 1997, that burgeoning school enrollments around the country are caused by baby boomers' children. The nightly TV network news picked up the press release and ran with it. Even in immigration-epicenter California, newscasters mindlessly told their listeners, "It's baby boomers who have delayed having children and are now giving birth before their biological clocks run out."

Why are parents with children in school not saying anything? They have the most to lose because of large class size and deteriorating schools. Perhaps they say nothing because in California, 51 percent of 1996-97 enrollment was comprised of Hispanic and Asian Pacific Islander children (CA Dept. of Education, California Basic Educational Data System [CBEDS]). The most overcrowded classrooms are full of immigrant children. Why would they complain about too many immigrants?

Los Angeles Unified School District has had the largest enrollment growth in the country according to the Department of Education. To help cope with the growth, Los Angeles voters approved a school bond last April in excess of $2 billion. In Los Angeles County as a whole, only one third of the 1,549,833 students enrolled in October 1996 were white or black children (CBEDS). Secretary Riley should have come to Los Angeles to hold his press conference and to maintain a straight face while he told the press that white and black baby boomers were responsible for all those Hispanic and Asian children.

It is really quite simple to understand and, make no mistake, Secretary of Education Richard Riley understands the numbers perfectly. In *Projections of Education Statistics to 2007*, the National Center for Education Statistics, part of the Department of Education, projects that school enrollment in the United States will increase from 46,353,000 to 48,262,000 between 1997 and 2007. That is an increase of 1,909,000 students. Chart 1 shows that



together, California and Texas will account for 1,334,000 added students or 70 percent of the enrollment change.

As California, alone, will comprise almost half the enrollment increase, the racial and ethnic composition of growth in the last 11 years suggests that virtually all of the new growth will be Asian and Hispanic children. See Chart 2 which shows that between October 1985 and October 1996, Hispanic and Asian children made up 92 percent of the added

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

students in California. For the entire state of California, white students increased by 3,765 in eleven years.

This seems pretty conclusive but to wrap a bow around the package, birth data demonstrate that all of the increase in enrollment is, in fact, because of immigration and births to immigrants. National school enrollment peaked last in 1971. If one examines birth data for the longer term, 1970 to 1995, then one must come to the conclusion that baby boomers have nothing to do with crowded classrooms.

Chart 3 shows annual births in California between 1970 and 1995 by the mother's place of birth. Annual births increased from 362,652 to 551,226 in this period. From 1970 to 1995, annual births to native-born women declined by 16,164 and births to immigrant women increased by 204,738 (California Department of Health Services). Interestingly, births in the whole country rose from 3,731,000 in 1970 to 3,900,000 in 1995 for an annual increase of only 169,000 as compared to an annual increase of 188,574 in California (U.S. Department of Commerce). That is because in most other states, births declined.

Baby boomers were not having children; however, immigrants were. In 1995, nationally, immigrants accounted for 84 percent of births to Asian/Pacific Islander women and accounted for 62 percent of births to Hispanic women. Among non-Hispanic white women, 5 percent were foreign born and among non-Hispanic blacks 9 percent were foreign born (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).

All of this data is available and known to Secretary of Education Riley. Why, one wonders, does he continue to tell the American people that the overpopulation of our schools results from baby boomers' children? More curiously, why is there silence among so many about what is so obvious? TSC

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

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Immigrants: 60 Percent of U.S. Population Growth

by Virginia Abernethy

The immigration share of the U.S. population growth rises continuously as births to recent immigrants are added to the annual flow of new arrivals. The usually reported numbers reflect *annual flow.* But this flow does not fully represent immigration's impact on population size because the downstream effects, i.e., family formation and births, are ignored.

Total immigration impact is *annual immigration* plus *births to the foreign born* minus *deaths* and *emigration of immigrants.* The native-born account is *births* minus *deaths* and *emigration* of this sector. Annual population growth is the sum of the immigration and native born accounts.

These calculations for the year 1994, using National Center for Health Statistics (1996) figures on births and deaths and Center for Immigration Studies (1995) figures on immigration, yield startling results. The foreign born are about ten percent of the population but had over 18 percent of births. Immigration and children born to the foreign-born sector, in 1994, accounted for a *net* increase of 1.6 million persons, or sixty percent, of the United States' annual population growth. TSC

1994	Native Born	Foreign Born	Total
Immigration[1]	0	1,206,000	1,206,000
Births[2]	3,264,505	731,262	3,995,767
Deaths[3]	-2,074,136	-204,858	-2,278,994
Emigration[4,5]	-125,000	-125,000	-250,000 (estimate)
Population Growth	1,065,369	1,607,404	2,672,773
Percentage Share	40%	60%	100%

Virginia Abernethy, Ph.D. *is a professor of psychiatry (anthropology) at Vanderbilt University Medical School and editor of the journal* Population and Environment.

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Tunnel Vision Dooms America's Future

Population study ignores everything that counts

by B. Meredith Burke

Whom you seek advice from reveals what you want to hear. This observation by Jean-Paul Sartre best explains the diametrically opposite conclusions reached in 1972 by the President's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future and the report that has just been issued by the National Academy of Science panel at the behest of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform.

The bipartisan 1972 panel, headed by John D. Rockefeller III, founder of The Population Council, had a diverse membership. It included lay people, politicians and scientists. Its five-volume report examined the role of population in every facet of American life. The effects of population level and growth on both the individual and community levels were thoroughly examined.

The Commission observed the high value Americans place upon low-density, compact communities, and easy access to uncrowded open space as well as to political representatives. It concluded there was no value in American life that could be furthered by additional population growth. It condemned our pro-growth ideology, recommending population stabilization (then at 200 million) as fast as possible. Immigration policy would necessarily have to respect this reality.

This year's report was produced by a panel of social scientists led by a Rand Corporation economist. They favor econometric computer models that utilize readily quantifiable monetary and demographic data. The methodology rules the kinds of questions that are asked, rather than vice versa. Societal values and quality-of-life considerations which produce preference rankings do not fit this model.

Moreover, the Commission expressly enjoined the NAS panel from addressing the issue of optimum population. Therefore, the NAS report evaded the implications of doubling by mid-21st century (and more likely sooner) a population the earlier panel found already excessive. It ignored two decades of national surveys showing an American consensus on the need to stop population growth — *e.g.* a 1992 Roper poll found that only 27 percent nationally and 11 percent in California, home to half the new immigrants, believed their state could handle an increase in population. It was oblivious to the assessment by some leading ecologists that the United States' long-term sustainable population is 150 million, a total we have exceeded ever since 1950.

> ***"[The Commission on Immigration Reform] recommended continuing the pace of immigration that has already nullified the benefits of the low fertility of the boomers."***

Instead, the panel endorsed the perpetual motion model of population. Rather than hailing the "Baby Bust" as a welcome corrective to the previous baby boom, it condemned the resultant temporary shift upwards in the age distribution of our population. Thus it recommended continuing the pace of immigration that has already nullified the benefits of the low fertility of the boomers themselves.

Most culpably, the panel's restrictive definition of immigration's "costs" excludes dozens of categories. It excludes all environmental costs considered by the

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1972 Commission, including the pressure upon our exiguous remaining wetlands, our threatened loss of flora and fauna from sprawl fueled by population growth, our drained aquifers. It excludes "congestion costs": swollen commute times; elevated coliform counts at popular beaches; access, parking and litter problems at recreational areas; housing market tightness and inflation due to sheer population increase. It excludes the costs of our projected loss of food self-sufficiency by 2040 in a world which had relied on our surpluses.

The panel even denies that immigration policy is population policy — despite the fact that immigrants after 1970 and their descendants account for three-quarters of current American population growth and *all* of our projected population growth in the 21st century.

What Congress as well as the public needs to know is that there is a battle going on in the population/ environment/ immigration arena. Political correctness now deems "selfish" the anti-growth view. Enthusiastic cornucopians dominate both liberal and conservative think tanks as well as the traditional academic journals. They share a love of narrow disciplines, computer models, neoclassical economics' assumptions of infinite resource substitutability and waste absorption capacity, and an accounting method that accords zero present value to any resource more than seven years out.

But there is still a small (and growing) number of scholars, including myself, who stubbornly cling to an interdisciplinary view of the world. Though quantitatively trained, we do not elevate dollar transactions above nature's resource accounting nor the normative values of society. We publish in low-profile journals: *Population and Environment*, the *Journal of Ecological Economics*, and *BioScience*.

Had the Immigration Commission consulted us and some of the rank-and-file citizens fleeing cities swelling toward 30 million population, it would have heard a story very different from the one delivered by the National Academy last May. But ours was not the conclusion it wanted to hear. TSC

The Malthus Bicentennial

Landmark essay continues to stir debate

by John F. Rohe

Next year marks the bicentennial anniversary of one of the most controversial essays in Western thought. In 1798, the Industrial Revolution was dawning. Prospects of more people producing more merchandise led to a prevalent sense of optimism. In this setting, Thomas Robert Malthus predicted human populations could not grow perpetually on a finite planet. "Misery and vice" would, according to Malthus, eventually bring the number of people into balance with available resources. Amid the enthusiasm for more people, Malthus saw distress as inevitable. The essay could forever change our view of nature and of ourselves, yet there would have been little reason to expect an enduringly clairvoyant forecast from 1798.

Mobility was still on horseback or by foot. Medical cures often entailed greater risks than the underlying disease. In this pre-scientific era, Malthus cracked the door to one of nature's best kept and most formidable secrets. He observed excess reproduction among all flora and fauna in the biological kingdom. Some thrive; many perish. We now recognize excess production as a universal law of nature, but in 1798, this law had to be pried from nature's firm clutch. Malthus extended these laws of nature to human populations. Accordingly, he anticipated the affinity for growth would lead to our demise. He was labeled a heretic and became the inspiration for Dickens' "grasping, squeezing, covetous old sinner," Ebenezer Scrooge.

John F. Rohe is an attorney in northern Michigan. He is active in a variety of conservation projects, and is the author of A Bicentennial Malthusian Essay, *recently published by Rhodes & Easton. The book may be ordered from The Social Contract Press, 1-800-352-4843.*

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Unbounded optimism now accompanies stock market surges. Economic growth abounds, surplus food swells in our breakfast nook and more comforts of life are enjoyed by ever more people. We are feeling good about ourselves. If everything is right, Malthus must have been wrong. Right?

"Confidence in perpetual growth has become the unexamined conviction of the 20th century."

Maybe these 200-year-old ideas are obsolete. And maybe they explain whatever ails you today. Name it. Road rage. Urban sprawl. Loss of farmland and open space. National parks loved to death. Congestion. Violence. Incivility. Biodiversity losses. Endangered species. Pollution. Ozone depletion. Greenhouse effect. Carnage on the highways. Hunger. Malnutrition. Food shortages. Unbounded immigration. Landfill expansions. Radioactive waste disposal. Pick your cause and you will find Malthus had a finger on the pulse of your discontent. Malthusian predictions are quietly unfolding amid blind economic optimism.

Confidence in perpetual growth has become the unexamined conviction of the 20th century. It governs our business affairs and every economic report. Were Malthus our conscience today, we would be reminded that economic optimism only temporarily liberates us from the rigors of biological reality.

The planet now experiences a daily net population gain of 250,000 people (total births minus deaths), and over one billion of us go to bed hungry every night. Several hundred thousand slip beyond the brink of malnutrition every year while per capita food production continues to dwindle day by day.

Our economic experience resembles the optimism prevalent at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Malthus found it necessary to publish his essay anonymously. Did he spoil the party for some? Or did he hope to keep it going for others? Was he truly a Scrooge-like figure? Or might he have been the most misunderstood humanitarian of all time?

The lofty perch we seemingly occupy at the top of the food chain is a mere illusion. We remain perilously embedded in the ecosystem. Forty percent of Americans breathe air unfit for human consumption by federal standards. Ground waters are contaminated, endangered species are dislodged, and natural habitats are eclipsed by our cultural priorities. The feverish affinity for growth compels dispiriting urban sprawl and the construction of places not worthy of our affection. Yet we mindlessly maintain faith in growth while clinging to the frontier's romantic mystique. Is there truly no limit whatever to the earth's horizons and natural resources?

The Malthusian message about limits becomes particularly poignant when optimism clouds our sense of reality, as it did in 1798. And as it does now. We remain indifferent to limits at our peril. Implicit in our present optimism is an abiding faith that laws of nature do not apply to the human experiment. We were not exempt from the laws of nature unveiled by Thomas Robert Malthus in 1798. And we are not exempt now. TSC

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

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A New Question for Makers of Public Policy

What will be the nation's demographic destiny?

by Richard D. Lamm

You would be surprised at the number of years it took me to see clearly what some of the problems were which had to be solved ... Looking back, I think it was more difficult to see what the problems were than to solve them. — Charles Darwin

One of the new questions for 21st Century public policy will be: What is our nation's demographic destiny? The size and makeup of the population (how many and who) will become a controversial issue in most nations. This debate will be about both quality of life and physical limits. Some nations, like the United States, could physically absorb additional millions of people. But increasingly, citizens of this nation — and citizens of most states and regions — are asking: Why do we want additional population growth? What public policy reasons are there to double the population of Colorado? Or California? Or the United States?

These questions were never before articulated, not only because population growth was an unquestioned asset, but also because we thought the matter outside effective human control. However, the debate is changing. A nation's demographic future has shifted from an unalterable given to an alterable variable — from something we blindly inherit to something we can determine. A culture of growth is being challenged. People and nations wonder whether population growth is an asset or liability, a cure or a disease.

The concern about runaway world population is well known. In 1992, the U.S Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society of London warned: "If the current predictions of population growth prove accurate and patterns of human activity on the planet remain unchanged, science and technology may not be able to prevent either irreversible degradation of the environment or continued poverty for much of the world." In the same year, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a "World Scientists Urgent Warning to Humanity" signed by 1,600 of the world's leading scientists, including 102 Nobel Prize winners. It stated that the continuation of destructive human activities "may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it is required if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated."

These are not ordinary public policy questions. These are life and death questions about the future of Earth. Does it require a "life or death" question before a geographic area considers population a threat and attempts to set limits? Does a nation or a region have to let its demographic situation grow to intolerable limits before it acts?

In one sense, much of human history can be seen as asserting control over factors once thought immutable. Children were a "gift of God" until humankind discovered the fertility cycle. We either lived or died "at God's will" until we discovered the miracles of medicine and public health. We were stuck in the same social class as our parents until our institutions reformed to allow social mobility. Human history is constantly redefining the unacceptable and changing what was thought to be unchangeable.

This is clearly true of population. For most of human history, the question of how many people the world should have was never asked — never thought of. Population growth was an asset, and the more people the more blessed a country considered

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itself. France and Russia gave medals for large families. Pre-World War II Germany had a variety of pro-natalist policies to encourage bigger families. Mussolini turned off the lights in state-owned housing at 9 p.m. so people would go to bed and conceive new Italians. "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth" had its counterpart in all the world's religions, and public policy followed. The larger a country's population, the stronger the country was thought to be militarily, economically and geopolitically. Towns equated size with success. "Watch Us Grow" was once the literal or symbolic slogan posted outside most cities and towns.

"In the United States, immigration is to population growth what smoking is to cancer."

The process of how world population growth went from "God's will" to a factor within human control is a fascinating story. The atavistic feeling of the "bigger the better" is not easily changed. "Policy is formed by preconceptions and by long-implanted biases. When information is relayed to policy makers, they respond in terms of what is already inside their heads and consequently make policy less to fit the facts than to fit the baggage that has accumulated since childhood."

If I could have left anything carved on Colorado's Capitol after 12 years as governor, it would be: "Beware of policies that were successful in the past but are disastrous to the future." The hardest challenge of public policy is to change a policy which has been successful. This clearly applies to the question of population and its related subject.

Immigration patterns will largely dictate the kind of America in which our children and grandchildren will live. We are presently headed, but for immigration, for a stable U.S. population. The average American woman has 2.1 children in her lifetime — a number which would stabilize the U.S. population by the year 2040 at approximately 305 million Americans. Whether we grow to 400 million or 500 million Americans, or even a billion Americans, depends almost entirely on immigration. Today, 24.5 million people — more than one of every 11 people living in the United States — were born in another country. The foreign-born percentage of our population has doubled since 1970.

I believe that mass immigration is a policy that has outlived its usefulness. Yet past successes prevent us from fully considering whether it continues to make demographic sense. Our society must look at the long-term domestic impacts of immigration and answer some hard questions. It is not enough to quote some words added to the Statue of Liberty years after its dedication by a New York schoolgirl. We must ask: What kind of interests are being served by large scale immigration?

Do you really want twice as many people in California, or Colorado, or the United States? Will that make these better places to live? I moved to California in 1957 when it had 10 million people. It was uncrowded, peaceful and relatively crime free. But it soon grew to 20 million, is now 32 million and is expected to have 50 million people by 2010. I have yet to meet a Californian who wants 50 million neighbors. By 2040, the population will be 64 million Californians — almost entirely because of foreign immigration. Some 400,000 Californians have left the state since 1990 because they believe the quality of life has diminished. In whose interest is it to have 50 million or 60 million people in California?

The first U.S Census in 1790 found 4 million Americans. This means we have had six doublings in our short 200-year history (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256). Just one more doubling gives us 500 million Americans. Two more doublings gives us more people than presently live in either China or India. To whose benefit?

The United States is no longer an empty continent that can absorb endless pools of labor. We are a society that requires tens of thousands of dollars in capital to create a job. We have large numbers of unemployed and underemployed. It is time to close down the age of mass immigration. It has served us well in the past. It does not make public policy sense for the future.

Twenty-five years ago, a presidential commission spent a lot of time and money looking at the reasons for population growth. The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future reported: "We have looked for, and have not found,

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any continuing economic argument for continued population growth. The health of our country does not depend on it, nor does the vitality of business, nor the welfare of the average person." Since then, we have added 60 million new Americans.

Today, nations and regions are going through a similar process on other aspects of growth. They are, for the first time, asking questions about their demographic destiny. Fear of crime, gangs, congestion, pollution, foreign immigrants, earthquakes, fires and reduced quality of life are the most frequently cited reasons for leaving California. The Clinton administration's muddled immigration policy is contributing to the unease. On his recent trip to Mexico and Central America, the President decried illegal immigration but seemed to shrink from any major steps to deport illegals or refugees overstaying their welcome.

Perhaps the most common reason given for additional population growth is that it is good for the economy. At the risk of treating lightly what is a complex subject, it is important to point out that the fastest growing per capita incomes are in countries with the lowest rates of population growth. Conversely the lowest (or negative) rates of per capita income growth are in countries with the highest population growth.

Not all members of a region (or country) experience the same economic impact from a growing population. Large landowners and those involved in real estate benefit disproportionately. But the benefit to the average person is more problematic. Japan, for instance, has set a policy of increasing the per capita wealth of its existing citizens. Its public policy since World War II has been to slow population growth dramatically. The Japanese go to great lengths to eliminate low-skill jobs by automation and try to move the workforce into higher value-added jobs. With 120 million people on an island the size of Montana, they want a high quality workforce — not an endlessly growing population. The wealth of a country has much more to do with the education level and skills of its population than with the size of the population.

Recognizing that any essay dances lightly across difficult terrain, I would suggest that public policy is changing rapidly on the issue of population and its related issue of immigration. As the Cairo Conference on Population and Development stated: "Population-related goals and policies are integral parts of cultural, economic and social development, the principal aim of which is to improve the quality of life of all people."

It has been said the hardest challenge to public policy is to change a policy that has been successful. A world that has always promoted population growth is now moving to stabilize that same growth. Both at a world and a regional level, people are thinking the unthinkable, questioning the unquestionable, and reforming the previously unalterable. TSC



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Those 'Marrying Sams'

Here's another case study of immigration fraud

by James Walsh

[*In the previous issue of The Social Contract we featured an article by James Walsh, retired from a position as Associate General Counsel at the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Over the years Walsh has collected true stories of flagrant attempts by aliens to attain entry to the United States. Some of these frauds are quite ingenious and many are downright humorous. We offer another story from his collection here and hope to keep this column open for many editions to come.*]

At a Texas university, three Pakistani and two Indian students joined forces to demonstrate their entrepreneurial skills — despite the fact that India and Pakistan are otherwise bitter enemies. Greed makes strange bedfellows too, as the five students became middlemen, or as they call themselves, facilitators, in a fraudulent marriage brokerage business for foreign nationals in need of immigration papers.

Their business plan was simple; they paid money-strapped co-eds — U.S. Citizens (USCs) all — the sum of $500 to marry Afghan, Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, or Sri Lankan foreign students attending the university on student visas. The facilitators, on the other hand, collected $13,000 from each foreign national thus matched. The newlyweds would then hurry to the nearest INS office to file for a non-immigrant visa for the spouse of the U.S. citizen. The marriages involved little overhead other than the payments to the co-eds, local marriage license fees, and fees charged by those performing the ceremonies.

Expanding their business to nearby universities, they also began locating male USCs willing to marry female aliens who wanted either to come to the United States or to remain here after their temporary visas expired.

Once an alien spouse received the coveted work permit — previously known as a green card but since 1996 a pink card — and become a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), the couple suddenly discovered irreconcilable differences and filed for divorce. The U.S. citizen usually received an additional $200 for appearing at the final divorce hearing. Since few couples ever consummated the marriages, most were clear cases of immigration fraud, which U.S. law classifies as a felony. With divorce decree in hand, the LPR was then free to marry a mate of similar ethnic or religious background, who could enter the U.S. as an LPR spouse, with no need for a facilitator fee. The United States thus gained two new alien residents admitted on the basis of the marriage-fraud game.

The Marrying Sams operated for two years out of their Texas university until they graduated and relocated their business to the eastern United States. A disgruntled co-ed, on learning how much the facilitators were collecting from the foreign nationals, demanded a larger cut for her past and future "marriages." When the facilitators refused she blew the whistle. Once the INS began questioning the facilitators about their multi-million-dollar scheme, they up and left the country. Today, they continue to operate from abroad, using relatives in the United States and recruiting women mainly from rural areas in the eastern United States — having had their fill of capitalist college girls. Their international immigration marriage-fraud operation survives today by staying one step ahead of the INS. As one facilitator remarked, "There are just too many people wanting to get the U.S. dollar."

MORAL: The INS should monitor all entries made by spouses of USCs or LPRs; and divorces within three years of entry should be investigated for immigration fraud — valid marriages will be able to bear the scrutiny. TSC

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Myths of Family Reunification

by William Buchanan

The admission of immigrants who are nuclear family members — spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens (legal immigrants) — is sound social policy. The same cannot be said for extended family preferences which produce mounting backlogs, chain migration and significant displacement of low-skill domestic workers. A return to assimilable levels of immigration must begin with the elimination of such preferences.

Of course, defenders of America's current immigration policy disagree. They portray extended family immigration as good for the country, and a part of American tradition, facilitating the loving reunification of long-separated families and (with a superior lift of the eye) affirming family values. Which view is supported by the evidence?

I. Some History

Prior to 1917, the selection process for immigrants was rather simple, if difficult to enforce. Dangerous or unproductive individuals such as criminals, prostitutes, carriers of disease, and persons likely to become a public charge were excludable. But there were no overall numerical limits and therefore no need for preference categories. Hod carrier, husband; needle worker, niece; illiterate, illegitimate, ill-mannered — all were welcomed.

Things changed, however, with passage of a 1917 law requiring new immigrants to be able to read and write — in English or any other language. Recognizing the importance of family ties, our lawmakers now had to deal with the question of admitting the illiterate family members of literate immigrants. Obviously feeling their way, they chose wives, adult unmarried daughters, children under age 17, and parents and grandparents over age 55.

In 1921, numerical limits and national-origins quotas were introduced for immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere. Preference was granted "so far as possible" to children under age 18, and the wives, fiancés, parents, and brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens.

A product of experience, the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act provided for the admission of wives and minor children of U.S. citizens with no numerical limit (non-quota), but limited all other Eastern Hemisphere immigration to 150,000 per year, apportioned by national-origins quotas. Up to 50 percent of each country's quota could be used for husbands and parents of U.S. citizens plus skilled agriculturalists (and their spouses and minor children). The remaining 50 percent was reserved for non-preference immigrants — the "sink or swimmers" willing to come to a strange new land, often with little but their courage and fortitude to support them.

The Congress relented in 1928, allowing leftover quota visas to be used by spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens (legal immigrants). That was it! After 40 years of wrestling with it, the Congress appeared to have consigned massive immigration to the halls of remembrance.

Following WWII, however, Congressional resolve began to weaken. The American economy boomed and labor unions struck. Business complained of a "labor shortage" and demanded relief. One obvious target was unused ("wasted") quota slots. Quota-favored Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany, for example, used only 134,000 of 327,000 available quota slots in the three years 1949-51.

Responding in 1952 with the McCarran-Walter Act, our representatives added husbands of U.S. citizens to the list of those admitted outside of quota and divided the 150,000 national-origins quota visas among three discrete preferences — 50 percent for "needed workers" and their spouses and minor children, 20 percent for spouses and minor children of permanent resident aliens, and 30 percent for parents of U.S. citizens. Unused visas in any one of

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Family Preferences Specified in Selected Immigration Acts

	1924-8	1952	1959	1965
Minor Children of USCs	NQ	NQ	NQ	NQ
Wives of USCs	NQ	NQ	NQ	NQ
Husbands of USCs	Q	NQ	NQ	NQ
Parents of USCs	Q	Q	Q	NQ
Spouses and Minor Children of PRAs	LQ	Q	Q	Q
Unmarried Adult Children of PRAs			Q	Q
Brothers and Sisters of USCs		LQ	Q	Q
Their Spouses and Minor Children			Q	Q
Adult Children of USCs		LQ	Q	Q
Their Spouses and Minor Children			Q	Q

Key: USC = U.S. Citizen
PRA. = Permanent Resident Alien (Legal Immigrant Non-Citizen)
NQ = Non-Quota (Without Limit)
Q = Quota — Annual Limit
LQ = Leftover Quota

these preferences were available for either of the other two preferences.

Since there might still be some unused visas, leftover quota slots were made available for extended family members — brothers and sisters and adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens — in what came to be called "fourth preference." Instead of luring the favored peoples, however, extended family backlogs began to appear for the countries with small quotas. This, in turn, made the national origins quotas appear still more onerous and problematic.

In 1959, Congress rearranged the deck chairs again. Fourth preference was expanded to include spouses and minor children. Permanent resident aliens could now bring in their unmarried adult sons and daughters. But once again, there were few takers in the quota-favored nations, but a lot of demand (backlogs) arising in countries with small quotas. In the five years 1960 to 1964, only 23,176 fourth preference visas were issued, but the fourth preference backlog grew to 163,805. And in 1965, only two-thirds of the 150,000 Eastern Hemisphere quota slots were used and 80 percent of these were for non-preference.

To sum up, in the years 1952-65, Congress strove mightily to maintain quota immigration at 150,000 per year, retain the unequal national-origin quotas, respond to humanitarian appeals, reunify families, and provide incentives so as not "waste" quota slots. It was a little like trying to direct a blizzard to build a snowman.

In a further effort at "correction," Congress now passed the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act — the correction that keeps on correcting until it gets everything wrong! National origins quotas were scrapped. Parents of U.S. citizens were shifted to non-quota status, the Eastern Hemisphere quota was bumped up to 170,000, and four discrete quota preferences were set up for extended family. Family would now account for 74 percent of quota immigrants, all to be admitted without reference to skills. Emphasis would shift from national-origins to extended family, and extended family to a kind of nepotism, where, once again, a few countries would dominate.

Assurances were given that the 1965 Act would not affect jobs and, indeed, would change America very little — our country and indigenous population were too vast to be affected; backlogs would soon dry up; people from Third-World countries would not come here because of the cultural differences.

Chief spokesman for the opposition, Sen. Sam Ervin, attacked every argument for the 1965 Act with Demosthenean oratory and logic — he feared displacement of American workers and was suspicious that advancing extended family preferences to Third-World countries with large and impoverished families might substantially change immigration patterns — existing and undeniable backlogs were visible evidence of potential problems. Offering his opinion of that long-ago debate, former Congressman and mayor, Ed Koch, remarked gleefully (and approvingly): "You were misled"!

Ervin did manage to obtain a first-time-ever cap on Western Hemisphere immigration — 120,000 per year. However in 1976, to celebrate the

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Bicentennial, Eastern and Western Hemisphere quotas were combined and extended family preferences were applied to the Western Hemisphere. Legislation to essentially uncap refugee admissions followed in 1980. Now 80 percent of quota visas (216,000 per year) were devoted to family reunification.

Onward and ever upward! While an uninformed public slept, our representatives dumped the 1990 Immigration Act on us. They increased the number of quota visas for family members to a minimum of 226,000 per year and provided for the transfer of unused worker visas to family members. Between 1992 and 1996, the extended family category would use up, on average, 130,000 of these visas each year.

II. Evaluation

TRADITION OR ENTITLEMENT? Extended family preferences, back door entrants in 1952 and 1959, hardly qualify as part of a tradition. Instead, what we have are entitlements. And like all entitlements, the numbers have a life of their own with lawmakers constantly responding to the boundless demands of the beneficiaries.

ENEMY OF THE TIGHT LABOR MARKET. During every immigration debate, a great deal of oink and ink is shed over fears of a "labor shortage" but very little about the flip-side of the coin: a "tight labor market." A tight labor market is, perhaps, the most effective means to narrow the income gap between rich and poor. It stimulates productivity and innovation, and is a significant agent of community. Massive immigration is always at odds with a tight labor market and its desirable results.

ENEMY OF RACIAL PROGRESS. With passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, America, land of opportunity and equality, decided to become such for black Americans after 300 years of enslavement and Jim Crowism. But Congress was on a roll and, bemused by words, passed the 1965 Act, calling it: "Civil Rights Legislation for the World". In the opinion of one observer: "....it was the genius of the architects of immigration 'reform' that they recognized the possibility for conflating the two [equal rights for blacks and an end to national origins quotas for immigrants] and amalgamating them as statute law."

One could focus on the ironies but for the fact that the effect on black Americans has been devastating. Whole areas of unskilled niche labor, once typically handled by black workers, are now performed by foreign workers. Average unemployment levels for black workers rose from 9.0 percent in the 1960s, to 11.1 percent in the 1970s, and 14.9 percent during the 1980s. It is reasonable to assert that the policy of admitting extended family members with no reference to skills is one major reason for this.

CHAIN MIGRATION. In 1981, Father Theodore Hesburgh expressed disappointment that the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which he chaired, had voted to continue the preference for brothers and sisters. "I do not believe we should continue a preference in which there will be an ever-multiplying demand to immigrate, totally disproportionate to the number of visas available," he lamented. He then projected how, by means of this preference, a single naturalized couple could make "no less than 84 persons...eligible for visas in a relatively short period of time."

"While an uninformed public slept, our representatives dumped the 1990 Immigration Act on us."

BACKLOGS "DRY UP"? Backlogs have risen without respite — from the 164,000 noted in 1965 to 800,000 in 1976, 1.8 million in 1982, 2.4 million by 1990, and 3.6 million in 1997. Moreover, naturalizations, which qualify one to petition for extended family, have increased steadily — the annual average was 146,000 in the 1970s, 221,000 in the 1980s, and 343,000 in the five years 1991-5. And in FY96, naturalizations exceeded a million — more than double the previous annual record — and almost two million more applications are in the pipeline.

THE 1996 LEGISLATION: SOLUTION OR TEMPORARY FIX? By one estimate, 40 percent of the aliens on current waiting lists no longer qualify for admission thanks to the 1996 welfare and immigration reforms. No doubt some who would immigrate to get on the dole will be discouraged by the new laws. And elimination of SSI and Medicaid benefits may reduce

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the number of parents who enter. The fact that the affidavit of support is now enforceable in court might discourage some would-be sponsor from bringing in her ne'er-do-well brother and his family. And the requirement that sponsors must "maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line..." may disqualify some of them.

"[w]ith our own population undereducated and underskilled ...it defies all common sense and rationality for unskilled foreign workers to be admitted to this country. It can't be justified." — Barbara Jordan, Chair Commission on Immigration Reform

It's much too early to assess the effects of last year's legislation, however. Historically, all new immigration reform legislation springs forth like the national bird — proud, full-beaked and vigilant. But, then, court decisions, Justice Department sidesteps, inadequate funding, and worm-holes in the unfathomable INA soon combine to clip its wings. Add to this the private bills, the lawyerly observations, the scam artists, state and local initiatives that "pick up the slack," and a deluge of tiny non-germane "compassionate" back-slides attached to "must-pass legislation," and the noble bird may be reduced to a pile of picked-over bones.

NO MORAL IMPERATIVE. Financial requirements imposed on would-be immigrants, it should be noted, are nothing new. Beginning twenty years before the Lazarus Memorial plaque was affixed in a hallway under the State of Liberty in 1903, American policy had been to deny entry to any alien who might become a "public charge." The reapplication of monetary and fiduciary requirements for sponsors should remind us that family reunification has never been regarded as some kind of moral imperative.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS. The Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR), in its June 1995 report, recommended elimination of extended family preferences in large part because such family members often turn out to be unskilled workers. Commission Chairwoman Barbara Jordan had this in mind, in part, when she observed caustically that: "[w]ith our own population undereducated and underskilled...it defies all common sense and rationality for unskilled foreign workers to be admitted to this country. It can't be justified."

COMMISSION OUT OF COMMISSION? The National Research Council (NRC), in its recent report to the Commission, found that despite the likelihood that the federal deficit would be reduced by the year 2002, "long-term projections reveal that serious [fiscal] imbalances" will result from the aging of the population. Constructing a "Baseline Scenario" for the year 2016 (their supposed year of the crunch), and developing net present values (NPVs) by age, and projecting that the median age of Americans will climb to 38 years while that of immigrants at entry will remain at 28 years, the Commission concluded that we need more immigrants. This is also the answer offered by the irrepressible Ben Wattenberg.

There are some problems with that Council solution. If the past 20 years offer any evidence, the next 20 years will see more change than any such period in history. Life expectancy may skyrocket, nanotechnologies may eliminate all manufacturing jobs, the federal retirement system may be privatized, and medical care may actually become cheaper.

Assuming, as the NRC does, that the world will remain static, however, the panel might have considered a survey conducted by one its own — Thomas Espenshade. The author of many studies sympathetic to immigrants, Professor Espenshade nevertheless concluded, based on an array of studies, that increased immigration would be "ineffective on a small scale and impractical on a large one" as a means for solving America's aging problem.

Others conclude that there is something repugnant, even craven, about bringing in immigrants to support aging retired Americans. In any case, though the NRC report will haunt the immigration reform debate for years to come, the

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Commission on Immigration Reform, in its final report, decided to stick with its earlier call for a modest reduction in immigration — to an annual level of 550,000.

NOT ALL BAD? The NRC report projected a positive NPV "for an immigrant aged 21 years with a high school education...." However, "For arrivals after the mid-thirties," they found, "the NPV turns negative, reaching about [minus] $224,000 for an immigrant arriving at age 70." A 1988 GAO study found that, on average, 12.4 years elapsed between the arrival of a primary immigrant who becomes a citizen and the arrival of his or her non-quota immediate relatives — spouse, minor children, and parents. Entry of quota-limited extended family members would be further delayed, putting the age of most well into the negative NPV range. Thus confirmed in its earlier conclusion, the Commission, in its final report, repeated its recommendation that extended family immigration be eliminated.

"...the lure of increasingly generous government benefits such as SSI and Medicaid — a decided advantage to citizens of Third World countries."

DOES OUR POLICY ACTUALLY REUNIFY EXTENDED FAMILIES? A decent respect for the language says: no, it doesn't and it can't! Realistically, what we have is a series of options that allow some foreign relatives to join some U.S. citizen relatives — the sponsor must become a U.S. citizen, must petition for the foreign relative, and must sign an affidavit of support, and the foreign relative must act on the petition. We all have relatives we would just as soon never see and should not be surprised to find that many petitions for family members are advanced out of a sense of family obligation rather than a desire for reunification. Indeed, many petitioners may secretly wish that such options were not available.

More to the point, immigration is basically a process of disunification. Almost every individual immigrant leaves a large extended family in his wake. Immigration is a linear process, extended family reunification is a geometric one.

RE-DISUNIFICATION? There is nothing to stop a "reunited" family member from making the bargain look ridiculous by moving somewhere else in the country in search of work or a nicer place to live. Is a Moroccan who moves 3,000 miles to join her brother in Raleigh, NC reunified with her family when she then relocates 6,000 miles away in Hawaii? In fact, isn't the process a familiar one? — American families distribute themselves all across our vast land. Would we consider legislation to reunify them? And don't we all have the same options? — the telephone and airplane put us all within minutes or hours of everyone on Earth.

PARENTS. America has always provided for the admission of parents of U.S. citizens. But until recent years, the numbers were small — for reasons not hard to divine. Picture an elderly couple living comfortably in a society they have known since birth. Imagine they are surrounded by their children and grandchildren and brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces, and cocooned in a traditional web of obligations that protect them from extremes of poverty. Such parents would be unlikely to pick up and move to a strange land, with a strange tongue, and no welfare safety net, just to rejoin one child who had immigrated there.

Parent admissions were first reported in 1954 and averaged less than 3,000 per year in the years 1954-8. Why did the numbers balloon to an annual average of 60,000 in the years 1992-6? There are two obvious answers: (1) adoption in 1953 and 1959 of extended family preferences meant that many of a parent's children and siblings could now move to the U.S., making relocation more comfortable and desirable; (2) the lure of increasingly generous government benefits such as SSI and Medicaid — a decided advantage to citizens of Third World countries.

Children ought to take care of needy parents. But with few exceptions that can best be effected by means other than immigration. Absent SSI and Medicaid benefits, most naturalized citizens will find it cheaper to support their parent(s) in the home country. And, still surrounded by their extended family, parents are apt to prefer that arrangement.

Proposals have been advanced that would limit

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the immigration of parents to situations where all or more than half of their children are living in the U.S.A. Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation proposes exploring a "guest" visa program which would admit parents on a permanent basis but deny them the right ever to become immigrants or citizens and thereby the opportunity to qualify for government assistance.

NO MORE ANCHOR BABIES? Many parents-to-be enter our country in order to bear a child on American soil. Obviously, this method for gaining the prize of American citizenship for one's child should be discouraged. For one thing, the numbers are potentially astronomical. There is much argument over whether denying such citizenship would require a statute or a constitutional amendment. One thing we can do is to deny these "anchor babies" the right (at age 21) to legalize the status of their parents and siblings. Who knows? These secondary benefits might turn out to be the main incentive for such births.

POPULATION. Like all other categories, extended family immigration adds greatly to our population. Large marginal increases have a massive impact on our schools, our environment, our physical infrastructure, and our opportunities for solitude. All such increases portend additional government and consensual regulations and consequent reductions in our freedom.

Extended family reunification is one of the least justifiable of all the huge flows that make up our current immigration policy. Like much of that policy it is out of control, associated as it is with mounting backlogs and the encouragement of illegal immigration.

Since no skills are required, extended family members almost by definition will compete with American workers who can least afford such competition and of whose meager grasp on the ladder of success we should be most protective.

And since immigration is basically disunifying, extended family immigration is justified upon a false premise — it does not and cannot reunify families. We can reunite, reunify, and rejoin the extended family best by not separating, fracturing and breaking it apart in the first place.

Family reunification therefore can only sensibly mean nuclear family reunification — granting immigrant status to the spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens and legal immigrants with no affidavit of support required. This is real family values! TSC

NOTE

[1] Under current law these include adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and minor children; brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and minor children; and the unmarried adult sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

Irish: The Great Emigrants

But not so keen on receiving outsiders

by Kevin Rafter

DUBLIN

Resentment is growing in Ireland against foreigners seeking asylum here.

The antagonism has become so public that Irish President Mary Robinson has warned of the danger of racism "rearing its ugly head" unless people learn to deal with the issues surrounding refugees and immigration.

The number of asylum-seekers in Ireland has grown from 39 in 1992 to 1,179 least year. Ireland, which has for the last two centuries exported its own people to the four corners of the globe, is now the destination for refugees from the Third World and Eastern Europe. It's said that not since the Celts were driven westward by the Romans has Ireland seen such a large influx of refugees.

Ironically, statistics from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development show that among all the Western

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European countries, Ireland actually has the lowest proportion of foreigners in its population. In 1992, just 2.7 percent of the Irish population were non-citizens. This compared with 3.5 percent in Britain, 6.3 percent in France, and 8.5 percent in Germany.

Why has Ireland attracted so many refugees? Many have found ti an easier place to gain entry following a recent tightening of immigration procedures in other European countries, such as Britain and Germany.

Many leading European nations also have been experiencing economic difficulties. With little economic growth in places like Germany and France, there are fewer jobs for foreigners.

Ireland's economy, on the other hand, has been booming for five years. With almost nonexistent inflation, and nearly 1,000 new jobs being created every week, Ireland has become a magnet for refugees.

The largest number of refugees has been from Romania, followed closely by Congo (formerly Zaire), Somalia, and Algeria. Irish refugee agencies have been ill-prepared for the increase. The ease with which refugees can enter the country has only added to the numbers.

So far, Ireland has resisted introducing restrictive immigration procedures. But the reception refugees are receiving has been far from "100,000 welcomes" for which the Irish are famous.

"The reception refugees are receiving has been far from the '100,000 welcomes' for which the Irish are famous."

Many refugees were appalled by the anti-immigrant comments of several candidates in the recent Irish general election. Several leading politicians warned of "floods" of immigrants coming into Ireland, many of whom were "professional beggars."

This attitude is "both cheap and shallow," says Drazen Nozinic, a Serbo-Croatian from the former Yugoslavia who obtained refugee status four years ago.

A former government minister with responsibility in this area, Joan Burton, says that "Irish people have been taken by surprise by the cultural differences between them and refugees." Partly in response to these attitudes, refugees are now trying to establish an association to represent their interests.

Not all the comments about refugees are bad. Jon Bennet, who runs Dublin's Hill Top Hostel, describes them as the "most polite, appreciative, graceful, and well-mannered people. It's horrifying to hear the things being said about them."

The majority of refugees coming to Ireland are like Mr. Nozinic: they have no place to go home to in safety. He fled the war in the former Yugoslavia after friends were killed and family members were beaten up.

Many countries have fast-tracked procedures for asylum-seekers. In Austria, a decision on an asylum application takes only a few hours. In Ireland, it takes on average three years to process each application.

At present, almost 2,000 refugees in Ireland await decisions on their cases. They exist in legal limbo. They live in temporary accommodations and are prohibited from working or pursuing an education.

In an attempt to defuse the debate, President Robinson has appealed to the Irish people to be receptive in their attitudes toward refugees. She drew a parallel between the treatment of refugees in Ireland today and the reception afforded Irish emigrants to North America in the past. Just as the Irish crossed the Atlantic Ocean in search of their fortunes, many now see Ireland as a haven.

As Sean Love of the Irish section of Amnesty International says, "The least we can do is offer these people a fair hearing and fair treatment." TSC

Kevin Rafter writes from Dublin.

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It Can't Happen Here, N'est-ce-pas?

Confronting the forces of dissolution

Book Review by Gerda Bikales

The title of a much-talked about new book by Jean-Claude Barreau asks a provocative question: *Will France Disappear?* Right there the subtleties of the French language come into play, for "disappear" is the accepted euphemism for death, while it also retains the meaning of fading away. The American reader is left to wonder whether we are talking about a definitive end or a slow evaporation into insubstantiality.

The inspiration for his book's title, Barreau tells us, comes from a 1970 book by Soviet dissident Andrei Almarik, *Will the USSR Survive until 1984?* At the time the question seemed absurd — the power of the Soviet Union seemed quite beyond dispute. Yet Almarik did not miss by much. The Berlin Wall crumbled five years later.

La France Va-t-elle Disparaître?
by Jean-Claude Barreau
Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset

Jean-Claude Barreau is hardly an apocalyptic right-wing crank wishing to raise anxiety about French survival. For many years the author was a worker-priest in the slums of Paris, an engaged social reformer in daily contact with the struggles of newly-arrived immigrants. Eventually he left the church, but not his faith. He married and raised a family, wrote novels and essays, and became an advisor to political leaders of both the left and the right. He was an advisor to President François Mitterand, a socialist, and later worked for two center-right cabinet ministers closely associated with immigration reform — Charles Pasqua and Jean-Michel Debré. In this book, Barreau often reveals himself to be a man of the left, though one often at odds with others who define themselves as such.

If the author's political stance defies labeling, his national identity is clearly French. His historical references tend to be obscure events in French history, not always easy to unscramble. His heroes are Joan of Arc, the young Napoleon (in his "First Consul" period), and Charles de Gaulle. His overarching loyalties are to the spirit of the Revolution of 1789, born of the Enlightenment, and to the secular Republic it so painfully established.

Barreau's understanding of the State is built upon a Hobbesian social contract. Given man's violent nature, the State is an artificial construct for channeling violence. It is not expected to deliver a terrestrial paradise, but merely to keep life from being hell. For the system to work, affective ties must bind the governed to the State and to each other. Likewise, the State must care for and about the people it rules, striving to govern wisely to keep their support. In each generation, the majority must consent to be ruled, or the State falls. Minorities can be suppressed, if the majority doesn't care about them but the majority can't be suppressed indefinitely. What Almarik sensed in the USSR in 1970 was bad governance and a loss of popular consent. What Barreau senses today in France is growing disaffection among the governed and between the rulers and its people.

Nation-States, we know, are unraveling everywhere. Still, it is startling to find the forces of dissolution working so effectively in that most classic of Nation-States. France is perhaps the oldest one, created by some accounts in 843 in the treaty formalizing the break-up of Charlemagne's empire.

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Paris has been its capital continuously since 987. In the intervening centuries, the characteristic hexagonal shape on the map that we recognize today as "France" has emerged, through many territorial expansions and contractions. The country emanates an aura of age-old solidity and unity, but in reality it is vulnerable and requires constant reassertion to maintain itself whole.

For France is not a nation based on race or ethnicity, but on a mythologized version of history accepted by all and on a vision of a common destiny. It may be fashionable in America to lump all fair-skinned people together into "Euro-Americans," but Europeans are highly sensitive to the different bloodlines ands cultures that populate the Continent and have shaped its often-tragic history. France is conscious of its "exceptionalism," its ethnic Pan-European heterogeneity, thrust upon it by geography. Bordered by the North Sea, the Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, France is the melting pot of Europe. Flemings, Germans, Catalonians, Celts, Normans have blended with Gauls and Mediterranean tribes for centuries. More recently, immigration has added Armenians, Slavs, Jews, Asians and North Africans to the mix. "France *is* Europe," claims Barreau.

If geography preordained its heterogeneity, it is a point of pride in France that it is French political philosophy and institutions that have allowed its citizens to thrive in unison, and to produce one of the world's most admired civilizations. From the ashes of royal tyranny and the excesses of the Revolution arose the secular Republic, committed to "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" for all. Discreet observance of religion and cultural traditions was tolerated in the private sphere, but each generation was carefully trained to consider itself wholly French. It has been said that France absorbed its immigrants — quite literally.

In a Nation-State with such a highly developed sense of national identity, what dangers could be lurking, dangers serious enough to imperil its very existence? Barreau identifies them at some length. In essence they are of two kinds: threats to the State and threats to the Nation.

The most imminent threat to the French State is the European Union, post-Maastricht. Conceived after the devastation of the Second World War as a low-key economic free-trade zone of independent nations, it has steadily been recasting itself as the Nation of Europe — a federation modeled after the United States, in which the nations of the Continent take the place of the states. The European nations, however, are fully developed and delineated civilizations, with their own political systems, which must be disabled to make room for the new Supernation. And indeed, no one who has recently traveled to Strasbourg (site of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the European Court) or to Brussels (where the powerful European Commission is headquartered) would have failed to notice the gigantic construction projects underway to house these ambitious institutions and their appendages, nor to wonder whether the costs and grandeur are justified.

"The most imminent threat to the French State is the European Union....legislatures are losing authority over large areas of public life."

The power appropriated by the European Union is subtracted from the national legislatures, and these are losing authority over large areas of public life. The Union's own parliament is home to a variety of political misfits, often losers in national elections, who don't feel accountable to anyone. The French delegation appears to be particularly disinclined to defend its own nation's interests. Many crucial decisions are made by the Commissioners in Brussels, faceless technocrats beyond the reach of voters. The European Union is busy demolishing the "Europe of Nations" and is replacing it with the "Nation of Europe." This has resulted in some vital losses for the French State: a loss of interest in national politics by its electorate, a loss of sovereignty as decision-making moves outside the country, and a loss of legitimacy as government decisions come under scrutiny and criticism by Brussels and Strasbourg.

To accelerate the destruction of national governments, Brussels has taken up the cause of regions, "communities," ethnicities and minorities.

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The Council of Europe has concocted a "Convention on National Minorities" that goes counter to the French tradition of respect for individual rights and rejection of group rights. Brussels is now headquarters for lobbyists from every group and region, maneuvering for European Union support in wrenching concessions from national governments.

Barreau greatly admires the Euro-skepticism of the British. Alone among the Union's members, Britain seems to have been spared the fever of Europeism, and still dares to defend its own interests from this European version of the globalization bandwagon, a cultivated fear of being left behind in the new economic global village. French leaders, on the left and on the right, are committed Europeists, though the economy of France has suffered badly in the mad rush toward a common European currency. Barreau argues that France is in the best position to say "no," to slow down the pace, to force reconsi-deration of Europe's new structure. Its battered economy is still largely domestic and can manage on its own, if it came to that. France holds the key to a united Europe — there might be one without England, but none is possible without France.

These ideas play well with the French people, who sense that they are headed the wrong way. But the leadership stubbornly persists. The author conjectures that it is still suffering from the shame of defeat by Germany in 1940. It has lost confidence in a future for France, and can't conceive of one apart from Europe's — dominated though it is by a politically purified post-Maastricht Germany. A far-fetched explanation, perhaps, but one that still resonates more than fifty years after World War II.

The somber assessment of the consequences of European Union may surprise American readers, who tend to view it as a fairly benign development, and fear only its potential as an economic competitor. Though we are ourselves partners in a controversial North American Free Trade Agreement, there is still little day-to-day awareness of its impacts, and adverse political (as opposed to economic) consequences to the American Nation-State have not yet appeared on our radar screen.

We are, however, quite familiar with the internal dangers that, Barreau claims, threaten to dissolve the French nation.

It is telling that much of the media discussion of this best-selling book has centered around immigration — a topic to which the author devotes less than twenty pages. The past year has seen a number of highly publicized events relating to immigration policy, including the occupation of a Catholic church by 300 *sans-papiers* (undocumented immigrants) claiming a right to be legalized, a high-profile hunger strike by ten *sans-papiers* and a celebrity-initiated protest against tougher immigration laws that spread rapidly before withering in the face of contrary public opinion.

"Barreau reserves his wrath for the 'angelicals' ...[who] prefer to dream up a world without borders in which residency in France is a universal 'right'"

Barreau's position, adopted by Interior Ministers Pasqua and Debré, is that legal immigration of about 100,000 persons a year is manageable (adjusted for population size, this number would correspond to about 450,000 persons in the U.S.). As France no longer recruits foreign workers (though citizens of European Union countries are allowed to work there), these admissions are reserved for family reunification and political asylum cases. It is clandestine immigration, in numbers unknown but increasing rapidly, that the author insists must be stopped. This is not an easy task, especially as border controls have been given up within the European Union. To be effective, the laws have to be strict and consistently applied.

Commenting on recent events, Barreau reserves his wrath for the "angelicals," his term for those ethereal kind souls too delicate to bother with the crass reality of numbers and legal procedures. They prefer to dream up a world without borders in which residency in France is a universal "right." In this they are joined by an activist judiciary that, more often than not, will invalidate the law's intent by managing to find technical or human rights violations in every detention or deportation order. The judges don't worry about what happens to the people they release, who promptly swell the ranks of the

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unemployed and exploited, the discontented and the resentful.

Barreau is not a hard-liner who would deny the State the right to show compassion in some situations — provided it is clear that the grant of legal residence is always the willful option of a humane government, and not an automatic "right" of would-be immigrants. He advocates consistent and well-publicized deportations of recent settlers, for these have a dissuasive influence on others contemplating clandestine residence. At the same time, he favors discreet adjustment for those already well adapted to life in France.

"When birthrates are low, immigration becomes more problematic. It does not merely add population, it substitutes population."

The national civic crisis stretches far beyond willful disobedience and judicial perversions of the laws. The historic sacrifices of generations for the good of the Republic are little taught and beyond the comprehension of today's youth. The prevailing spirit of the day is cynicism, and a Frenchman's ultimate civic obligation is to criticize his country. For its own good, naturally. The book quotes philosopher Michel Serres, who mostly teaches in America, asking humbly in the pages of *Le Monde*: "Could you perhaps — not every day of course, that would be asking too much — but just from time to time could you say something good about France?"

The schools have not only given up the teaching of history as civic grounding, they have fallen into the trap of multiculturalism. In 1973, France negotiated agreements with sending countries to send instructors to teach immigrant students their native language and culture. In short order this came to mean the teaching of the Koran and Islamic fundamentalism in the public schools! Everyone bemoans this breach in the school's secular character, but no government has had the courage to dismantle the system.

For Barreau, several other trends are eroding the nation's cohesiveness. Though a believer in women's reproductive rights, he worries about France's demographic decline, and the lack of confidence in the future it implies. The generations no longer renew themselves, and the nation's culture can't be transmitted to children who are not born. When birthrates are low, immigration becomes more problematic. It does not merely add population, it substitutes population.

And, finally, there is the end of military conscription, announced for 2001. The idea that every young Frenchman owes his country the time and courage necessary to defend it dates back to the Revolution and is strongly embedded in the French ethos. It is closely tied to people's conception of French citizenship. But in the wake of the Cold War the time required has grown much shorter, the courage much less, and there is a general recognition that a professional army would be more effective. Still, military service asked something of the young, who soon will be freed of this quasi-symbolic duty, too.

There is still a longing in the land for a self-affirming France that is more than a geographic site, especially among the common people who are not in fashion. They are still stirred by the sight of the tricolor flag and the sound of the *Marseillaise*, they still take pride in being French, they still love their homeland, though expressing that love is now a little awkward. Patriotism and its symbols have been discarded and ridiculed by the hip and fashionable elites as ancient artifacts from a world by-passed by globalization. The National Front has wrapped itself in the discards, and people are flocking to it, hungry to reaffirm their belief in a French future, hardly listening to the party's dangerous message of fascist revival.

Barreau pretty much leaves us there, though he fantasizes a more optimistic if unlikely future that could renew his dying country. In that scenario, it would dawn on the French leadership that their abdication of Brussels and blindness to civic decline can only lead to an eventual National Front victory. They will do the right thing. They will say, "enough."

American readers owe a debt of gratitude to this author who shows himself to be somewhat antagonistic and ill-informed about our country. But by focusing so sharply on the force of dissolution undermining his own, which we believed so solid and coherent, he has held up a mirror in which we may catch our own image. TSC

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Mexico's Managed Decay

A continuous environmental disaster

Book Review by Wade Graham

Joel Simon, an American journalist who lives in Mexico City, has produced an excellent, wide-ranging, movingly-reported book about Mexican environmental history and the environmental costs of the country's economic policies — costs increasingly felt not only in Mexico but in the United States. Simon's thesis — developed in chapters covering the oil industry, logging, rural agriculture, coral reefs, pollution, and a tour-de-force history of Mexico City through its (lack of) control of its water resources — is that the fate of the land is ineluctably linked to the political and economic dispensation of the society that subsists on it.

In Mexico's case, this dispensation was established in the first moments of the Spanish Conquest and has yet to be meaningfully altered. Beginning with a short, lucid sketch of the collision between the Aztec and Spanish empires, Simon argues that the legacy of the conquest was not conquest at all in the sense of absorption or even combination into a new, coherent society but spotty superimposition of Spanish norms over Indian ones: an ethic of private landholding over communal, of one racial community over another, of an urban cultural realm over a rural one. Far from becoming resolved over time, these tensions have fueled a state of permanent conflict between the dominant, landholding minority (about two percent of the population) and the rural, landless majority — inheritors of the original "castes" of the sixteenth century.

Endangered Mexico: An Environment on the Edge
by Joel Simon
San Francisco: Sierra Club Books
275 pages, $27

This conflict is in turn driven by a structural instability of land tenure — on the one hand the tradition of unfettered encroachment by large estates onto village lands, on the other the state's theoretical power to redistribute land "in the interest of the nation," a power actually enshrined in the Mexican constitution — instability which encourages unsustainable extraction over stewardship. Mexican history — Mexican time — has been occupied by the serial rape of Mexican space, with little accumulation of wealth, even at the thin apex of the economic pyramid, to show for it. Simon notes that an integral part of this legacy is, charitably, a lack of accountability in civic institutions: a fact widely aired during the Nafta debate and one which would seem to dim any hopes of rapid progress on environmental issues in Mexico.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of *Endangered Mexico* to American readers is its attempt to explain how the Mexicans we encounter in our cities and fields came to be there largely as a result of government farm policies, both Mexican and American, which have sought to turn the Mexican peasant "...from subsistence farmer to part-time wage laborer, to agricultural, full-time worker ... a process that has been going on for most of this century and is expected to accelerate. In fact, with a few brief interludes, the Mexican policy toward the *campesino* has been remarkably consistent for the past quarter century. The strategy has been to get rid of them — but slowly, in order to minimize the social disruption." Since the 1940s the Mexican government has pursued the "proletarianization" of its peasantry in order to further its dream of rapid industrialization and development through "export-led growth." This was accomplished through encouraging dependence on fertilizers and pesticides, squeezing credit, and manipulating corn subsidies until the "cycle of debt" drives *campesinos* off the land and into cities — often U.S. cities —

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refugees from a sort of taxpayer-sponsored Dust Bowl of the Mexican heartland.

That this model of development has failed, and failed radically, is one of Simon's strongest, and most basic points. But, the strategy has developed a dynamic of its own, a momentum of human need which poses a very stiff challenge to environmentalism. "For many first world environmentalists," Simon writes, "it is demands for basic resources made by the poor that are putting the strain on Mexico's — and the world's — environment ...cutting down the forests to plant its corn, crowding the cities, and contributing to its own misery by having too many children." Indeed, Mexico's population has exploded from 15 million after the 1910 revolution to at least 90 million now, and the burgeoning poor are manifestly a burden on resources. In the book's most powerful and distressing section, Simon recounts his journeys to the Lacandon jungle in Chiapas State to visit with Subcommander Marcos, leader of the Zapatista rebellion. What he discovers is that the Indians who are the soldiers and constituents of the Zapatistas — themselves immigrants to the jungle, having been pushed off their traditional lands elsewhere — are demanding first and foremost access to jungle reserves, believing that their only chance for survival is in clearing what remains of the jungle for farms and ranches.

"The Zapatistas ... are demanding first and foremost access to jungle reserves, believing that their only chance for survival is in clearing what remains of the jungle for farms and ranches."

Those in the developing world fix the blame on the developed world's manifestly rapacious patterns of consumption. Simon, for his part, points out that Mexico has both exported its problems and imported them: the poor, and their reproduction, are to some extent *made* — constructed by a system for which American policy, economic theory, and consumer demand are heavily responsible, and from which Americans profit: "...the managed decay of the Mexican rural environment feeds the labor pool," he writes, and helps "to put cheap food" on American tables.

At one level, the conflict headlined as "environment or jobs," may be irreducible as long as we remain shouting across an "economic chasm." One scene in the book says it all: Simon speaks with a woman in a Tijuana neighborhood polluted by maquiladoras who has lost a baby to anencephaly, "a rare and fatal birth defect in which the baby is born with an open skull and undeveloped brain."

> *By pooling the pay of several children who worked in the factories, she was able to acquire a refrigerator, a stove, and a television. Perhaps that is why talking about the pollution made her more depressed than angry.*

To her and tens of millions of others, it seems to be an unfortunate but acceptable trade. But it does not therefore have to be acceptable to Americans. And the economic gap may not be bridgeable, Simon warns: "Uniform, global progress is not the world's destiny. ...The challenge for the next century will be to find ways for fishermen and petrochemical plants to share the same river." It is a challenge which will not be met unless hard positions for preservation and the enforcement of environmental laws — including U.S. laws — are taken, to force people and markets to change the way chemicals are made and fish are caught and sold. Environmentalists should not strive first to be peacemakers or arbitrators, but advocates, at least until they succeed in putting themselves out of business.

There are a few quibbles with what is otherwise a fine book, one which admittedly makes no claims to comprehensiveness. The packaging panders too much — *An Environment on the Edge* of what? Simon details at length the continuous environmental disaster that has been Mexican history, so where can it go from here? What exactly is endangered we are not told. The book's lack of specificity and basic quantification is bothersome and weakens Simon's case: there are few numbers beyond the most abstract of statistics, and no maps. Even the cover photo, by Sebastiao Salgado, is mysterious, given no time or place — one wonders if it was taken in Mexico. TSC

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A Novel Approach

Authors highlight threats to the U.S. of illegal immigration and a Mexico in turmoil

Book Reviews by Wayne Lutton

Clive Cussler, author of a dozen consecutive *New York Times* bestsellers with sales of over 70 million copies, has just released a new adventure novel, *Flood Tide*. The story, set in the year 2000, centers around the launching of demographic and economic warfare by the leaders of mainland China. Chinese aliens flood into the U.S., Canada, and other countries around the Pacific Rim. Drugs and guns come with them. The sitting U.S. President, here a former governor of Oklahoma, is himself compromised by virtue of the fact that the leading Chinese alien-and-drug smuggler, who poses as an international businessman and philanthropist, has poured vast sums into his reelection campaign. A handful of dedicated American law enforcement agents, led by the Immigration and Naturalization Service along with Cussler's hero, Dirk Pitt of the fictional National Underwater and Marine Agency (NUMA), combat Asian and traitorous American elites.



Flood Tide
by Clive Cussler
New York: Simon & Schuster
511 pages, $26.00

Although a work of fiction, the author salts his story with data about immigration, population pressure, and the hard economic consequences of "free trade" policy. For example, on page 66, Cussler has the INS Commissioner (who is *not* modeled after Doris Meissner!), inform a gathering of national security officials: "Congress appropriated a sixty-percent increase in INS border patrol agents, but provided no funds for expanding our investigations division. Our entire department has only eighteen hundred special agents to cover the entire United States and foreign investigations. The FBI has eleven hundred agents in New York City alone. Here in Washington twelve hundred Capitol police patrol an area that is measured in city blocks. Simply put, there are nowhere near enough INS criminal investigative assets to put a dent in the flow of illegal immigrants."

Would not that kind of leadership be an answer to the earnest desires of many readers of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT?

Later, the head of NUMA warns, "The last census put the U.S. population at roughly two hundred and fifty million. With the coming increase in births and immigration, legal and illegal, the population will soar to three hundred and sixty million by the year twenty fifty ... Every great nation or civilization either fell by corruption from within or was altered forever by foreign migration." Toward the end of the book, the CIA forecasts the breakup of the United States: "The Chinese in time will control the West Coast from San Francisco to Alaska and the Hispanics will govern the lands east from Los Angeles to Houston. It's happening before our eyes."

As we go to press, *Flood Tide* is already atop the national best-seller lists for fiction. Cussler is to be commended for introducing many thousands of readers to the very real demographic, political, and economic considerations upon which he has spun a

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story of high adventure and intrigue. Perhaps his public will be led to ponder what these sobering facts and trends portend for the future of their country.

* * *

Will America be ready for *The Next War*? That is the question behind each of the hypothetical war scenarios that compose this sobering yet readable book.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Hoover Institution Visiting Scholar Peter Schweizer dramatize the outbreak and progress of major wars that realistically could occur over the next decade. They include conflicts in the Far East, the oil-producing Gulf States, and Russian aggression following the emergence of a dictator who promises to restore national greatness.



The Next War
by Casper Weinberger and Peter Schweitzer
Washington, D.C.:
Regnery Publishing
470 pages, $27.50
(Available from the Social Contract Press, 1-800-352-4843)

Readers of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT will be especially interested in Part Three, set in the Spring of 2003. Here the authors outline a crisis along our southern border. The economic collapse of Mexico, triggered by a government beholden to drug lords, leads millions of Mexicans to tramp northward. The U.S. President calls out Army troops to reinforce the Border Patrol. But they are swamped. Latino terrorists set off bombs and touch-off riots in cities in California and Texas. As the story unfolds, the U.S. President is unafraid to take decisive action to restore order and protect American interests.

That someone with Weinberger's credentials should look upon Mexico as a likely national security threat should lead at least some of those who view conditions there with complacency to re-evaluate their position. Clearly, the authors see that the current unwillingness of Washington policy makers to deal with Mexican-related problems could soon have disastrous consequences. TSC

Fifty-eight Good Reasons To Oppose Immigration

Book Review by Samuel Francis

Probably the greatest irony of the debate over immigration is that there is no debate. With more than 80 percent of Americans believing that immigration should be essentially halted, most people have already made up their minds. As for those in the other 20 percent who favor immigration and more of it, they've made up their minds too. Since the latter happen to control both political parties and most of the media, there is no debate.

But if there were a debate, one publication that both sides should read would be a short monograph by immigration expert Lawrence Auster titled *Huddled Clichés: Exposing the Fraudulent Arguments That Have Opened America's Borders to the World.* I'll bet you can guess which side of the non-debate Mr. Auster is on.

Huddled Clichés: Exposing the Fraudulent Arguments That Have Opened America's Borders to the World
by Lawrence Auster
American Immigration Control Foundation (AICF) Box 525, Monterey, VA, 24465
58 pages, $3.00 (postpaid)

Mr. Auster's booklet — 58 pages long — is published by the American Immigration Control Foundation, which for some years has published some of the most

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thoughtful studies of the impact of immigration on American life. Mr. Auster's most recent monograph — he published a similar study of immigration some years ago called *The Path to National Suicide* — is one of the most useful of its publications.

What makes it particularly useful is that Mr. Auster simply walks through most of what we hear in favor of immigration and shows very succinctly and simply that it's all flapdoodle. There may be a valid argument for immigration, but if there is, Mr. Auster hasn't met it.

The arguments he surveys and demolishes one by one are not simply straw men that he invented. Everyone who's ever gotten into a discussion of immigration has heard them, and every such argument is dissected and pinned to the pages of Mr. Auster's pamphlet. Moreover, he actually quotes the arguments from those who spin them — not only liberals and leftists but also conservatives who have fallen for the clichés of the left.

One such cliché is that: "if we didn't have immigrants doing all kinds of jobs in America today, there would be nobody to do them." This is a favorite of the agribusiness boys, who claim that unless they hire illegal immigrants, their crops won't get picked. In fact, Mr. Auster picks their crops for them

The claim, he says, is "empirically false," but also it's based on "a false assumption, which is that the American economy could only have developed in one way, with lots of immigrants coming here and taking lots of jobs." As he points out, the jobs the immigrants perform exist *because* of the immigrants. If it were true that no one except immigrants would do the jobs, the jobs would not exist because those who offer them would invest in other enterprises.

Mr. Auster gives as an example the exclusion of Chinese from California after 1882. Had there been no such exclusion, Chinese immigrants would have come to California and taken various kinds of jobs and started various kinds of businesses. But state law excluded them from coming and so they didn't. Nevertheless, California's economy somehow managed to develop in other ways without the Chinese.

***Samuel Francis, Ph.D.**, is a nationally syndicated columnist.* *© 1997, Tribune Media Services, reprinted by permission.*

The "no immigrants, no jobs" line is common among libertarians, but conservatives have their own species of clichés. One that is especially common is that immigrants are socially conservative and have strong family values. Mr. Auster points out that this based on a "deeply cynical premise: we Americans are so degenerate that we are no longer a viable society."

"The reason there is no real debate about immigration is that there are too many vested interests, too much political power, and too much money bound up with keeping the tide of immigrants coming."

Moreover, whether the "cynical premise" is true or not, Mr. Auster cites statistics showing that Hispanic immigrants "are significantly more likely than white Americans (and East Asian immigrants) to drop out of school, go on welfare, and end up in jail. The illegitimacy rate among Mexican-Americans is 28.9 percent, more than twice as high as that of white Americans. This is not exactly *Leave It To Beaver* with a Mexican accent.

Of course, there is no bottom to the bucket of clichés about immigration, and Mr. Auster in his 58 pages can't scrape out every one of them. "We are a nation of immigrants," "America is based on an idea, not ethnicity," "immigration is inevitable and can't be stopped" — all of them are dealt with summarily in the pamphlet, but for every dragon he slays, ten more pop out of the mental software that throbs between the ears of the immigration lobby.

The reason there is no real debate about immigration is that there are too many vested interests, too much political power, and too much money bound up with keeping the tide of immigrants coming. Mr. Auster and his clear thinking can't stop that, but at least his busting of the immigration thought-balloons will help expose the special interests that keep the debate stifled.

TSC

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Immigration on the Internet

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT journal and THE SOCIAL CONTRACT PRESS are on the internet. Our address is: **www.tscpress.com**. Our home page gives our mission statement, information about THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, a list of books for sale, editorials from several immediately previous issues which highlight the contents of each, plus the internet addresses of other groups working on immigration reform, population control and national unity questions.

This home page also hosts the newsletter of the Biocentric Institute edited by William Dickinson. In addition, the Biocentric Institute also has its own web site at <ultralink/net/IAPM>.

In addition, here are some other sites that readers may be interested in exploring:

- Philip Martin publishes *Migration News* and can be reached at <migration.ucdavis.edu>.
- Professor Norman Matloff has many articles and a great deal of data at: <heather.cs.ucdavis. edu/pub/Immigration/Index/html>.
- Joseph Daleiden heads the Midwest Coalition to Reform Immigration. His web site is: <www.enteract.com/~mcri97>.
- Glenn Spencer leads Voices of Citizens Together and their web site is <www.instanet.com/~vct>.
- *People and Place* is a journal published by the Centre for Population and Urban Research at Monash University in Australia. They can be reached at <www.swin.edu.au/sbs/pub/pnp>.
- *Mankind Quarterly* — <mankind.org>.
- The Aztlan Organization is at <aztlan.org>.
- <fedpub.com/immigration> brings up Federal Publications, Inc. which has a sub-heading for developments in immigration law.
- The American Immigration Lawyers Association <aila.org/home.htm>.
- <cofcc.org> reaches the Council of Conservative Citizens.
- <lra.com/swtaboo/index.html> is based on Garrett Hardin's idea of "stalking the wild taboo."
- "Immigration by the Numbers" continues the thrust of Roy Beck's video at <numbersusa.com>.
- <amren.com> reaches American Renaissance.
- *Politically Incorrect — An On-line Magazine* is at <cyad.com/cvgibin/pinc/july97/index.html>.

E-mail addresses for pertinent organizations:

- <fair@fairus.org> The Federation for American Immigration Reform
- <center@cis.org> Center for Immigration Studies (CIS)
- <103527.3545@compuserve.com> Negative Population Growth (NPG)
- <ccn@igc.apc.org> Carrying Capacity Network (CCN)
- <caps@calweb.com> Californians for Population Stabilization (CAPS)
- THE SOCIAL CONTRACT's e-mail address is <soccon@freeway.net>.

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